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Abstract 
The evolving possibilities of using new types of technology in emergency settings have made 
both the UN agencies and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) open their 
eyes for the potential benefits this can present for them in humanitarian emergencies. 
Especially information and communication technology (ICT) systems have been applied to 
ensure that the needs of the people at risk are being meet, through a reliable and efficient 
information management system across organizations. This explorative thesis will present, 
discuss and conclude the findings from our two fieldworks conducted in Lebanon in 
2014/2015. The empirical material has been collected from relevant governmental and 
humanitarian actors at field and national level as well as beneficiaries. Our study focuses on 
how ICT systems can contribute to reliable information management in the humanitarian 
response. Descriptive and normative theoretical perspectives within information processing 
have been applied to be able to describe how information management across levels in a 
hierarchical system either should be reliable, or how the organizational errors may lead the 
information processing to fail. In addition a theoretical perspective on how technological 
systems are diffused and adopted in the hierarchical system is used; this will shape the 
theoretical framework and guide the findings when answering the research questions and 
problem. The key findings in this thesis suggests that the official ICT systems in Lebanon are 
innovated and implemented in ways that do not make these compatible with the needs of all 
users across levels within the organizations. This is especially the case for the users at field 
level, who have identified different technological needs than what has been developed at 
national level. Findings also illuminate that when the ICT systems are not covering the 
existing needs it creates challenges for cross-organizational information processing as users 
starts to develop their own internal ICT systems to cover their needs, creating a fragmented 
information picture over needs and gaps across organizations. Further, the findings indicate 
that a lack of standardized ways of both sharing information, as well as organizations operate 
with their own set of information, further hampers the possibility for reliable information 
management. Lacking a holistic approach when performing assessments, the implementation 
of further interventions may not be according to the actual needs. The lack of a common 
approach, when handling information therefore limits the possibility, of having reliable 
information management through ICT systems in the humanitarian response in Lebanon.     
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1.0 Introduction 
 
For the last decade there have been an increased development and usage of technology. 
Technology has not only changed the way organizations and institutions operate, but also the 
entire social existence of life (Mørk, 2014). The spread of mobile phones, the rise of Internet 
and digital social media are enabling people to connect with each other across previously 
impenetrable divides. As people in both rich and poor countries are getting connected through 
these types of technology at an accelerating pace, humanitarian aid agencies are racing to 
understand how this can change the way they operate (IFRC, 2013; UN-OCHA, 2012). In the 
last years the usage of technology has increased in humanitarian operations, and developing it 
further is seen as essential within this field as it gives opportunities to improve information, 
analysis, coordination and other vital functions within the humanitarian field (IFRC, 2013). 
 
It is especially the development of information and communication technology (ICT) that has 
increased in recent years within humanitarian aid (IFRC, 2013). The term covers all devices 
used for communication, and all the different applications associated with the devices (Rouse, 
s.a). A number of ICT systems have already implemented within several humanitarian 
responses around the world (IFRC, 2013). ICT systems can detect the needs more rapidly 
than what previously was possible, predict the crises better, and ultimately increase the 
efficiency of response through pairing the resources to needs of communities at risk, leading 
to more accountability and transparency (IFRC, 2013; Ngang & Kuo, 2010; Saab, Tapia, 
Maitland, Maldonado, & Tchouakeu, 2013). In order for the ICT systems to detect the needs 
more rapidly and predict the crisis better than before, the information that is feed to the ICT 
system needs to be accurate. Accurate and timely access to information is crucial in a crisis 
(UN-OCHA, 2012), and the humanitarian assistance is driven by information in determining 
priorities and resource allocation (IFRC, 2013). Analyses of emergency responses in recent 
years have, regrettably, revealed poor information management, whereby the responders have 
been hamstrung by a severe lack of shared standards for information sharing (UN-OCHA, 
2012). However, the newly arisen technologies for information sharing in humanitarian 
operations offer humanitarian organizations the chance to address these shortfalls, as well as 
the possibility to get closer to the people they are seeking to effectively assist (Ergun, Gui, 
Stamm, Keskinocak, & Swann, 2014; Sandvik, Gabrielsen, Kalsrud, & Kaumann, 2014; UN-
OCHA, 2012). Nevertheless, the usage of ICT systems in humanitarian aid is a relatively new 
phenomenon, there currently are little or no systematic and standardized procedures for 
implementing them (IFRC, 2013).   1 
 Previous reports have, in particular, emphasized how the diffusion and adoption of 
humanitarian technology has allowed the crisis-affected population to state their needs in a 
new way (IFRC, 2013). The ways in which this affects the operational humanitarian 
organizations information management has, however, focused more on the tremendous 
advantages this gives in the efficient gathering of information. How the various organizations 
are going to manage to work together through these ICT systems has been given little or no 
attention. This is noteworthy, as several UN reports, and previous research has identified a 
lack of common standards for information management in humanitarian operations, which 
hampers the potential for efficient information processing in the response (Altay & Pal, 2014; 
Huesmann, 2006; Kruke & Olsen, 2005; UN-OCHA, 2012). Little attention has been given to 
how insufficient information management across organizations affects the optimization of 
these ICT systems in a crisis, though United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) did state in their 2012 report that humanitarian 
organizations were struggling to adjust to these new technological forms for crisis response 
management. In order to deliver aid according to the existing needs of the beneficiaries, the 
humanitarian response needs to be efficient, reliable and well-coordinated between 
organizations (Kruke & Olsen, 2005). Reliability can be seen as a mix of resilience and 
anticipation. Where a reliable humanitarian response will be able to predict and prevent 
potential dangers before the damage has occurred. If the damage is already done, however, 
the reliability in the response should have the capacity to cope with these dangers before they 
become manifest (Ibid). This means that for the ICT systems to fulfill its purpose it needs to 
enable the organizations to have reliable information management, where they can prevent 
and predict potential dangers, as well as cope with damages before it is manifested (Ibid). 
 
 
1.1 Background for choice of topic 
While humanitarian organizations are struggling to adjust to new technological systems (UN-
OCHA, 2012), the number of humanitarian emergencies around the world is increasing. 
Never in this century has there been more people escaping from their homes to save their 
lives. Today, at least 51, 2 million people have the status internal displaced person (IDP) or a 
refugee (Skretteberg & Lindstad, 2014). Syria is the biggest humanitarian emergency in our 
decade and have sent 7,6 million people on internal displacement, as well as 3.8 million 
identified Syrian refugees across the borders of the neighboring countries (NRC, 2015). 
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Lebanon is the country that has received the most number of refugees compared to their 
population and geographical area. The situation in Lebanon today demands an international 
humanitarian response as it has 1,183,327 registered refugees (UNHCR, s.a-b) 
 
Powered by technologies such as ICT systems, humanitarian actors can engage in disaster 
response at an unprecedented level, where if they manage to work together, they can provide 
aggregated and analyzed information that improve humanitarian relief for the increasing 
numbers of refugees and IDPs (HHI, 2011), as they can access more accurate, timely and 
reliable information, through adapting to new data sources (UN-OCHA, 2012). ICT systems 
was already used by humanitarian actors after the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 (Heinzelman & 
Waters, 2010).  Yet this humanitarian response was considered a failure, due to the 
fragmented nature of the response, and the use of hierarchical models of information 
management (Altay & Labonte, 2014). There is a growing recognition of the critical role 
information management can play in formulating efficient humanitarian relief operations 
(Ibid). Previous research has however focus more on two-way communication with the 
affected population (Heinzelman & Waters, 2010; HHI, 2011; IFRC, 2013; UN-OCHA, 2012; 
Veil, Buehner, & Palenchar, 2011). This has contributed to valuable knowledge about how the 
ICT systems can be further developed, in ways that allows the affected population to 
disseminate information about their actual needs. However, there is until now no profound 
research that aims to answer how these ICT systems can be adjusted to the needs of the 
humanitarian organizations, and how this in combination with the humanitarian system 
obstruct or promote the possibility for the ICT systems to fulfill its intended purpose. Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) stated in their Disaster Relief 2.0 report (2011) that the rapid 
development of ICT tools made it increasingly difficult to handle information, due to poorly 
adapted tools training and strategies, therefore it is seen as important to examine how these 
tools are spread and implemented in a humanitarian response. In addition as the humanitarian 
system consist of different actors that have inconsistent approaches with regards to practices 
and beliefs, as well as their view on the role of international aid (HHI, 2011). Therefore it is 
important to explore how the establishment of ICT systems could create reliability in terms of 
information management in a humanitarian response, because it presents a profound 
possibility to grasp old problems with a new systematic and common way of sharing 
information. As Lebanon currently is facing a tremendous humanitarian crisis, and has 
implemented several ICT systems for information management, it was our possibility to 
examine the challenges and advantages presented throughout section 0.1 and 1.1 further. 
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 1.2 Research problem and operational research questions  
Using ICT systems in a crisis offers profound advantages in disseminating crucial information 
across humanitarian organizations (UN-OCHA, 2012). Communication technology does, 
however, become problematized by the differences in culture, lack of shared standards and 
the absence of operational protocol: thus rendering it difficult for diverse humanitarian 
organizations to work together (Ibid). Therefore, based on these assertions it is reasonable to 
investigate this further to see how the organizations and the ICT systems are able to contend 
with this. To investigate such issues the following research problem has been established:   
  
How do ICT systems contribute to reliable information management in the humanitarian 
response in Lebanon?  
 
In order for the ICT systems in a humanitarian response to contribute to reliable information 
management, the system needs to be diffused and fully adopted by all relevant users. To 
achieve its purpose of providing timely and accurate information, it needs to be structured and 
clear information processing between the humanitarian actors.  A fully diffused and adopted 
ICT system that is based on structured and clear information, will then lead the assessments, 
planned activities, and implementation of interventions to be reliable and meet the actual 
needs. This is ultimately what information management in a humanitarian response seeks to 
accomplish. So that when re-assessing the affected population, there is a link between needs 
that have been meet and gaps that needs to be further addressed. Three operational research 
questions have been developed, to answer how ICT systems does contribute to reliable 
information management in the humanitarian response in Lebanon. The research questions are 
respectively: 
 
1) How is the diffusion and adoption of ICT systems in Lebanon?  
2) How is the information processing among humanitarian actors in Lebanon?  
3) What is the relation between the assessments, the planned activities and the 
implementation of interventions in the humanitarian response in Lebanon?  
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1.3 Limitations 
 
The limited capacity and scale of this thesis made it necessary to delimit what areas this 
research would examine. The theoretical framework presented in chapter 3 in this thesis has 
set boundaries for the area of focus, and therefore limits how the empirical findings are 
presented and discussed. The research has been conducted in Lebanon in 2014/2015, and 
especially UN agencies, INGOs headquarters in Beirut have been the main focus of 
informants. The research does however also consider the Ministry of Social Affairs, NGOs 
and to a degree also beneficiaries. This thesis seeks to understand and describe the 
humanitarian response mechanism, and is therefore limited to the response mechanism in 
Lebanon. The theoretical stance is framed by Rasmussen’s (1997) socio-technical systems. 
This function as a superior framework to see how the information processing is horizontal and 
vertical through levels in Lebanon. The strategic level of humanitarian agencies globally will 
not be discussed in this study due to limited access and time. Moreover the thesis is limit to 
the diffusion, adoption and innovation processes in organizations by Rogers (2003) diffusion 
of innovation, meaning that the initiation phase of technology will not be considered. For 
information processing Turner’s (1976) understanding of incubation period is applied, and 
not the trigger to the crisis or the crisis in itself, but rather how the way of operating may lead 
the humanitarian response towards a new crisis. The research was conducted in a “window of 
time”, the planned modifications set for the response mechanism during 2015 are not the 
focus in this thesis. Changes in the humanitarian system and the official ICT systems are 
therefore not taken into account, as it was not possible to describe actions that were not 
implemented yet. 
 
Certain terms are used frequently throughout this thesis; therefore it is necessary to clarify the 
meaning of them. Information management in this thesis is based upon UN-OCHA’s 
definition: how humanitarian actors collect, analyze and share information in the response 
(UN-OCHA, s.a-a). Humanitarian actors are all actors working with the humanitarian 
response such as UN agencies, INGOs, NGOs. The Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) is also 
a part of the humanitarian response, but are not considered as a humanitarian actor in this 
thesis. Implementing partners is humanitarian organizations funded by the UN. The UN 
delegates assignments for these partners to implement. Official ICT systems are the 
technological systems innovated for inter-agency usage and are developed for the entire 
humanitarian response; these are ActivityInfo, RAIS and maps from the inter-agency (ref 
5.1.1). Internal ICT systems are technological solutions innovated and developed for the  5 
internal usage within one organization or level. This thesis will describe the humanitarian 
response through field, national and strategic level. The field level is used to describe the 
humanitarian actors that works in the field and daily interfere with the beneficiaries. The 
national level is the various United Nation agencies (UN), International Non-Governmental 
Organizations (INGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working at their 
respective headquarters. It will be specified and distinguished when it is necessary who the 
actors at national level are. These humanitarian actors manage and control, executor 
interventions that are implemented by the field level. The strategic level is the various UN 
agencies and INGOs at their respective headquarters globally, and they establish strategies for 
the national level. The operational level will be use as a collective term for humanitarian 
actors working both at their respective headquarters and at field level as they have a role in 
both field and national level.  
1.4 Previous research  
Even though previous research has not focused on the same topics as in this thesis, there has 
been extensive research performed within crisis communication, information sharing and the 
usage of technological solutions before, during and after crises. Previous research within 
communication has highlighted communication as an increasingly important function in 
emergency management (Coombs, 2015; Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2011; Quarantelli, 
1997; Seeger & Sellnow, 2013). The World Disaster Report (IFRC, 2013) focused on how 
information and communication technology can assist international and national actors, 
government, civil society organizations and communities more efficiently in preventing, 
mitigating, and preparing for crises.  However several researches has stated that  
when implementing these into humanitarian responses there has been a distinct lack of 
common standardization and regulation internally within organizations, particularly in terms 
of data security when protecting the beneficiaries personal data (Karlsrud, Jumbert, & 
Sandvik, 2014). The usage of technology in crisis management was also seen as an efficient 
resource to gather data, but the technology should not replace the basic aid assistance (Mørk, 
2014). In the IFRC World Disasters Report, findings stated that despite the benefits of using 
technology in humanitarian aid, the poorest population and local NGOs might not have access 
to these types of technology. Making the overall communication and power balance unequal 
in a crisis response (IFRC, 2013). 
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Previous research on technological systems is not only prominent in humanitarian aid, but 
also within governmental institutions. A recent published master thesis examined the usage of 
the social media platform Twitter within the Norwegian police.  Their findings indicated that 
the police lacked guidelines and standards when informing the public trough Twitter (Ranum 
& Andersen, 2014). These findings were also revealed in a study on crisis communication 
through micro blogging in five Norwegian municipalities (Høgestøl, 2014). Similarly, 
Åsveen’s (2014) study of Crowd Innovations found a lack of insufficient knowledge with 
regards to technical skills, training and equipment, and mistrust to crowd-generated data 
(Åsveen, 2014). These previous research topics indicate that there exist profound 
shortcomings with regards to standardization, guidelines and regulation when implementing 
and utilizing technological solutions before, during and after a crisis, and for crisis 
communication. As this is a relatively new phenomenon extensive research needs to be 
conducted on the topic. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
In addition to this introductory chapter, this thesis will consist of six main chapters. Chapter 
two presents the outer and inner contexts this thesis is embedded in. The ‘outer’ context 
describes the characteristics of Lebanon and its current situation, and the ‘inner’ context being 
the humanitarian system operating in Lebanon, with its structures, standards, guidelines and 
values that will present the degree of external validity - how it is possible to transfer the 
findings to another context. Chapter three presents the theoretical stance, and the three main 
theories: The socio-technical system (Rasmussen, 1997), as a hieratic model shaping the 
humanitarian system, the diffusion of innovation (Rogers, 2003), aiming to describe how ICT 
systems spread and are adopted, and failure of foresight (Turner, 1976), to explain the 
difficulties of information processing in a socio-technical system. Chapter four will explain 
the research process and the methodological considerations encountered during the two 
fieldworks, and how the process of this research has been conducted. The external validity 
will also be explained here. Chapter five presents the main findings from the conducted 
fieldworks in Lebanon and is organized by relevance of themes, and, cumulatively, this 
shapes the foundation for further discussion. Finally, this will be discussed in chapter six 
through the theoretical lenses, which are structured based upon the research questions, with 
subchapters that answer the research questions sequentially. Chapter seven presents the 
conclusion of the main findings as well the aspects that are consider to require further 
research. 
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2.0 Context  
This chapter elaborates the key elements of the context in which the thesis is grounded in 
regarding the empirical material collected before, during and after the two fieldworks. The 
methodological choices and considerations are further explained in chapter 4. As the subject 
of the thesis is to examine how ICT systems contribute to reliable information management in 
the humanitarian response in Lebanon, we studied this within its real-life context (Yin, 2014), 
there should, therefore, be a distinction between the ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ context (Kruke, 2010). 
The ‘outer’ context is understood as the real-life setting, meaning the historical, and present 
aspects limited to the context of Lebanon. The ‘inner’ context is here understood as the 
organizational structures, guidelines, standards, statuses and responsibilities that the 
humanitarian actors work within (Kruke, 2010). The ‘inner’ context presents the humanitarian 
operation mechanism in conjunction with other humanitarian operations in the world. The 
external validity is therefore presented through the factors of the ‘inner’ context, as these 
present the ability to transfer the finding to other contexts (Kruke, 2010). 
 
2.1 The ‘outer’ context – complex emergency?  
UN-OCHA defines complex emergencies as: 
 
A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable 
breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflicts and which requires an 
international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or 
the ongoing United Nations country program (IASC (1994) as cited in Kruke & Olsen, 
2005:275).  
 
The ‘outer’ context of Lebanon will now be presented, with the influx of refugees, political 
instability, and social tensions. This will finish with a conclusion and an explanation of 
whether these aspects can be in accordance with what UN-OCHA defines as a complex 
emergency.  
2.1.1 Refugees in Lebanon 
The four-year civil war in Syria has led to the most serious humanitarian crisis yet seen this 
century. Approximately 2.6 million displaced Syrians were registered by the United Nations 
High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) in the surrounding countries by the end of April 
2014 (Skretteberg & Lindstad, 2014). By 21st January 2015 the total number of registered 
refugees had increased to over 3.7 million. By the 7th May 2015, Lebanon had 1,183,327  8 
registered Syrian refugees in the country (UNHCR, s.a-b).  The total amount of refugees in 
Lebanon is, however, vague as there is presumed to be several hundred thousand unregistered 
Syrian refugees in the country who, for various reasons, have chosen not to register with 
UNHCR. As of May 6th 2015 the possibility to register new refugees in Lebanon was, 
anyway, prohibited by the Lebanese government, leaving the refugees that are not yet 
registered unable to get any form of assistance through the official UN response mechanism. 
In addition to Syrian refugees there are also around half a million Palestinian refugees 
dispersed across the country (Skretteberg & Lindstad, 2014). This is because the Lebanese 
government is not a member in the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees, nor 
they have not signed the 1976 Protocol, which means that displaced Syrians are not officially 
acknowledged as refugees (LCRP, 2015). The Lebanese government does not wish to 
increase the tension between different societal groups as the public holds diverse views 
towards the current civil war in Syria. Building new refugee camps has therefore not been 
possible as yet (Skretteberg & Lindstad, 2014). The humanitarian actors have, therefore, 
distributed tents to the refugees and they have set up informal tented settlements (ITS) 
themselves on rented land. The land where tents are set up is owned by landlords that take a 
minimum of 200 dollars a month per tent.  
 
   
Figure 2.1 Photos of the ITS in Lebanon. Source: Jensen & Lura, 2015. 
 
Currently there are 1900 ITSs known of by the humanitarian organizations. As no formal 
camps exist, the refugees are scattered over the entire country, making it extremely difficult to  9 
know the precise locations. In addition to the ITS, large numbers of refugees from Syria have 
rented garages, terraces or rooms from the local populations. The living conditions are close 
to unbearable as access to clean water, proper shelter as well as the proper hygiene are 
constant challenges. The local population that have agreed to rent out rooms or garages get 
money from the UN organizations as compensation or have a two year agreement whereby 
the UN obligates them to fix problematic conditions in their household if they provide 
housing. There are also a huge number of refugees living rough on the streets and under 
bridges as well as in dumps, as they are not receiving any form of support through the UN 
system. The Palestinian camps have also become a shelter for a lot of Syrian refugees, as the 
rent cost for a room in these camps is comparatively cheap.  
2.1.2 The pressure put on Lebanon as a country 
The four years of the Syrian civil war has left Lebanon on the verge of total collapse as a 
functioning society (LCRP, 2015). This has caused an increase in social tensions as well as an 
impossible pressure on public services. This instability has also impacted heavily upon the 
economy and resulted in higher levels of unemployment (LCRP, 2015) as well as a growing 
political polarization between the different actors, affecting the country’s overall stability 
(Skretteberg & Lindstad, 2014).  
The massive influx of refugees coming from Syria to escape the war has put significant 
pressure on the Lebanese government, as they do not have the resources to cope. As one of 
the informant’s states: “Mainly we have more man-made hazards than natural hazards, this is 
the interesting thing in Lebanon” (Country coordinator, local NGO). The Syrian spillover has 
resulted in that the international humanitarian community and the UN is now operating in 
Lebanon to assist the Lebanese government.  
 
The situation in Lebanon is unique in many ways. Before the civil war started in 1975, the 
country, with its urban setting and richness of culture, was seen as the Paris of the Middle 
East. During the civil war the country was in recession but after the civil war ended in 1990 
the country again became a popular holiday destination (Tveit, 2011). After the breakout war 
with Israel in 2006, and the recent spillover of the Syrian crisis, the country has yet again 
faced setbacks. Even though Lebanon is heading towards a total collapse, it should be 
mentioned that several informants thought that the fact that Lebanon has managed to remain 
intact through these four years demonstrates the country’s strength. Several informants 
praised the Lebanese people for how they had welcomed the Syrians and taken great care of 
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them. Despite this, the situation has come to a point where the line of tolerance has been 
crossed. Informants from both a national level and field level reported an increased tension 
between refugees and the host community is developing and fear for the future if the crisis 
doesn't come to an end. The informants see the only solution for this is peace in Syria and the 
consequent return of the refugees. The international and local humanitarian actors described 
the current context as a complex and difficult crisis to manage. The challenges in Lebanon 
identified by informants are political instability, geographical location, infrastructure and 
social tension. These identified challenges are further elaborated below. 
 
2.1.3 Political instability and geographical location  
   
Figure 2.2. Map of Lebanon. (LonelyPlanet, s.a)   
Lebanon has a very fragile political system, one which is based on the diversity of the present 
religions in the country. After the country became independent from France in 1943, a 
political covenant was established to regulate the division of power between the different 
ethnic groups in the country (Tveit, 2011). After Israel was established in 1948, several 
hundred thousand Palestinians relocated to Lebanon, and, due to the ongoing situation 
between Israelis and Palestinians, they have not been able to return. This has been a heavy 
burden for Lebanon to carry, as they never had the capacity to handle the influx of the 
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Palestinian refugees (Tveit, 2011). Additionally, it should be noted that one informant 
credited the government for managing to maintain the country’s stability: “The government 
and the politicians should be given credit for managing to maintain the country stable. If they 
succeed they can learn other countries how it is done, how they succeeded and how it’s 
possible to grow” (Head of office, UN agency). This means that even if Lebanon, as a 
country, is struggling, they have managed to stay intact as a nation. Currently, the government 
of Lebanon is reluctant to accept refugees as legal citizens, as they fear for the consequences 
this will have for the already unstable political situation. In 2014 the massive influx of 
refugees from Syria reached the political actor’s frontier, leading them close the borders 
(LCRP, 2015). In addition to this the refugees are not allowed to work, or build homes, and, 
given the fact that there are almost 1.2 million registered Syrian refugees, as well as the 
alleged eight hundred thousand unregistered ones, it has become impossible for the 
government to address this systematically. The tents they put up are torn down again, but as 
the numbers of people are so high many areas go unnoticed. The humanitarian aid 
organizations are struggling to come to agreement with the political actors to find ways that 
do not leave the refugees going unassisted. However, the restriction still remains, and the 
creation of new refugee camps has not yet been approved.  
 
On top of Syrian crisis, there is the issue of IS1 and Al-Nusra2 trying to infiltrate the borders. 
In August 2014, IS managed to take over a town, Arsal, close to the Syrian border 
(TheDailyStar, 2014). Numerous civilians as well as military personnel were kidnapped. At 
the beginning of 2015 the situation worsened and the Lebanese military as well as the 
political party, Hezbollah, are fighting daily along the border to prevent a full-scale war. The 
local population in Lebanon stated that they are thus preparing themselves for yet another 
war, but are hoping that local militant groups such as Hezbollah will be able to protect them. 
In addition there has been recent unrest between Israel and Hezbollah, creating further 
instability (Samaha, 2015). Lebanon and Israel have a painful history of constant distrust, and 
the vulnerable relationship has escalated to clashes several times before (Tveit, 2011), leaving 
the local population uncertain about the future. 
 
1 IS – Islamic State is a terror organization originating from Al Qaeda in 1999, and are sought to establish a Caliphate as an Islamic State. Operates in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria (Leerand, 2015) 2 Al- Nusra is a terror organization that also branches from Al Qaeda that operates in Syria and Lebanon (Leerand, 2014).   12 
                                                        
2.1.4 Infrastructure 
One professor, working within environment and infrastructure, said that due to political 
disunity the country had suffered from poor electrical and water services. While Beirut only 
suffers power cuts for six hours a day, the rest of the country can only be guaranteed three to 
six hours electricity a day, relying heavily on diesel aggregates to provide it. The water supply 
is also limited and polluted, resulting in lack of access to safe water for both the local 
population and the refugees. With the high influx of refugees the infrastructure has been 
overwhelmed, creating even more frequent electricity shutdowns. In addition to water and 
electricity issues, waste management is also overburdened and, when talking to the mayors in 
Lebanon, they identified waste management as their biggest concern at the moment, as there 
is no capacity to handle it. The fragile infrastructure has also increased the tension between 
the local population and the refugees. 
 
 2.1.5 Social tension and informal settlements 
“In Lebanon everyone like each other, but everyone hate each other at the same time, this 
makes the situation schizophrenic” (Professor at local university). This quote is a good 
explanation of the current situation in Lebanon.  During the Lebanese civil war many 
Lebanese stayed with Syrians in Syria (Tveit, 2011), and when the war started in Syria the 
Lebanese felt obligated to return the favor, but after four years the hospitality is starting to 
come to an end. The massive influx of Syrians has created social tensions and conflict 
between the local population and the refugees. The unemployment rate has increased 
drastically as the employers have started to hire refugees who will work for lower wages, 
creating tension as the local population start to lose their jobs, and are struggling to pay for 
their housing. At the same time, many refugees that have the same living conditions as the 
local population receive monthly contributions to pay their rent, which has increased the 
tension even further. A large part of the Lebanese population lives beneath the poverty line3, 
and the areas where they live are also the areas where refugees have most frequently rented 
rooms.  A mayor in a municipality in Lebanon expressed concerns for the future of the 
Lebanese people because of this: “What I fear the most is the future. I fear that there is no 
future for the Lebanese people and no jobs”. The informant is referring to the results of the 
high influx of the refugees.  
3  Two-thirds of the population in Lebanon are currently living below the national poverty line (UNHCR, 2015).   13 
                                                        
The increased tension have resulted in refugees changing their Syrian accent, and refusing to 
allow aid workers to visit their rented rooms, in fear of what the neighbors would do if they 
found out that they were Syrians. The situation is now to the point where it’s seen as socially 
acceptable to attack Syrians. The humanitarian actors are working in co-operation with the 
government to reduce this tension, and the new response plan LCRP 2015-2016 (ref footnote 
in 2.2.2) seeks to focus both on development needs and humanitarian needs.  
 
2.1.6 Complex emergency  
The situation in Lebanon has been highly affected by the four year war in Syria, with its 
massive influx of refugees, poor infrastructure, and political instability leading to social 
tension.  It now appears to be approaching a tipping-point where Lebanon is close to a 
substantial breakdown, and they are in need of an international humanitarian response that 
goes beyond the mandate and capacity of any single organization or the UN country program 
(IASC, 1994). The situation in Lebanon is not the result of an internal conflict, even if there is 
ongoing internal conflicts in the country. Nonetheless, it has increased social tensions 
between the Lebanese and Syrians, and assaults and attacks occur daily. The emergency in 
Lebanon is clearly as a result of the conflict in Syria, and the country would not be in need of 
a significant humanitarian response if it weren’t for this. There is not a civil war in Lebanon, 
nor a cross border one, but the situation in Lebanon can be defined as a complex emergency 
due to all aspects presented in this subchapter. 
 
2.2 The ‘inner’ context  
While the ‘outer’ context of this research is limited to Lebanon, the ‘inner’ context will have 
some common features and structures recognizable in other emergency responses globally. 
The informants from the humanitarian organizations are the same organizations that are 
operating in other emergencies in the world, and all are obligated to work by the same codes 
and guidelines. Therefore the aspects presented throughout this subchapter contributes to 
illuminate the external validity of this thesis (Kruke, 2010). 
 
2.2.1 Coordination of the humanitarian response in Lebanon 
In 2014, MoSA and UNHCR were the overall leaders of the humanitarian response in 
Lebanon. Originally in humanitarian emergencies, it is UN-OCHA that has the responsibility 
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for bringing the humanitarian actors together to ensure a coherent response to the emergency 
(UN-OCHA, s.a-d). This is what differentiates the humanitarian structure in Lebanon from 
the common humanitarian structure, and may reduce the extent of external validity of the 
thesis. In the initial phase of the emergency in Lebanon, the crisis was classified as a purely 
refugee response, therefore the overall coordination mandate was given to UNHCR, as their 
area of expertise is to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide (UNHCR, 
2013b). In humanitarian emergencies the coordination body of the response is usually UN-
OCHA, as it is their mandate to coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in 
partnership with national and international actors (UN-OCHA, s.a-d). In order to ensure a 
coherent response and avoid omissions UN-OCHA developed the Cluster approach to define 
and forge partnerships between the NGOs, INGOs, UN agencies, national and local 
authorities, and the civil society. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, in each of 
the main sectors of humanitarian action, such as health, or education and consist of both UN 
and non-UN organizations (UN-OCHA, s.a-c). Since UNHCR is the overall coordination lead 
in Lebanon, the Cluster approach has not been implemented, but UNHCR has implemented 
Sector Working Groups (SWG) which is further elaborated in section 2.2.2. The main 
difference between the SWG and the Cluster approach is the accountability. The Cluster 
approach has global cluster leads in each division of aid; these are accountable for national 
and global clusters. When organizations participate in a cluster at national or field level, they 
are obligated to follow-up and respond to the identify issues agreed in the cluster meetings. In 
SWG in Lebanon there is no international lead accountable for the sector, and it is not 
mandatory for all actors in the sector to follow-up identified issues at national or field level. 
However, implementing partners that receive funding from the official response mechanism 
are obligated to follow-up. UNHCR has three roles in Lebanon. In addition to being the 
coordination body of the response, the agency also functions as a donor for other 
humanitarian organizations, as well as managing their own programs within the various 
sectors they lead. The main role of UN-OCHA in Lebanon is the humanitarian financial 
tracking system and the role of supporting the Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident 
Coordinator4, which, in Lebanon, is delegated to one individual. UNHCR has a mandate for 
the protection of Syrian refugees and is assisting the coordination efforts with the government 
through co-leading the inter-agency coordination structure with MoSA, with the support of 
4 Humanitarian coordinator and resident coordinator in a humanitarian response has the responsibility to ensure effective coordination of humanitarian action in the field (UN-OCHA, s.a-b).  15 
                                                        
the Humanitarian Country Team5 (HCT) The government of Lebanon has deployed regional 
coordinators to support the overall coordination in the eight different sectors of: Water, 
hygiene and sanitation (WASH), Shelter, Public Health, Social Cohesion6, Protection, Non-
food items7, Food Security and Education. The following table shows the sectors and the 
leading agencies in these sectors in Lebanon (RRP, 2014). 
 
Sector Lead 
Public Health UNHCR and WHO 
WASH UNHCR and UNICEF 
Shelter UNHCR and MoSA 
Social Cohesion MoSA and UNDP 
Protection UNHCR and MoSA 
Non Food Items UNHCR 
Food Security  WFP and MoSA 
Education UNHCR and UNICEF 
 
Table 2.3 Sectors and leading agencies in Lebanon (RRP, 2014).  
 
The responsibilities that the different actors have in a country is jointly agreed upon through 
contracts and international agreements, and this will form the basis of their mandate in the 
country (Kruke, 2010; RRP, 2014). However, the mandate of the organizations will differ 
based on context and operational situation (Adinolfi, Bassiouni, Williams, & Lauritzen, 
2005).The response plan for Lebanon in 2014 was jointly developed between the government, 
UN agencies and NGO partners. 51 international and local NGOs participated in the response 
as implementing partners (RRP, 2014). The main INGOs in Lebanon are Norwegian Refugee 
Council, Danish Refugee Council, ACTED, International Red Cross, Save the Children, Care 
International, and REACH Initiative. The main UN agencies working in Lebanon are United 
Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program (WFP), United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), and World Health Organization (WHO).  
 
The UN agencies, INGOs and NGOs all have different mandates that function as terms of 
reference for their operations and this depends on their area of expertise. In Lebanon there 
exist Syrian refugees and Palestinian refugees (ref 2.1.1) and the mandate to coordinate the 
two groups is divided between UNHCR, which has as mentioned the mandate for the Syrian 
5 Humanitarian county team is a decision-making and oversight forum in humanitarian emergencies. Lead by the humanitarian coordinator in the respective country (UN-OCHA, s.a-c) 6 Social cohesion meaning “the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding polarization” (COE, 2004). 7 Non-food items often mean items such as medicines, blankets, clothing, ovens etc. (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005).  16 
                                                        
refugees. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency assist the Palestinian refugees from 
Palestine (UNRWA). This agency has assisted the Palestinians in Lebanon since 1948 
(UNRWA, s.a). UNDP focuses on the country’s stabilization (RRP, 2014). The INGOs and 
NGOs focus is restricted to their expertise, and the funding they receive from UNHCR or 
donor specific contributions to their organization. Some INGOs and NGOs are mandate based 
related to water, children, shelter, food, stabilization etc., while others are need-based: 
meaning they cover the various needs. There are profound differences between mandates and 
standards which organizations follow internally. All of the informants stated that their 
dissimilar mandates and different internal standards might affect the coordination and co-
operation structure, as they don’t have one common standardized working method. In 
humanitarian responses there is no agency with overall authority, except the Lebanese 
government. This creates difficulties, as there is no forcing-mechanism to ensure that 
everyone co-operates and coordinates in standardized ways, yet they are obligated to work by 
international guidelines/standards. These principles are called the Code of Conduct for the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs (Hilhorst, 2005). The CoC 
was published in 1994 and brings together the principles of humanity, independence, 
neutrality and impartiality that humanitarian organizations should work by (Hilhorst, 2005).  
 
Similarly, there is the Sphere Handbook (2011) with core standards that outline the processes 
and approaches necessary for an effective response. These standards focus on capacity, active 
participation of the beneficiaries, comprehensive analysis of the current state, effective 
coordination and appropriate and skilled aid workers as being essential for a humanitarian 
response. In Lebanon the humanitarian organizations are obligated to work under these 
guidelines, standards and principles, which increase the external validity of this thesis as these 
are superior for all humanitarian organizations working in an emergency response. 
Additionally, there are other common features that humanitarian actors are built upon: the 
organizational structure, the different status and responsibilities that the actors create 
internally and externally in organizations in order to coordinate the response (Kruke, 2010). 
The roles that the staff from the different organizations are divided into are designated a 
specific status, which vary from coordinators, information managers (IM), field officers, and 
country directors, and are assigned different degrees of responsibility and decision-making 
authority. In Lebanon the designated statuses are similar to statuses in other humanitarian 
emergencies, the difference here is as mentioned that the lead agency being UNHCR, and 
implementing SWG instead of the Cluster approach.  
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2.2.2 Sector working groups   
SWG is based on many of the same premises as the Cluster approach, but a key difference is 
the sector lead, which is UNHCR in almost all sectors in Lebanon. There is one SWG within 
each of the operating sectors (see table 2.2), with the sectors divided into five operational 
areas: the North, South, Mount Lebanon, Beirut and Bekaa. The SWG is lead by the sector 
leads (see table 2.2). The working groups have meetings on both national and field levels. In 
addition to the SWG there are Inter-Agency meetings in operation within each sector. These 
meetings are held at both national and at field level within each operational area. All 
humanitarian organizations can attend all meetings, and the monthly schedule for the 
meetings is displayed on UNHCR’s Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal (UNHCR, s.a-b).   
Several informants at national level emphasized that if the Cluster approach had been 
implemented the lead in the different sectors would not be UNHCR, but other UN agencies 
with expertise in the designated area. The sectors would then be co-lead by INGOs or NGOs. 
In the response plan for 2014 it was stated that UNHRC would pursue improvements to 
coordinate arrangements in partnership with other agencies. The coordination of the response 
was going to be strengthened in decentralized areas by reinforcing the capacity of field SWG 
to lead the implementation and monitoring the response plan. This was going to increase the 
engagement of the NGOs and the affected population (RRP, 2014, p. 10). In addition to this, 
the SWG structure particularly emphasizes tight coordination within the division of aid across 
geographical areas.  
 
2.2.3 Information management 
In the response plan for 2014, the capacity of coordination staff would be strengthened, to 
ensure that partners receive timely and relevant information to inform their response, and to 
nurture the cooperation with INGOs and NGOs (RRP, 2014, p. 10).   
The government of Lebanon and UNHCR has established an Inter-Agency (IA) mechanism to 
coordinate the response and the IA is supported by an Information Management working 
group (IMWG). The participation in IMWG is open for all information managers within 
humanitarian organizations performing interventions (RRP, 2014). These meetings are held 
once a month at national level in Lebanon. UNHCR chair the IMWG meetings and the IM 
staff that work within each sector are encouraged to attend. Each sector has one dedicated IM 
that is employed by UNHCR, UNICEF, or WFP. The role of this IM is to spread information 
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vertically and horizontally in the response within their sector, as well as working with ICT 
system awareness among the actors in their sector. The IMWG is a coordination group and 
they facilitate humanitarian activities through improving data collection, data standards and 
analysis as well as the dissemination of information. When specific tasks arise, the IMWG 
establishes a target-working group. The target groups and IMWG provide tools for better 
information management for the operational humanitarian actors both nationally and 
internationally (UNHCR, s.a-a). A humanitarian response needs to be based on coherent and 
contextualized assessments, monitoring and evaluation that aims to analyze the needs, 
vulnerabilities and capacities (TheSphereProject, 2011).  In Lebanon the humanitarian 
response mechanism implemented prioritization and targeted aid assistance across all sectors, 
to protect and meet basic life-saving needs of the most vulnerable beneficiaries. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Photo of targeted assistance in Lebanon: source Jensen & Lura, 2015. 
 
 Targeted assistance was going to improve monitoring and enable the humanitarian 
organizations to adjust their programs to needs identified through mapping and reassessing 
areas where the highest population of vulnerable beneficiaries exist. This was initiated in 
order to allow the humanitarian partners to better geographically target their intervention 
(RRP, 2014). In the response plan for Lebanon in 2014 it was also stated: 
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Regardless of the method of delivering assistance, the need to ensure effective 
monitoring and outreach is recognized, both to ensure effective use of resources, but 
also as a critical safeguard to ensure that vulnerable refugees are identified and 
reached. This will be done through household visits; information provided by host 
communities, local authorities and front-line services providers; information gathered 
during registration verification exercises; and, through the expansion of refugee 
volunteers (RRP, 2014, p. 9). 
 
 
This was going to improve the coordination of the humanitarian response in accordance to the 
actual needs of the refugees, and improve the information sharing across organizations 
working in the response. The tools developed and used by the humanitarian actors in Lebanon 
are elaborated in the empirical findings see sub-chapter 5.1.1. The challenge now in Lebanon 
is that there has been a shift, and the crisis is no longer defined as a purely refugee crisis, but 
also a humanitarian and a development crisis, that needs to be managed not just by UNHCR, 
but also MoSA and UNDP. MoSA will therefore be the overall leader of the response 8 
(ICVA, s.a; LCRP, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
8As of January 2015 the Lebanon Crisis Resilience Plan 2015-2016 was launched. This plan defines the 
government of Lebanon’s Crisis Cell as the highest national authority for all the international partners inside the 
Lebanese territory. The Ministry of Social Affairs is mandated by the Crisis Cell to oversee the government 
response to the crisis in collaboration with the RC/HC and in co-operation with the Crisis Cell and the lead UN 
agencies UNDP within stabilization and UNHCR for refugees. The activities within the new LCRP plan are 
coordinated through Sector Working Groups held by line ministries, with support by the UN, INGO and NGO 
partners.  The plan is not fully implemented yet, but the actors are, as of February 2015, divided into their roles 
and planning the way forward into fully integrating the plan (LCRP, 2015).  20 
                                                        
3.0 Theoretical framework    
This chapter presents the theoretical framework selected for this research: by which the 
information management in the humanitarian response in Lebanon, is analytically interpreted 
in order to address the research problem. This theory will be essential when discussing the 
findings of the research problem in this thesis, as it sets the framework for how the social 
world is envisage through the actors’ interpretation. The research problem is: How do ICT 
systems contribute to reliable information management in the humanitarian response in 
Lebanon?  
  
Part 3.1 presents the definition of reliability. This is further explained in part 3.2 through Jens 
Rasmussens’ (1997) Socio-technical system, as a normative model describing how the system 
can be reliable in terms of creating a closed feedback loop of information flow between 
levels, through technological systems, human behavior and organizational structures. Part 3.3 
presents the diffusion of innovation by Everett M. Rogers (2003), and explains how 
innovations spread to individuals and organizations, as well as discussing how organizations 
innovate and implement innovations.  Part 3.4 presents the understanding of Barry Turner 
(1976) Failure of foresight as a descriptive theory, explaining how accidents occur through 
organizational failures when processing information. This chapter ends with a theoretical 
conclusion in part 3.5.  
 
3.1 Reliability   
In this thesis, reliability will be based on the reliability to improve management in complex 
emergencies. Earlier definitions claimed that reliability had the main focus for an “unusual 
capacity to produce collective outcomes of a certain minimum quality repeatedly” (Hannan 
and Freeman (1984) as cited in Kruke & Olsen, 2005 p. 283), but Kruke & Olsen (2005) 
stress the fact that this definition does not incorporate the constant and unexpected flow of 
events that can be found in complex emergencies. Kruke & Olsen (2011) therefore claim that 
the environment of complex emergencies is one calling for situational awareness, also called 
mindfulness. This is only possible with a reliable seeking strategy that, due to the rapidly 
changing environment, combines both resilience and anticipation (Kruke & Olsen, 2005). 
Anticipation is defined as “prediction and prevention of potential dangers before damage is 
done “ (Wildavsky, 1991). This is possible in complex emergencies because their nature is 
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creeping and not unexpected. Even if it is not possible to prevent a complex emergency, it is 
possible to reduce the consequences or prevent the situation from developing into full-scale 
complex emergencies with all of these characteristics (Kruke & Olsen, 2005). Resilience is 
defined as the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest 
(Wildavsky, 1991), and studies have shown that this appears to be the coping strategy during 
complex emergencies (Kruke & Olsen, 2005). Based on the definitions of resilience and 
anticipation, and seeing this as the base of reliability in humanitarian operations, then 
reliability will be to predict and prevent potential dangers before the damage has occurred. If 
the damage is already done, however, the reliability in the response should have the capacity 
to cope with these dangers before they become manifest (Ibid).  
  
3.2 The socio- technical system   
Rasmussen (1997) has developed a system-oriented model for risk management in dynamic 
societies. The model is based on three shaping behavior mechanisms: work system 
constraints, boundaries of acceptable performance, and the subjective criteria guiding 
adoption to change (Olsen & Scharffscher, 2004; Rasmussen, 1997). The model for shaping 
the behavior mechanism is the socio-technical system, incorporating the technological change, 
organizational structures and human behavior (presented in figure 3.1) (Rasmussen, 1997). 
This model is originally developed for industrial organizations, but as Olsen and Scharffscher 
(2004) note, this is also highly relevant for explaining how humanitarian INGOs and NGOs 
are run, and how they co-operate with each other in a humanitarian response.  
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Figure 3.1: The socio-technical systems (Rasmussen, 1997) 
 
The socio-technical systems incorporate several levels ranging from the legislators, managers, 
to work planners and system operators. The context of the socio-technical system is 
emphasized by the fast pace of technological change and a competitive environment 
(Rasmussen, 1997). The socio-technical system highlights vertical levels in the system as a 
working model with a space of possibilities (Olsen & Scharffscher, 2004). This space of 
possibilities is limited by the constraints in the work system, boundaries of acceptable 
performance set by actors on a higher level, and the controllers’ subjective criteria that guide 
adoption at the action level. This is the concept that socio-technical systems are built upon 
(Rasmussen, 1997). The aim of the model is to reveal and define the different levels, and 
adjust to the processes presented by the spaces of possibilities (Olsen & Scharffscher, 2004). 
To create a reliable system and reduce vulnerabilities there should be tightly coordinated 
analysis across levels in the system where there is a deep understanding of the working 
constraints, and what the boundaries for the work operation should be in a dynamic society 
(Rasmussen, 1997).  
 
In order to reduce vulnerability it is important that the actors are competent enough in their 
acumen and practical skills, in addition to the formal knowledge, to understand the situation. 
This is in order that the decisions are based on information in the running context and, 
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because of this, avoid untimely decisions, and see the significance of weak signals and 
respond strongly to them with familiar action alternatives (Rasmussen, 1997; Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). The competences are also extremely important when working in 
a fast-changing context. This is because it increases the possibilities of taking the appropriate 
risk-management decisions (Rasmussen, 1997); ones that are based in norms, strategies and 
assumptions that organizational members hold in common (Dixon, 1994). This also includes 
awareness on safety constraints throughout the system, as defined by the legislator or top 
level management, as well as the explicit priorities on safety implications (Rasmussen, 1997). 
When disseminating, integrating and interpreting information and deciding what to be 
communicated up, down and horizontally in the system, it is important to be both familiar and 
have knowledge of the relevant hazard sources (Kruke & Olsen, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997).  
 
Human behavior in the system is shaped by the objectives and constraints, which must be 
respected by the actors in order for the work performance to be successful. The degree of 
freedom is affected by criteria such as workload, cost effectiveness, risk of failure and joy of 
exploration (Rasmussen, 1997). Actors may work freely in the spaces of possibilities, yet are 
bound by the explicit administrative, functional and safety constraints that identify the 
objectives, value structures and subjective preferences governing the behavior. It is therefore 
necessary to give the controllers the possibility to develop coping skills, to work within the 
constraints and boundaries (Ibid), and give them the ability of making sense of the situation 
(Weick, 2001). 
 
The hazard is presented by the technical core at the bottom, though the entire system needs to 
be involved in the control of the hazardous sources. Therefore, there needs to be an active 
closed feedback loop that identifies control structures, the actors’ objectives and performance 
criteria, and that their capability of control must be evaluated - as well as all information 
available to them being analyzed from the viewpoint of feedback control (Rasmussen, 1997). 
The controllers need to be informed about the proper action targets and these must correspond 
with their action opportunities (Ibid). There has been evidence stating that different 
understanding of the situational change exist from headquarters to field offices (Kruke & 
Olsen, 2011). The long chain from the headquarters to the field operators and back again will 
often result in grey zones where the different responsibilities to apportioned each actor result 
in misinterpretations and may hamper the information flow (Kruke, 2009). 
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The space of possibilities can create latent conditions for accidents because there is always a 
potential for creating misunderstandings, mix-ups or confusion about the expectations, and 
responsibilities when visions, strategies and operational tasks are transferred from one 
administrative level to another (Olsen & Scharffscher, 2004). This is in accordance with 
Turner’s (1976) decoy phenomenon, where the action task to prevent only distracts attention 
from the true problem because of misperceptions (Rosness, Guttormsen, Steiro, Tinmannsvik, 
& Ivonne, 2002). 
 
3.3 Diffusion of innovations 
Diffusion of innovations is the process where an innovation is communicated over time among 
members of a social system, and how this potentially leads to adoption of the innovation 
either by individuals or an organizational unit (Rogers, 1995, p. 10). The diffusion process is 
the consequence of a long sequence of action (figure 3.2), yet in order for the innovation to 
get to the diffusion phase there is a full range of activities and decisions deriving from the 
decision to begin research, and going all the way to the consequences of the innovation 
(Rogers, 1995). The stages prior to the diffusion process will have a great influence on the 
diffusion and adoption process, and its potential success.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Main phases of the Innovation-Development process, based on Rogers (1995). 
 
The figure above (3.2) shows the innovation-development process. Although this would 
imply a linear model, in reality this might not always be the case (Rogers, 1995). The 
diffusion, adoption and the consequence phases is the area of Rogers (1995) innovation-
development process that will be used in this thesis. 
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The four main elements in the diffusion process are the innovation, communication channels, 
time and the social system. Together, these explain the process of how the innovation spreads 
and diffuses to organizations and individual users, as elaborated below 
 
3.3.1 Main elements in diffusion process  
Innovation 
The first part of the diffusion process is the innovation, which is an idea, practice or object 
that is perceived as being new by an individual or the members in the social system. This does 
not mean that the innovation has to be new in the objective sense, but if the innovation is 
perceived as new to the individuals it is therefore an innovation. This newness is not based in 
knowledge about the innovation, but rather the attitude formed towards it (Rogers, 1995).   
 
The terms innovation and technology are often considered synonymous, but technology is 
designed for instrumental action that aims to reduce the uncertainty in the cause-effect to 
achieve the desired result, as demonstrated by the model below (Rogers, 2003). The 
uncertainty implies a lack of predictability of the occurrence of events related to the 
alternatives and the relative probability of these alternatives (Ibid). Aase (1991) defines 
technology as the process whereby actors (or teams) operate tools to solve certain tasks. We 
have therefore included teams into the table, as his definition will be used in this thesis (as 
cited in Olsen & Lindøe, 2009 p. 744).   
 
Figure 3.3 The interplay embedded in the technological systems (Olsen & Lindøe, 2009).  
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Figure 3.3 shows how the tools are dependent upon the task and the team in order to function. 
The team operating the tool must have the right skills and objective for the tool to 
successfully solve its task of action. Aase’s definition of technology is the integration of 
physical artifacts and instrumental devices (Aase, 1991) together with the individuals or the 
organizational knowledge, and their purpose when handling the tool (Olsen & Lindøe, 2009). 
Rogers (2003) does not consider the individuals and organizational knowledge in his 
definition of technology, but rather sees it merely as a design that includes the software and 
the hardware, where the hardware is the physical artifact that you can see, and the software 
forms the information base for the technological tool.  
 
The characteristics of the innovation can contribute to rate of adoption and the success of the 
diffusion process. These characteristics are not objective in terms, but subjectively - as how 
they are perceived by potential adopters (Rogers, 1995). The relative advantage explains the 
degree to which innovations are better than what they replace, and these are often expressed 
as economic advantages, social prestige or other types of benefits, depending on the situation. 
The innovation’s compatibility is the degree to which the innovation is perceived as consistent 
with the existing values, experiences and needs of the potential adopters. This particularly 
concerns socio-cultural values and beliefs, but also the previous experiences, as it is the 
mental tool to assess the new innovation as it is being interpreted by what is known, along 
with the needs the client has from the innovation. However, the client does not always 
recognize these needs until they are aware of the consequences and benefits of the innovation. 
The innovation’s complexity may explain the rate of adoption. This means whether the 
innovation is difficult to use and understand for the client. If the client perceives the degree of 
complexity as high, then the possibility of adoption is consequently lower. There is also the 
degree of trialability, meaning how the innovation is experimented with, and, lastly, the 
degree of observability - the visibility of the innovation’s results (Ibid). 
 
Communication 
The communication is the second and the most important part of the diffusion process, and it 
is a two-way process that communicates new ideas. The communication process is how 
individuals gain knowledge about the innovation from other individuals, and, in this way, 
gain a common understanding (Rogers, 2003).  Diffusion is a special type of communication, 
where the messages are about new ideas, and, because of this newness, there will always be a 
degree of uncertainty in the communication (Ibid). The communication of new ideas is 
through communication channels such as mass media, which have the possibility of reaching 
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many potential adopters. However, studies have shown that the most efficient way for 
diffusion is through interpersonal channels (Ibid), meaning that diffusion is a relatively social 
process.  
 
Time 
The third important element in the diffusion process is time, and time plays an important role 
in the process in three ways. The first one is the innovation-decision process, which is the 
time from the individual’s first knowledge of the innovation to the adoption/rejection. The 
second one is the innovativeness, where a unit or individual adopts the innovation before the 
members in the system. The third is the rate of adoption, which is the length of the adoption 
time that is required for a certain percentage of the members to adopt (Rogers, 2003). 
Diffusion can be seen as a social change, and is the process that occurs in the structure and 
function in the social system. Social changes occur in diffusion, such as when new ideas are 
invented, diffused, adopted or rejected, leading to certain consequences (Ibid). 
 
Social system 
The last element in the diffusion process is the social system, which are the units working 
together to accomplish a common goal. These may be individuals, informal groups, 
organizations, and/or subsystems. When an innovation is adapted in to a social system it can 
be seen as a social change, and affects the structure and function of a social system. The 
norms and the role of the opinion leaders and change agents can be affected as well as type of 
innovation-decision and the consequences of the innovation. All of these aspects will 
constitute boundaries for the innovation to diffuse, and involves the relationship between the 
social system and the diffusion process occurring within it (Rogers, 2003).  
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3.3.2 Decentralized and centralized diffusion   
The classic diffusion theory emphasizes that innovations originate from a limited source of 
experts, and that this source diffuses the innovation to the potential adopters, and that 
adopters are more or less passive accepters. However, this focus have been strongly criticized 
by Schön (1967) for not grasping the degree of complexity, where innovations originate from 
numerous sources and diffuse via horizontal networks and evolve themselves (Schön, 1967). 
Rogers (1995) has therefore further developed his understanding of decentralized diffusion, 
and how this flows from the operational level in the system, and spread, with modifications, 
horizontally as re-inventions to match innovation to the particular context (Rogers, 1995).  
 
What separates decentralized diffusion from centralized is the role of the change agent. In 
decentralized diffusion the adopters can be change agents as long as the adopters are highly 
educated, and/or the innovation is not very complex and sophisticated. A change agent is an 
individual who has great influence on adopters’ innovation-decision in the direction desirable 
for the agent (Rogers, 1995). In centralized diffusion there is more control on the top of the 
system and the change agent is either the national government or a technical expert. The other 
main difference is how the innovation fits the adopter’s needs, and how it solves potential 
problems. Centralized diffusion is often described as a technological-push where the adopter 
of the innovation may feel they are not in need of the innovation. The decentralized diffusion 
has a wide share of power and control among members, and can be described as a 
technological-pull where the locally perceived needs and problems are considered, and in this 
way more likely to fit the users’ needs and problems (Ibid).  
 
There is an aspect of the diffusion theory that Rogers (2003) claims can affect the diffusion 
rate. This is authority innovation-decisions, where the members of the social systems have no 
influence, and the government, or someone with technical expertise, forces the decision. This 
is a faster rate of adoption in comparison to it being optional or a decision based on consensus 
among all units and individuals. The characteristics of the diffusion of innovation process are 
often described as an individual process, but this thesis relates to ICT systems in a 
humanitarian response. It is therefore necessary to go deeper into how organizations innovate, 
adopt and implement innovations, which is much more complex in comparison to individual 
diffusion (Rogers, 1995).  
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3.3.3 Organizational innovation and implementation   
According to Rogers, an organization is (1995 p. 375) defined as a stable system of 
individuals who work together to achieve common goals through a hierarchy of ranks and a 
division of labor. The diffusion leads to a potential adoption of an innovation that 
subsequently leads to implementation, although this does not always directly follow the 
adoption. The innovation process in organizations consists of five stages:   
 
 
Figure 3.4,The five stages in the innovation process in an organization, based on Rogers (1995) 
 
In the initiation phase agenda-setting is the first stage of the innovation process in an 
organization. In this phase a definition of the organizational problem that needs innovation is 
stated, and followed by identifying and prioritizing needs and problems. At the same time 
innovative solutions are sought in the organization’s environment that have the possibility to 
solve and meet the organizational problem. The second stage in the initiation phase is 
matching, which seeks to fit the innovation to the defined problem. Information is gathered, 
and, together with conceptualizing and planning, this match leads to the decision of either 
adopting or rejecting the innovation. If the decision is to adopt the following phase is the 
implementation (Rogers, 1995).  
 
 
The implementation phase consists of the last three stages. The first is 
redefining/restructuring; where the adopted innovation starts to lose its foreign character, and 
starts to be re-invented to fit the organizational context and structure (Rogers, 1995). The 
organizational structure also adapts itself to the innovation, as the technological systems are 
products of human interaction, and are, therefore, not objective (Orlikowski, 1992). However, 
if the innovation is designed within the organization, it is more familiar and compatible; this 
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is especially the case in regard to software components as intellectual tools. A barrier to this is 
the lack of expertise and knowledge in the technological system which may slow down the 
implementation process. When the implementation is related to technological systems, it may 
create uncertainty that could result in difficulties of implementation (Rogers, 1995). Gerwin 
(1988) highlights three main uncertainties with computer technologies: 1) technological 
uncertainty, the capacity of organizations to determine the reliability, capacity and precision 
of the technological systems, 2) financial uncertainty, which is the degree of return of 
investment, and 3) social uncertainty - whether conflict is likely to occur if implementing, 
especially if the innovation is radical (Gerwin, 1988).  
 
Clarifying and routinizing are the two last stages in the implementation phase. Clarifying is 
when the innovation’s meaning is becoming clearer to the members, and the possibility to 
correct any unwanted side effects that occur when gaining understanding of the technological 
innovation. This is because the meaning of the innovation is a social process through human 
interaction. The very last stage is routinizing where the innovation is incorporated and has lost 
its separate identity, is no longer thought of as a new idea, and is absorbed in the organization. 
The innovation is now completely implemented in the organization (Rogers, 1995).  
3.4 Failure of Foresight 
Barry A. Turner (1976) has developed a descriptive theory of Failure of foresight to describe 
the opposite of normative reliability seeking models in organizations that focus on stable and 
failure free performance, this theory stresses how disasters can be accumulated by gross errors 
by organizational groupings with complex chains of events over years, as an outcome of 
interaction between the human and the socio-technical system. He states “common causal 
features are rigidities in institutional beliefs, distracting decoy phenomena, neglect of outside 
complaints, multiple information-handling, difficulties, exacerbation of the hazards by 
strangers, failure to comply with regulations, and tendency to minimize emergent danger” 
(Turner, 1976 p. 378). 
 
Failure of foresight explains how organizations are developed to define collective goals and 
deploy available resources to take action in order to reach those goals. When organizations 
implement action tasks there will always be uncertainty if the present action will result in the 
desired goal (Thompson, 1967). However, these tasks are often loosely formulated and 
lacking unequivocal criteria for deciding when the goals have been attained (Turner, 1976). 
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The uncertainty is therefore often attempted to be reduced by resolving problems with rules of 
thumb, rituals, relying on habitual patterns or, more self-consciously, by setting goals and 
making plans to reach them (Turner, 1976) by the collective simplification of assumptions 
about the environment to “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1957). This can result in 
accumulation of latent conditions for accidents and bring about organizations going into an 
incubation period (Turner, 1976). 
 
Before the incubation period, individuals cope with the world and hazards by following 
normative prescriptions as laws and codes of practices based on the initial culturally accepted 
beliefs. Accidents do not happen because of adequacy of the accepted norms and beliefs 
(Turner, 1976), but rather when unnoticed sets of events that are not understood or accepted 
in the accumulated beliefs of the world and its hazard, and the world starts to differ from the 
way we think of it. The events that accumulate differ from our reality, beliefs and norms, and 
therefore are not noticed or understood by its consequences and the organization finds itself in 
an incubation period (Ibid).  
 
3.4.1 Incubation period  
Organizational and inter-organizational factors are often the cause of accidents, as they fail to 
notice or understand the situation until it is too late, and little can be done to avoid the 
accident and turn the situation around (Turner, 1976). Turner (1976) particularly focuses on 
four main groupings of misunderstandings that lead the organization to the incubation, where 
the failure of foresight interferes -these are classified as latent conditions. 
 
Events unnoticed or misunderstood because of difficulties in handling information in 
complex situations: patterns of misunderstanding, ambiguities and failure of communication 
can be factors that contribute to the disaster. When information fails to be sufficiently 
disseminated and collectively integrated and interpreted, it may lead to misleading 
information that results in information being unintentionally distorted (Turner, 1976).  
 
Perfect communication is impossible to ensure, even in the simplest systems. Failures in 
communication often get compounded when there are no consequences to poor information 
handling (Turner, 1976). During the accumulation of events, the risk of failure in terms of 
communication increases with the size of the organization. Large and complex organizations 
will have an increased number of messages requiring processing in comparison to small  32 
organizations (Ibid). If the task is to be handled by several organizations, then the failure of 
communication will increase even further, and the possibility of maintaining communication 
is further lowered. This is because each organization has their own distinctive subculture and 
framework of bounded rationality. This might result in assumptions that other units are 
handling the problem. Additionally, when the task is prolonged, complex, vague, hasty and 
large-scale, the information handling is even more problematical to maintain. This will 
change the responsibilities and administrative roles, and result in increased complexity when 
handling information, because it will generate more information requiring processing (Turner, 
1976; Wohlstetter, 1957).  
 
During large-scale and complex situations it is not possible to agree upon a single description 
of the situation. This is because everyone operates with one set of information, and constructs 
their own theories about what is happening, and how it should be dealt with. This obscures an 
already complex situation, because the information that is available is not supplementing what 
is needed to describe and take into full account. The reason for this is because the complexity 
makes relevant information a limited resource, and the cost of obtaining one set of 
information is added to the cost of another, which hampers the possibility of having full 
control of the situation. This is not the same as the lack of communication, but the reflexivity 
of the situation forces the actors to be extremely selective in terms of communication (Turner, 
1976). 
 
Events unnoticed or misunderstood because of erroneous information can here 
accumulate when the erroneous information are not expected or explained away as decoy 
phenomena, because they are not noticed or not fully understood. This results in distracting 
attention from the true problem (Turner, 1976). 
 
Effective violations of precautions passing unnoticed because of cultural lag in existing 
precautions. This happens because existing precautions are discredited, as they are either out-
of-date or inapplicable to the existing event. This may lead violations to pass unnoticed 
(Turner, 1976). This can create latent problems because of the mismatch between procedures, 
standards and regulation (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).    
 
Events unnoticed or misunderstood because of a reluctance to assume the worst 
outcome. When existing danger signs are not perceived, given low priority, are treated as 
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ambiguous, or as a source of disagreement or even considered insignificant, this creates the 
possibility of exacerbating events and disasters (Turner, 1976).  
 
In addition to the latent groupings above there are also the risks of poor design in managerial 
systems, lack of insufficient training and inconsistent supervision. There is also a risk of a low 
ability to analyze changes in the environment and the practical operation leading to latent 
conditions that may exacerbate organizational accidents (Reason, 1997).  
3.5 Theoretical conclusion   
The socio-technical system (Rasmussen, 1997), diffusion of innovation (Rogers, 2003) and 
Failure of foresight (Turner, 1976) are system-oriented, meaning that they, in various terms, 
explain how systems are built upon different vertical and horizontal levels in hierarchical 
systems.  
 
The thesis adopts the socio-technical system (Rasmussen, 1997) as a framework to describe 
our interpretation of the humanitarian response and the actors within it. The thesis will also 
use the author’s understanding of how the system can be reliable, in order to see how the ICT 
systems can contribute to more reliable information management and processing, and through 
this potentially precipitate a more reliable response. Within the socio-technical system, the 
diffusion of innovation (Rogers, 2003), will contribute to the understanding of how the actors 
adopt and diffuse the ICT systems as innovations, and how the adopters and agents innovate 
the ICT systems on different levels. How the ICT systems adopt and diffuse within the socio-
technical system (Rasmussen, 1997), as well as how organizational factors can ensure a 
reliable closed feedback loop between the assessments, planned activities and implementation 
of interventions will not be elaborated through Turner’s (1976) failure of foresight. Through 
Turner (1976) it will be elaborated how organizational failures may accumulate and create 
latent conditions within the framework of socio-technical system, and hamper the information 
management and processing among the humanitarian actors, that can subsequently affect the 
potential reliable closed feedback loop between the assessments, planned activities and the 
implementation of interventions.    
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4.0 Research design and methodology   
Colloquially, a research design is a logic plan for getting from here to there, where 
here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there is some 
set of conclusions (answers) about these questions. Between ‘here’ and ‘there’ may be 
found a number of major steps, including the collection and analysis of relevant data 
(Yin, 2003, p. 20). 
 
This chapter aims to explain how we got from ‘here’ to ‘there’ by elaborating the three main 
phases of the social research design: planning, executing and reporting, as well as explaining 
the methodological choices taken in each phase (Blaikie, 2010). The research for this thesis 
has been conducted through a qualitative in-depth approach, and was performed through two 
fieldworks. As the comprehension of the research topic selected in this thesis was unknown, 
we started the first fieldwork using an explorative approach. Blaikie (2010) defines the 
explorative approach as studying a topic that is unknown in order to produce ideas of what is 
going on, and how it may be further researched. This approach was utilized in our research to 
sharpen the focus of the research problem and establish a set of research questions based on 
the understanding collected through exploring, in order to perform a second data collection 
period. The following sections of this chapter therefore explain the methodological choices 
undertaken through the eyes of the authors’ experience of being researchers in Lebanon. 
Section 4.1explains the research design, strategy and process. Section 4.2 elaborates the 
selection of data. In section 4.3 the collection of data through triangulation is described. 
Section 4.4 explains the ethical considerations undertaken in this research. Section 4.5 
describes the challenges experienced during the data collection periods. Section 4.6 explain 
how the data was reduced and analyzed. The last section, 4.7 reflect on the reliability and 
validity of the data collected in this thesis. 
 
4.1 Research design and strategy 
The research design was chosen and guided by the research problem, which in this case was 
the usage of ICT systems in a humanitarian response. To research the topic of interest we 
needed a set of research questions. Research questions are therefore formed by what, why and 
how the topic will be studied (Blaikie, 2010). The purpose was to examine what new forms of 
technology existed within humanitarian aid in Lebanon, and what this signified for the actors 
using them. Why this area was chosen to examined was because using technology in 
humanitarian aid was relatively unexplored within the research field, and also because several 
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reports from the UN system stated that this area of interest needed further research. How we 
choose to study the phenomenon was in the context of Lebanon through two fieldworks 
studying the humanitarian actors within all levels, MoSA, as well as the beneficiaries of the 
response as a whole.  
The first fieldwork of this research was, as mentioned in section 4.0, conducted using an 
explorative approach. Our primary purpose was therefore to examine an unknown 
phenomenon in order to create the possibility to move towards some more refined research 
questions and hone the research problem. When stating that it offers the opportunity more 
precise questions, this refers to what the questions can contribute to future researchers 
(Neuman, 2006). As we conducted two fieldworks, the result from the first was used to design 
the second, which was conducted in a more extensive and systematic way. 
The research problem was therefore adjusted based on what was discovered during the first 
fieldwork, and examined more deeply during the second. The main feature of this thesis 
shaped itself to concern ICT systems, and how these systems can contribute to a reliable 
information management in the humanitarian response in Lebanon. To be able to produce a 
conclusion, a set of research questions was needed to provide a framework and set boundaries 
of what would be studied. This was done to narrow down the research problem, and to 
produce variables. The research questions are as followed:  
 
1) How is the diffusion and adoption of the ICT systems in Lebanon?  
2) How is the information processing among humanitarian actors in Lebanon?  
3) What is the relation between the assessments, planned activities and implementation 
of interventions in the humanitarian response in Lebanon? 
 
4.1.1 Abductive research strategy   
After the first fieldwork we established research questions that made the choice of selecting 
an abductive research strategy to answer the questions explicit. We decided to apply an 
abductive research strategy in accordance with Danemark’s (1997) understanding of the term. 
Danemark (1997) explains that the core of all abductive strategy starts with empirical 
incidents that is related to a set of rules or theories, leading to re-contextualization regarding 
the empirical incidents, which then results in new insight (Danemark, 1997).  
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The abductive research strategy was applied on the basis of three aspects that made 
conducting this strategy explicit. First, because limited knowledge about the ICT systems in 
the humanitarian responses exists, and we wanted to limit our own preconditions of 
background knowledge that could potentially shape the thesis through our subjective 
interpretations rather than the reality (Neuman, 2006). Therefore it was seen as necessary to 
apply a research strategy that emphasizes the humanitarian actors, MoSA and the refugees’ 
meanings, motives and interpretation in order to limit our own personal interpretations 
(Blaikie, 2010). Secondly, the relationships between the different organizations are structured 
in a way that is not possible to directly observe, but only possible to interpret through 
theories, models and concepts that frame some new ideas between the different aspects 
(Danemark, 1997). The third motive for choosing this strategy was based on the fact that after 
we had conducted the first explorative fieldwork, we saw patterns of interest that led us to 
create preliminary research questions. These questions not only seek to answer what existed 
of ICT systems, but also how the social actors understand the function of these. In order to do 
so we had to describe the ICT innovation, the adoption and the changes that this presented for 
the actors, leaving the abductive research strategy as the natural choice (Blaikie, 2010). We 
decided to perform triangulation when collecting data through both the phase of exploration 
and abduction in order to limit our own interpretations in ways that could constrain the social 
actors own interpretations.  
 
4.1.2 Research process   
Table 4.1 presents a summary of the essential steps that were undertaken throughout the 
research process. The process is divided into periods before, during and after the fieldworks. 
Although the period before and after the fieldworks are roughly characterized, the fieldwork 
that consists the empirical data collected in Lebanon is discussed more thoroughly in the 
following passage.   
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Table 4.1 Activities conducted in the research process.
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 Period 1 
In the preliminarily stage of the thesis our main focus was upon the literature studies with the 
purpose of gaining deeper knowledge of how technology was being used within humanitarian 
aid. We went to Oslo to interview three INGOs and one technological crisis management 
organization, in order to gain insight from them on the relevance of the research topic. The 
INGOs found our focus on technology interesting and gave us two contacts that were working 
with the Syrian response in Lebanon. Following this, we read several UN reports about the 
Syrian crisis and discovered that the context of interest was using technology to manage the 
response. The subsequent period was used to narrow the research problem and questions 
down, based upon the information gathered in Oslo and our literature studies. We started 
contacting the informants in Lebanon, scheduled an interview, and booked the trip to 
Lebanon. Once access to the informants was established we developed a theoretical 
framework. We had some initial apprehension regarding our focus on theory, as it could lead 
us in the wrong direction. With this in mind the research is based on an explorative approach, 
and that the purpose of the thesis is to understand the social actors’ everyday life, and not just 
our own understanding of the phenomenon (Blaikie, 2010). Therefore, we focused on 
considering a wide range of theoretical approaches before arrival in Lebanon. An open-ended 
interview guide was developed and the preparations for the fieldwork commenced. This 
included literature studies on Lebanon’s history and present context as well as 
accommodation, security issues, vaccines and contacting potential new informants. 
 
Period 2 
The second period consisted of the actual fieldwork in Lebanon. We stayed for four weeks; 
the period included both collecting empirical data but also performing an ongoing analysis as 
newly arrived data was attained. The qualitative data was collected through interviews, 
official documents received during interviews, participant observations, and engaging in 
conversation with the local population.
 39 
 Period 3 
In this period the focus was tightened and narrowed down. To achieve this we had to reduce 
the data that was collected, and analyze the empirical material from the first fieldwork. This is 
explained in detail in section 4.6. We also developed a new, narrower theoretical framework 
suitable for a new focus of interest. This was done to delineate a clear direction for the next 
fieldwork. 
Period 4 
The second fieldwork lasted for three weeks and was based upon the analysis from the first. 
During this period data was collected through observing meetings, conducting interviews, 
reading official documents handed to us during interviews and having informal conversations 
with the local population. The period consisted of a constant ongoing analysis of newly 
collected data and a comparison of this to the findings from the first fieldwork - as well as 
working on the theoretical framework. 
Period 5 
After the second fieldwork in Lebanon the data was reduced in order to minimize the 
complexity of the total amount of data. We analyzed the data from the second trip and 
thereafter started to compare the findings from the two fieldworks. This is further explained in 
section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Data collection  
In qualitative research human experiences are studied through using multiple methods and 
sources of data (Punch, 2005). We used semi-structured interviews with open questions, 
observations (field notes), field conversations and document analysis. By observing the field 
from different angles using triangulation the aim was to improve accuracy through looking at 
the field from multiple perspectives (Neuman, 2006). The choice of data collection through 
triangulation was also heavily influenced by three reasons: limited time, money and access to 
the context. Given the research purpose and topic the methods chosen were seen as suitable 
for gathering the relevant data. In the following subchapters of 4.2 we will describe the 
challenges with time and access within two field studies. Thereafter we explain how the 
sampling and selection of informants was performed, before noting how key informants 
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turned out to be door openers for our thesis. Lastly we elaborate how the various methods of 
collecting data were performed. 
4.2.1 Fieldwork: Access and time consuming 
The fieldwork was conducted in Lebanon and was accomplished in two phases. The first 
fieldwork took place from October 24th to November 24th 2014, and the second from February 
15th to March 6th 2015.  During the first fieldwork we faced challenges in getting access to 
informants, while on the second field trips we struggled with getting enough time to meet all 
the relevant actors. 
 
Access 
Entering the field can be seen as an access ladder whereby you begin on the outside (Neuman, 
2006). We began with a rough start, where access to any informants at all seemed impossible 
even after innumerable attempts to contact organizations through e-mails and phone calls 
when in Norway. We had, however, the initial two contacts that were willing to meet us in 
Lebanon. Therefore we decided to travel even though we were not sure if it was possible to 
conduct the research. As we did not have access to the field through any organizations, we 
traveled independently. The focus was on balancing the freedom of exploring the field and the 
integrity of the participants (Rossman & Rallis, 1998). This turned out to be both a positive 
and negative for us. We struggled with getting access to informants in the beginning, using 
almost one week just to schedule an interview when the pre-scheduled one was canceled. The 
positive side was that once we started to get access to informants, we had informants from all 
sectors in the response, giving us the possibility to really explore all aspects of the research 
topic. Having an articulated strategy and purpose was important for us because it would affect 
the participants in ways that could change the way they perceived us as researchers (Rossman 
& Rallis, 1998). As we were trying to gain access independently the strategy had to be 
informed in ways that allowed us to be perceived as someone of interest to the potential 
informants. We learned that technological innovation in humanitarian aid was a topic in 
which most actors on national level had an interest in. When trying to get independent access 
to actors we accordingly explained the importance of further research within the field, and 
that we were interested in their thoughts on the topic. Access to actors at field level was more 
difficult during the first fieldwork as they are often working in areas which were difficult to 
access without formal authorization (Repstad, 1993; Riis, 2005). However, once we had 
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access to informants at a national level, we also eventually got access to informants on the 
field level of the response through the informants on the national one. 
 
Time 
On the days we had scheduled interviews we often struggled with finding the location of the 
offices, as we always requested the interviews to be held in their natural setting (Blaikie, 
2010). This also gave us the opportunity to explore their environment and gain a greater 
knowledge of their work situation. To localize the office buildings was often a struggle as the 
names were given to us in English but all street names were in Arabic. Because of this we had 
to plan every interview in terms of time, so that we were sure that we had a long enough 
period to localize the street or building. It did not help that all organizations were based in 
anonymous buildings due to security concerns.  Therefore we often only had the chance to 
perform one interview a day, though some days we had to schedule several interviews which 
resulted in chaos and stress for us. On our busiest days we had four interviews. 
 
We particularly struggled with the time during the second fieldwork. This was not 
predominantly due to office locations this time, but mostly because we had less time and 
more informants to meet than during the first fieldwork. Once we had performed the first 
fieldwork we had managed to establish sound connections with several informants. This was 
both positive and negative. It gave us the possibility to schedule new interviews with them in 
advance before coming back to Lebanon and also gave us the chance to increase the member 
validation (Neuman, 2006). By meeting them for a second time the informants could validate 
the adequacy of what they previously had stated to us (ref. 4.7). These connections also 
enabled us to access further informants, meaning that our calendars was already pre-booked to 
a certain extent before we entered Lebanon the second time. This was originally done in order 
to ensure that the situation of not having access to informants did not repeat itself during the 
second trip. We wanted to be better prepared, but ended up being overwhelmed and feeling 
like we did not have enough time to meet all parties of interest.  
 
Another aspect that may have negatively impacted upon us was that with good relationships 
comes restraints, meaning that having access to informants freely could be hindered as we had 
several pre-booked interviews with new informants recommended by the previous ones. We 
tried to be aware of this, and not let it lead the research, but it was difficult as once in the field 
you become caught up in the context. It is difficult to know what might be data and what 
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might not (Neuman, 2006). This is because, as researchers using an explorative and abductive 
approach, we tried to let the informants guide the path, and focus on that data which can be 
collected in rare and most unexpected places. Therefore nothing can be left unseen or 
neglected, as this might turn out to be the most valuable data gathered (Ibid). This can best be 
exemplified with the meetings we had with refugees at the ITSs during the second fieldwork. 
At the time we did not fully comprehend the considerable significance of these meetings, but 
in retrospect after analyzing the data we saw that the refugees’ statements had a huge impact 
upon the empirical findings. 
4.2.2 Informants and sampling  
The selection of informants was based on Neuman’s (2006) understanding of sequential 
sampling, meaning that we tried to establish contact with as many informants we could, until 
the informants could not contribute any further information other than what was already 
revealed. When establishing relations with informants we experienced that the snowball 
method was highly efficient. The snowball method is where established informants interlink 
you to new informants based on recommendations and introductions (Neuman, 2006; 
Repstad, 1993). The sampling of data is seen as purposive sampling, because we, as 
researchers, deliberately had the purpose of study in mind (Neuman, 2006; Punch, 2005). The 
methods used for sampling in this thesis will not allow us to generalize the findings to a broad 
extent (Blaikie, 2010), but that is  anyway not what we wish to accomplish. The intention is to 
make a judgment as to what extent our conclusion might represent other humanitarian 
responses in other parts of the world, and particularly in urban settings similar to that of 
Lebanon (ref. 4.7.2 external validity).   
 
Sampling through predefined criteria’s 
The relevance that the informants had to the research topic was set out in some predefined 
criteria (Neuman, 2006). The population in the research is NGOs, INGOs, UN agencies and 
MoSA, as well as the beneficiaries and the local population. In total we had 78 informants9 
within these categories during the two fieldworks. The majority of the informants were 
reached during the fieldwork. The criteria and categories for the informants are elaborated in 
the following sections. In order to maintain the promise to ensure anonymity for the 
informants, the citing of the informants through the presentation of the empirical data and 
9 See list of informants Appendix B.  
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discussion (chapter 5 and 6) uses references based on their work genre for example IM, or 
fieldworker, as well as organizational genre (UN, INGO, NGO, MoSA or refugee). There 
exist two exceptions, with regards to using the organization name, the lead agency UNHCR 
and MoSA. This is further elaborated in ethical considerations see section 4.4. 
 
Before we established any contacts in Lebanon we sent e-mails and tried to call the 
international actors. It took us a week until we scheduled the first interview. Luckily for us 
this informant was a head of office and had an extensive network in the humanitarian system. 
This informant recommended us to a great deal of relevant actors. Once we had the possibility 
of referring to previous informants when establishing new contacts, things started to become 
easier and we were able to schedule interviews. How we are interpreted as researchers not 
only depends on what we say or do, but also on who you know (Repstad, 1993). The second 
fieldwork was then based upon our own established relationships that we continued to nurture 
in the period between the fieldworks. This was done in order to maintain the relationships 
with the informants so that we could get further access to the field. During the second trip to 
Lebanon we also managed to interview the governmental actors through the use of the 
snowball method. This is further explained in door openers, see section 4.2.3.   
 
During both fieldworks we used sequential and purposive sampling, along with the snowball 
method (Neuman, 2006). The main difference between the two fieldworks was the strategy. 
During the first fieldwork we explored the usage of ICT systems in the context in order to see 
how the topic could be further examined. In the second we aimed to describe, understand and 
reinterpret the changes that ICT systems presented in the context based on the findings from 
the first fieldwork. This led us to select informants more precisely during the second trip, as 
this time we wanted to confirm the actual findings, and talk to informants whose perspectives 
we lacked from during the first fieldwork (ref external validity 4.7.2). This was performed in 
order to try to find the missing pieces of the puzzle. During the first fieldwork we would meet 
everyone who was available, as exemplified with the interviews, that ranged from UN, 
INGOs, NGOs bot also a university professor, teachers in Palestinian refugee camps, and 
having dinners with local families, and meeting Hezbollah militiamen.  
 
Informants from national level: the UN agencies and MoSA 
As all ICT systems were developed and carried out from the managerial level, we saw it as 
essential to get access to informants from this level.  In addition, the government, the actors 
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that developed and re-designed the ICT systems, and UN organizations within the 
humanitarian response at management level were of interest. The initial reason for selecting 
the UN organizations was because they were the link between the ICT systems and the 
humanitarian response, as well as the beneficiaries of the entire response. 
 
Informants from national level and field level: INGOs, NGOs and MoSA 
The second categories of informants were the INGOs and NGOs at the national headquarters 
and field level. MoSA had fieldworkers and is therefore also in this category of informants. 
The organizations and MoSA are working as partners in the response and were seen as the 
users of the ICT systems. It was therefore important to seek to understand what these actors 
thought about the existing ICT systems, and also compare their perspective to the leading UN 
and governmental actors. During the first fieldwork we interviewed several partners at 
national level, though we only managed to get in contact with fieldworkers working in 
Palestinian camps during the first trip. In the course of the second fieldwork, however, we 
managed to meet up with fieldworkers in the Syrian ITS. The government, as well as sector 
leaders, turned out to be central informants allowing us to gain deeper access to field workers 
in their natural settings during fieldwork two (Blaikie, 2010).  
 
Informants from community level: beneficiaries and the affected population 
The third category of informants was selected because we wanted their understanding of the 
response as beneficiaries. The local population had connections to further relevant informants 
working in INGOs and NGOs, as well as valuable information about the country’s history, 
current state and context. The beneficiaries of the response are the individuals whose 
suffering will be exacerbated if the response mechanism is not proportionate to the challenges 
faced. Talking to the beneficiaries was initially only seen as something that could better the 
understanding of how the ICT systems worked in practice. Yet, when going deeper into the 
context we understood that these informants had turned out to be some of the most valuable, 
as the information that was collected from them did not correspond with what informants 
from UN and INGOs on national level were saying. We managed to gain access to two ITSs, 
where Syrian refugees were living, as well as two Palestinian refugee camps containing both 
Palestinian and Syrian refugees. One of these camps had restricted access, and we had no way 
of obtaining it. However, we surreptitiously entered anyway in with the help of a key 
informant. Each camp is located in different geographical areas of Lebanon. This gave us the 
possibility to examine if the humanitarian response mechanism was conducted differently in 
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each area. This increased the reliability of the data collected in regard to the challenges 
expressed by informants, as these turned out to be the same in each location (see section 
4.7.1) The choice of collecting the data from these specific camp areas was done because 
these were the areas we were given access to through the snowball method, and because we 
knew that these were the areas where most beneficiaries of the response could be found. 
 
4.2.3 Door openers 
A door opener can be seen as a key informant that enables the researcher to establish a 
connection with the context in which the study is conducted in ways that enrich the research 
(Repstad, 1993). The snowball method has, however, a tendency to contribute to imbalances 
in the data that is being collected, due to the fact that informants often want to recommend 
other informants based on a similar understanding of the topic of interest (Ibid). Key 
informants can ameliorate this to a certain extent if the researcher finds key informants that 
offer access to actors with diverse understandings of the research topic. The informants that 
became door openers for us during the first fieldwork were not the individuals that we 
expected. 
 
The professor 
A professor at our university has been working extensively within humanitarian aid for 
several years. As there is high turnover of staff in the humanitarian sector, several of his 
previous colleagues were located in Lebanon. This resulted in easier access to further 
informants and a higher willingness to share their perspectives, as we perceived that it 
increased the credibility.   
 
The taxi driver 
We got in contact with a taxi driver that had several connections in Norway within the 
humanitarian aid and the Norwegian news channel. The driver showed a great interest in our 
area of focus and we observed that for him to be able to link us to informants within the 
humanitarian sector gave him a great sense of accomplishment. We established contact with 
several informants through his help during both field studies and he also were our guide 
during visits around the country, which would be otherwise unsafe for us to travel to. He had 
great knowledge about the situational picture in the country and also knew the best routes to 
avoid potential dangers. 
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 The project leader 
A professor from Norway that we also got to know through our taxi driver worked as a 
project leader in Palestinian camps in Lebanon. He had a great cultural knowledge about the 
country and gave us access to several local informants. He also introduced us to a Lebanese 
family where we had dinner and got to know the culture of Lebanon from a different 
perspective. The meeting with the project leader also gave us access to a camp where it was 
difficult to gain access to. We met this informant during both field studies and his friendship 
gave us both motivation and guidance during the data collection. 
 
The florist  
As we tried to be open and get to know the local population as much as possible, we tended to 
end up talking to both people sitting in the streets as well as neighbors taking their daily 
walks. Through this, we stumbled upon a semi-retired man that used his flower shop as a 
means of socialize with other individuals. He had limited English, but he seemed to enjoy our 
company and showed a profound interest in helping us with localizing central locations in 
Beirut, as well as with practical concerns. We perceived this interest as a genuine wish to 
show us that a willingness to help outsiders still existed in Lebanon. The country has 
struggled with tourism in the last few years due to the conception that the country is unstable.  
Perhaps because of this, the florist appeared to want to change our interpretation of the 
country, and, in many ways, he did.  
 
The General 
We also got in contact with another informant who seemed to want to change our perceived 
understanding of Lebanon. This informant was a retired general with an extensive knowledge 
about Lebanon’s history and culture that started to talk to us during the first fieldwork. This 
man had made it his mission to contribute in our thesis in any way possible. He saw it as a 
chance to positively change some aspects of what the country was currently undergoing. The 
general not only gave us guidance and helpful advice, he also acted as an intermediary for us 
at the ministries office. When he heard that we were coming back to Lebanon, and were 
interested in talking to relevant actors within the government, he managed to schedule an 
interview for us, as he genuinely believed in what our thesis topic was attempting to do and, 
consequently, he served as the most essential door opener for us. 
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4.3 Triangulation 
Our research problem was to discover, understand and describe the interpretations of the 
humanitarian actors understanding of the ICT systems in Lebanon. Blaikie (2010) states that 
the best way to do this is seeing the world from “inside” and become a member of the 
informants’ world. A method of accomplishing this is triangulation measures, where you 
measure the phenomenon from different angles and viewpoints to get a deeper understanding 
and improve the accuracy of the collected data (Neuman, 2006). We used semi-structured 
interviews, field conversations, observations, participant observations as well as document 
studies to achieve this, and because some of the methods were not suited for all informant 
settings. When we met national actors from the government, UN, INGOs and NGOs a semi-
structured interview was well suited, whereas when we met the refugees and the affected 
populations, field conversations were more convenient and appropriate, especially when it 
came to protecting the informant’s integrity. We used triangulation in order to better validate 
the research as we could test findings from the different methods against each other (Fangen, 
2004) using observations as well as interviews is a good example of this. By not only 
listening to what the humanitarian actors and refugees were saying, but also observing them 
in action in their everyday lives, it gave us a different understanding of their context.   
4.3.1 Document studies 
We used documents for different purposes during the research. The report from UN-OCHA 
(2012) Humanitarism in the Network Age is worthy of particular mention as it contributed to 
deeper background knowledge for this area of humanitarian aid. We also used evaluation 
reports that we found online during the second stay in Lebanon, the two most valuable here 
were the real-time evaluation of UNHCR's response to the Syrian refugee emergency (Crisp 
et al., 2013) and UNHC’s (2013) response to this assessment. These reports help further guide 
the research problem, and contributed to a better analysis through secondary data, as it 
identified critical organizational factors that corroborated with the findings. Having both these 
reports also gave us the possibility to see if the issues we had found had already been 
identified two years prior to the research. Looking back, we are glad that we did not 
discovered these reports during the first visit to Lebanon, as they might have had more 
influence on the research methods and especially the interview guide with regards to how we 
interpreted the informants statements and how we structured the interview guide (also see 
reliability 4.7.1). We also used all published response plans for the Syrian crisis in Lebanon to 
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understand the response mechanism. The research is a “window in time” and, even though the 
2015-2016 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan was published during the last visit, it was not 
implemented. We did, however, use this document in order to find connections with our own 
findings. During both field studies we also gained access to several documents from the 
various organizations we encountered - this was both a challenge and a benefit. We learned 
more about each of the organizations, but ended up expending an extortionate amount of time 
reading through all these documents.  
4.3.2 Interviews  
For both field studies we used a semi-structured interview guide10 in order to ask open-ended 
questions within the research topic. The interview guide helped us stay focused on areas of 
interest, but did not restrict the informant’s opportunities to speak freely. All interviews were 
conducted face-to-face and performed in the informant’s natural settings. For most of the 
interviews we used a tape recorder, this enabled us to precisely transcribe the interviews 
according to what the informant had said. None of these interviews recorded names or 
personal information (ref ethical considerations 4.4). During the interviews where we could 
not use tape recorders we had to memorize the information as well as take extensive notes. 
This proved somewhat challenging, as we were not able to get the entire conversations written 
down verbatim. According to Repstad (1993) this hampers the analysis of the data because 
the way informants express themselves will be changed through the filtration of the 
researcher’s notes when it’s not literally recorded through transcription. There were several 
situations where we could not use the tape recorder, this was due to either the informants wish 
not be recorded, or to protect the informant’s integrity, as well as their fear of being quoted 
regarding sensitive information. This was especially the case when talking to the refugees or 
governmental informants. During these interviews we did, however, spend an extensive 
amount of time with the informants, ranging from a couple of hours to a day. This offered us 
the chance to take notes all day, as well as the chance to ask the informant several times in 
order to strive for accuracy in the data that we collected.  This said having a tape recorder 
enabled us, as researchers, to pay more attention to what the informant said without worrying 
about missing a word or sentence. It also gave us the chance to work in our own way in the 
interviews as how the informant perceives and interprets us will affect the amount of data 
offered (Neuman, 2006; Repstad, 1993).  
10 See Appendix A for interview guide.  
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We planned each interview in advance, reorganizing the interview guide in order to make it 
relevant to each category of informants. During all interviews we had a prior agreement on 
which one of us that would lead the questions and who would take notes of the non-verbal 
behavior of the informant, as well as notes about the settings. We also ended up conducting 
several group interviews, though, in some cases it hampered the actors in speaking freely and 
independently (Repstad, 1993) as one was taking the lead in the conversation. On the other 
hand, we did end up having group interviews where two lead actors of the response ended up 
saying the complete opposite to each other - giving us valuable information that we would not 
have been able to get in an individual interview. The group interviews were also a good 
setting to observe the dynamic within the group, as they tend to lead the conversation 
amongst each other, leaving us an opportunity to observe from the sidelines.  
 
During field conversations with mayors and the refugees we used an interpreter, as they did 
not speak English.  When using interpreter, there is there is a possibility that the interpreter’s 
identity will affect the words of the informant, and therefore be a pivotal part of the final 
research product (Temple & Rosalind, 2002). This was a challenge for us as we received the 
information in the form it was interpreted, leaving it difficult to grasp the true meaning of 
what the informant had said, and this may have influenced the collected data (ref 4.7 
reliability and validity). This was particularly true in one interview, when it was clear the 
informant’s body language that did not match what the interpreter claimed the informant was 
saying.   
4.3.3 Field conversations  
During both fieldworks we had innumerable field conversations, which could be classified as 
what Neuman (2006) refers to as unstructured, nondirective in-depth interviews. Sharing 
information about ourselves, and showing genuine interest in the informants seemed to build 
trust with the informants during field conversations, consequently enabling us to establish 
more in-depth conversations with them. Most of these conversations were not planned in 
advance, as we often made spontaneous contact when the opportunity presented itself. We 
wrote a daily diary as well day-to-day reports on all informal conversations. We also took 
notes during several of these field conversations in as a mean of increasing the accuracy of the 
data. The type of informants ranged from refugees to the local population. Sometimes these 
conversations were just for a few minutes, but other times we communicated for hours. Even 
though not all of these informants gave us insight into the actual research question, 
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nonetheless enriched our cultural knowledge as we learned to integrate ourselves into their 
society through rituals, ways of being and understanding underlying meanings of the way of 
life in Lebanon.    
4.3.4 Participant observations and observations 
A key principle of fieldwork is naturalism, meaning that, to seek the real underlying 
meanings of the world, you need to become directly involved and become a part of the social 
world you study (Neuman, 2014). For us this became both the biggest struggle and greatest 
achievement of our research. Most of the participant observations were connected directly or 
indirectly to the affected population or the refugees. We visited several community centers, 
and participated in the distribution of mattresses to Syrian refugees. We also had the chance to 
visit two ITS for Syrian refugees as well as two Palestinian refugee camps. During an 
excursion held by a NGO we also participated in a Disaster Risk Reduction program in a 
Lebanese village when we were asked to directly assist. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Photo of the Disaster Risk Reduction Program. Source: Jensen & Lura, 2015. 
 
 As a researcher in an emergency you can suddenly find yourself in the position of being seen 
as a resource rather than a researcher. This could potentially have negatively affected the data 
collected as we stepped out from the role as a researcher and contributed to shaping the 
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informants’ settings. To manage the role as a researcher is difficult in itself, because as a 
participant that observes the field, you need to gain respect and trust among the informants in 
order to gain access to the “inside” (Blaikie, 2010; Neuman, 2006). We gained access to 
information just by being curious, and asking questions, as we knew nothing about the field 
that we were in. So when the informants gave us the status of novice we tried to play the role 
the best we could, and did not see it as an option to say ‘no’ when asked to participate in the 
humanitarian response. 
 
We also observed two national meetings, one inter-agency meeting, and one national sector 
meeting. However, we used the opportunity to establish new contacts after the meeting. There 
are several advantages of using both interviews and participant observations, as during the 
observations we are able to see human interactions from a distance and consequently tried to 
find a deeper meaning to the informants behavior (Neuman, 2006). The challenges faced 
during field observations and observations are further explained in section 4.5.1.  
4.4 Ethical considerations  
Ethics begins and ends with our role as researchers. Both before, during and after conducting 
the fieldwork the researcher should reflect on their actions, something highly-dependent on 
the degree of integrity that researchers have (Neuman, 2006). Before conducting our 
fieldwork we discussed some ethical considerations in regard to how we would protect the 
informants’ anonymity. We strived to accomplish this both during and after the two 
fieldworks. One of the means of ensuring probity was to send out information letters by e-
mail to get approval before entering the interview settings.  These gave information about 
what we were studying, and ensured the informants that we would not ask them any personal 
questions and that it was anonymous.  
 
Conversely, this is very difficult to achieve when performing participant observations and 
conducting unstructured field conversations with refugees and the local population. We did, 
however, inform these informants about the study onset and that we would protect their 
anonymity. The refugees did not express any concerns regarding the matter of becoming part 
of the research, though we did experience challenges with regards to what they expected in 
return. This was highly difficult, as we had no authority to help these unfortunate people, and 
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never expressed that we could do so either. For example, during visit to an ITS we 
interviewed several refugees. After the interview several of the female informants ran to their 
tents and found their refugee registration papers, expressed their deep distress and wanted us 
to take their papers and assist them. This was, of course, not possible, but left us feeling that 
we had failed to preserve the ethical considerations with regards to these informants. We also 
excluded all names and personal information from all interviews, both those we recorded and 
those in note form.  
 
Another challenge we experienced was information received from governmental actors. In 
several instances we received information from actors that we feared would endanger their 
anonymity, as well as their professional working relationship with the government if the 
information were to come out. We therefore chose not to use this information even though it 
offered good empirical data that would strengthen the thesis. We also experienced extensive 
ethical challenges in regard to providing balance in the presentation of the empirical findings 
and not revealing the identities of the informants. Not using the organizational names is an 
obvious example of how we managed to preserve their anonymity. As mentioned in section 
4.2.2 we did use the organization/ministry name of the lead agency UNHCR, and MoSA. 
These were the informants that we could use the organization/ ministry name of, as there was 
no possibility to trace the identity of these informants. After some considerations we decided 
to not use the organizational name for the NGOs and the INGOs, as there might be a chance 
to reveal their identity, through the work genre.  
 
 
 During the data reduction period we also experienced ethical challenges. As we had 
transcribed most of the interviews, we consciously attempted to not take sentences out of 
context when using it in the empirical material. However, we knew that, as researchers, we 
will, to a certain extent, interpret and understand the findings based upon what we seek to find 
(Neuman, 2006). This has, though unintentionally, not only hampered the quality of the 
collected material, but also the ethical aspects with regards to showing the informants respect 
through presenting their statements in the context that they were said. We have, however, 
tried to limit this by having two data collection periods where we had second interviews with 
most of the informants from the first fieldwork. This was done in order to reduce our own 
potential misunderstandings as well as to confirm that this was what the informants actually 
meant by their statements. 
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4.5 Experienced challenges 
4.5.1 Emotional aspects 
Sympathy is, compared by Fangen (2004) to the ability to grasp other individuals’ roles, as 
sympathy implies that we suspend our personal desires to help and show compassion to other 
individuals by taking on their roles. As researchers in an emergency it is exceptionally 
difficult to manage the role as both a focused researcher with the topic of interest in mind, as 
well as attempting to inhabit the roles of the informants. This was especially difficult when it 
came to the local population and the refugees and during a visit at one of the ITS’s, we failed 
to do this. We had to cancel a distribution that we were going to participate in because we 
could not handle the emotional upset we suffered after deep conversations with the refugees. 
We had several incidents where we struggled to withhold emotional feelings, and keep our 
focus in mind, as both the thesis and the world we came from seemed to mean nothing 
anymore. Josselson (2013) describes this as a consequence of trying to learn from your 
participants, as you will be inviting them to have an impact on, and challenge your way of 
thinking. Seeing people live with no dignity, hope or possibilities, inhibited and tested the 
values we were familiar with. Feeling deep shame, injustice, and anger seemed to shape our 
minds to an extent that made it difficult for us to eat, sleep and focus after these meetings. 
When crying children grab your legs in desperation, with a hope that you can offer them a 
better life, you are forced to look at yourself with new eyes. What you have experienced and 
seen can never be unseen nor forgotten, or as Josselson (2013, p. 112) states “... In a good 
interview, you will be emotionally as well as cognitively engaged. There will be moments of 
such intense identification with the participants that you will feel you have lost yourself”. 
4.5.2 Security issues 
During the two trips to Lebanon we experienced several incidents and concerns regarding 
personal security. This led the data collection to a certain extent, as there were times when we 
had to cancel appointments or make new plans for conducting further data collection. The 
first fieldwork was originally intended to be predominately performed in Tripoli after some 
days in Beirut. This plan had to be changed hurriedly after militia suspected to be part of 
Nursa Front and IS attacked a central area of Tripoli. The tension and uncertainty followed 
throughout the stay in Lebanon, so we decided to stay in Beirut, but travel on day trips to 
Tripoli and other parts of Lebanon for specific interviews and field observations. The 
emotional anxiety that follows when you don’t know if, what and when something might 
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happen was something we could not prepare ourselves for. We did, however, establish 
emergency plans, which included reporting back home on where and when we would be at 
certain locations. When we returned to Lebanon the second time, the security issues had 
increased. Not only had the tension between the local populations intensified but there also 
were constant clashes along Syrian border between the Lebanese army and militia believed to 
be part of IS and Nursa Front. This heavily complicated the security situation in the country. 
During both our stays the Lebanese army managed to gain back control over border villages 
but several incidents involving IS terror cells, and the discovery of undetonated bombs 
impacted the stability in the country. Due to the situational picture during the second trip we 
tried to avoid daily routines with regards to places and areas. When religious rituals or 
demonstrations were taking place we stayed in our room. However, if something were to 
happen we could not control it, and this was something we had to accept. We managed to deal 
with this most days, but during our trips to extremely high-risk areas on the border to Syria 
we were extremely anxious both before and during the actual trip. We had never imagined 
that we would intentionally put ourselves in a situation where life seemed so fragile, but we 
put ourselves in these situations because it was the only way to reach certain informants. Even 
if we knew that the choices there and then might have been irrational, all we could see was 
what we could gain with regard to data collection. We needed contact with field workers and 
refugees’ living in these areas and this was the only way. In retrospect, it would have been 
better to travel with the security of an UN agency, but we never had the opportunity. 
Therefore, we had to establish connections ourselves and travel to these areas with our private 
taxi driver.  
 
We were forced to cancel a planned one-day trip to Akkar in the last minute due to a violent 
episode between terror groups and the local population. This was also a high-risk area for 
kidnapping, on the advice of the informants; we decided to cancel the trip to Akkar and travel 
to Tripoli instead. This did affect the data collection as we were not able to collect data in an 
area we knew had been most affected by the crisis, but we did have the opportunity to visit an 
area outside Tripoli. Throughout both field studies we listened and talked to the local 
population in order to be updated on security concerns, as they were the ones with local 
knowledge.  
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4.6 Data reduction and analysis 
Data production requires some manipulation to render it suitable for analysis, and this is done 
through data reduction techniques such as coding through categories, and these can be created 
prior to the data collection through the interview guide (Blaikie, 2010 p. 208). During the first 
fieldwork we therefore had an interview guide with questions that were based on general 
concepts from the theoretical framework. This enabled us to explore existed ones and then 
later hone the focus before further research in the second fieldwork. During the second 
fieldwork we used categories derived from the social actors and the new theoretical 
framework. This theoretical framework was established after we had narrowed the focus 
based on the understanding derived from the social actors during the first fieldwork. The 
questions in the interview guide during fieldwork two were based on the underpinning of the 
established theoretical framework. During both fieldworks there was a constant ongoing 
analysis in order to uncover interconnections between the theoretical stances and the 
preliminarily data collected. This helped us to have a thematic structure to try to answer the 
research questions formed, or change them if new data gave new insights or perspectives. 
Having this structure also made it possible to identify interconnections between the different 
theoretical categories. All interviews were based on a semi-structured guide, and, because we 
collected an extensive amount of data also including notes from field conversations, 
participant observations and observations, it was necessary to drastically reduce this amount 
after both fieldworks. We therefore transcribed all recorded interviews. Thereafter, we coded 
both the manually written and transcribed interviews as well as the notes. The answers were 
coded by categorizing them according to key concepts from the theory. We used the program 
NVivo to structure and reduce the data through these coded categories.  
 
4.7 Reliability and validity 
In this section we discuss how the data collection through the method of triangulation might 
have influenced the research, as well as elaborate how these aspects might have affected the 
reliability and validity of this research. Reliability is the dependability and consistency when 
stating your observations (Neuman, 2006). Reliability is how the stated measure can produce 
the same result by using the same method, put simply, reliability concerns repeatability. For a 
study to have validity it needs to be reliable (Neuman, 2006). Validity is, according to 
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Neuman (2006), seeking truthfulness, and, in qualitative research, giving a balanced, fair and 
honest account of the social life from the viewpoint of the social actors understanding.   
 
4.7.1 Reliability 
When considering the objective of reliability in the research we considered the consistency of 
the semi-structured interviews, participant observations, and field conversations - as well as 
the document studies that structured the data collection as a triangulation method. Reliability 
is ultimately a question of the ability to repeat the research and gain the same outcome based 
upon the same method of collection (Neuman, 2006). Using qualitative methods enables the 
researcher to measure the social world from different angles and form dissimilar points of 
views, which is not possible through quantitative research as it neglects the key aspects of 
diversity that exist in the social world (Ibid).  
The thesis’ biggest achievement in ensuring reliability is that we have conducted two separate 
fieldworks with a significant interval between them. As the first fieldwork was highly focused 
on discovering the understanding and the usage of technological systems by the actors in 
Lebanon, we had the possibility of developing a research problem that was based on what 
existed, and not what we as researchers assumed it to be, or a theoretical stance. During the 
second fieldwork we had the possibility of seeking a deeper understanding of what the thesis 
had the aim of describing. The findings from the first fieldwork corresponded with what we 
discovered the second fieldwork, even though this was narrower in scope and seen through 
the new theoretical lenses. The beneficiaries we interviewed during both fieldworks were 
located in different geographical areas, but expressed the same challenges. This increased the 
reliability of the collected data, as it shows that the same information can be collected across 
different areas, and with intervals of time between each collection period. Many of the 
informants were interviewed during both fieldworks, though some were later omitted as they 
were no longer relevant when the focus narrowed. During the second fieldwork we focused 
on interviewing the most relevant informants for a second time to confirm the findings, as 
well as interviewing new informants that we lacked the perspectives of during the first stay - 
such as the governmental actors and the beneficiaries. However during some of these 
interviews, an interpreter was used. When using an interpreter it is possible that the data 
collected may have been influenced by the identity of this interpreter (Temple & Rosalind, 
2002). Yet, the data collected from these informants was in accordance with other statements 
found during the two data collections. It is therefore likely that the interpretation was similar 
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to what the informants actually said. Therefore, the accuracy of the data from both fieldworks 
increases the reliability of this thesis. When comparing the collected data with the official 
reports evaluating the humanitarian response mechanism in Lebanon, we found, as stated 
earlier (ref 4.3.1), the same tendencies, even though this report was conducted the year before 
and with a slightly different area of focus. This triangulation increases the reliability of the 
findings. 
 
As this research process involved both authors, we always had the possibility of discussing 
the data throughout the process. When doing this we had the opportunity to reflect and 
compare our interpretations of data during the stay in Lebanon. This decreases the authors’ 
possibility of interpreting the situation based on their individual understanding, and increases 
the ability to present the real understanding of the informants. It is, however, important to 
state that we as researchers will always be shaped by subjective interpretations to some extent. 
Therefore, it will be impossible to avoid the data being completely unaffected by our 
subjective understanding, culture and values. There was always the possibility that our role as 
researchers might affect the informants’ willingness to share honest opinions, as well being 
skeptical to us as researchers. During the interviews we, however, felt that all of the 
informants willingly shared both their challenges and successes, and we felt that they were 
being honest and sincere when stating their understanding of their role in the humanitarian 
response in Lebanon. The informants were selected based on the criteria of knowledge and 
experience within the field of interest, and not on probability sampling. This means that the 
findings revealed in this thesis are not possible to generalize in a wider context. Despite this, 
some of the findings may be transferred to other context of humanitarian responses, which is 
further discussed in external validity. As the research problem stated an abductive research 
strategy, the theoretical stance adopted in this thesis will influence and structure the final 
conclusion - as we, as researchers, see the data collected and reduced through the theoretical 
lenses. Therefore, is impossible for qualitative research to attain perfect reliability. 
Throughout this chapter we have, however, discussed the challenges and methods honestly 
and sincerely. 
4.7.2 Internal and external validity   
Validity in regard to the research means to what degree the findings are truthful. As we have 
performed qualitative research, validity is only achieved through authenticity, meaning that 
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the presentation of the social life gives an honest, fair and balanced viewpoint that reflects the 
actors everyday lives (Neuman, 2006).  
 
Internal validity 
Internal validity is the degree to which your research design produce a conclusion that is 
presented in an error free manner internally (Neuman, 2006), and that the presented findings 
are recognizable to those informants (Ibid). Throughout this process we have continuously 
adjusted our theoretical framework, research problem and research questions in order to 
always be mindful of not presenting our own understanding. As we triangulated, with 
different methods and comparing data gathered through different methods, the internal 
validity increases as the same results are replicated. As we had two fieldworks, we had the 
possibility of testing the data collected during fieldwork one. This also gave us the chance to 
gain a deeper insight into the different actors understanding of how the ICT systems affected 
their everyday life. Therefore, we are sure that the data presented in this thesis is in 
accordance with how our informants will define this relationship. This can be stated as we 
have studied our field notes closely, transcribed all of our recorded interviews and compared 
them. This increases the internal validity of this thesis.  
Nonetheless, it is important to note that our informants from the initial interviews during the 
first fieldwork might not find the findings as easily recognizable. As we continuously 
changed focus and become narrower in our approach, the questions we asked changed 
accordingly. The concept of communication and information sharing through technological 
solutions have, however, always provided the building blocks of this thesis, so the concept 
itself will be recognizable. Taking sentences from interviews out of their original context in 
order to produce an analysis is also an element that negatively affected the internal validity. 
This problem, however, was ameliorated somewhat by having several interviews in order to 
potential find correlations, and also contacting informants for clarification when we were 
unsure of the content’s meaning. Not using a tape recorder during all interviews also reduced 
the internal validity, as the notes during these interviews did not incorporate the entire 
conversation. Nonetheless, we spent several hours, or even up to a day, with these informants. 
This gave us the possibility to repeat questions and confirm statements. Using an interpreter 
(ref 4.7.1) may affect the reliability, and thus also affect the informant’s ability to recognize 
the data presented in this thesis, which then hampers the internal validity. However, the data 
material from these informants was in coherence with the data collected from other 
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informants, which was interviewed two times during the data collection periods, this reinforce 
the validity of the data.       
 
External validity 
External validity is the ability to generalize the findings in Lebanon across other similar 
settings (Neuman, 2006). The research setting was the humanitarian response in Lebanon. 
The informants were relevant experienced actors with either a professional relationship to the 
response or a beneficiary of it. The question therefore asked was: is it possible to transfer the 
findings and conclusions out of the context of Lebanon and generalize it to humanitarian 
responses operating in other contexts? As discussed in the inner context (2.2) we see that the 
humanitarian structure, strategies, norms and way of operating are common structures 
identifiable in other settings that deal with refugee crises or humanitarian operations. Many of 
the humanitarian actors transferred from one operation to another will still work in 
accordance with one common structure developed in the international humanitarian 
environment. During the fieldworks we were both informed of, and personally observed, that 
there is a significant degree of turnover of staff, particularly in the field where 6 monthly 
tours of duty are commonplace. We also met heads of offices and sector leads that were 
preparing to move to different operations.  
The beneficiaries and governmental actors will be specific to the context of Lebanon, as they 
are local with their own set of beliefs, culture and values. However, the ways in which they 
live, in hopeless and devastating conditions, will often be seen in other emergency contexts, 
as well the overwhelmed national authorities. What will hamper the external validity is the 
degree of development of technological systems in these contexts. If there are operations 
working in more rural areas, where the infrastructure is not compatible with ICT system 
needs, it is rather difficult.  However the official ICT systems ActivityInfo and RAIS (further 
elaborated in 5.1.1) , is used as official ICT systems in several humanitarian responses around 
the world, which then increases the external validity, as both organizational structures and the 
ICT systems can be found in similar emergency responses. The fact that UNHCR is the lead 
UN agency of the response in Lebanon differentiates from most humanitarian responses that 
not only are dealing with a refugee crisis, this may hamper the external validity as this in most 
cases is in the mandate of UN-OCHA. However, in the regional Syrian response, the lead 
agency is UNHCR in all of the affected countries, and several of these responses do also use 
the ICT systems ActivityInfo and RAIS which increases the external validity of this research. 
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5.0 Empirical findings  
The implementation of ICT systems does not only rely on the diffusion, but also as described 
in chapter 2, upon the contextual framework in which it is embedded within. The framework 
is thus constrained by the actors in the socio-technical system (see also 3.2). The data in this 
chapter therefore seeks to explain the system and describe the process based on the actors 
understanding (Blaikie, 2010). 
 
The findings have been structured into three sections. The first section, 5.1, explains the 
diffusion and adoption of ICT systems in Lebanon. The second section, 5.2, seeks to highlight 
the key challenges preventing reliable information processing among humanitarian actors. 
Section 5.3 outlines how the assessments are linked to planned activities and implementation 
of interventions. To guide the presentation of section 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3  descriptions from the 
report of IFRC (2013), the real-time evaluation report (Crisp et al., 2013) of the Syrian 
response, and UNHCR’s reply to this (UNHCR, 2013a) have been included. 
 
5.1  Diffusion and adoption of ICT systems in Lebanon 
In order to describe the diffusion and adoption of ICT systems in Lebanon it is necessary to 
briefly elaborate the definition and the usage of ICT systems (see also 1.1). ICT systems are 
an umbrella term for information and communication technology, and include all devices and 
applications used for or associated with communication (Rouse, s.a). In recent years there has 
been an increased focus upon and use of information and communication technology in 
humanitarian aid. The ICT systems are used to detect needs more quickly, predicting the crisis 
and ultimately formulate an efficient and reliable response that matches the recourses to the 
needs of the community at risk, also leading to a more accountable and transparent response 
(IFRC, 2013). Digital data collections replace the traditional pen and paper assessments with 
digital devices, resulting in substantial gains in terms the speed and quality of data collected 
(Ibid). Large data analyses such as mapping subsequently gathers the information collected by 
digital devices and form reports based on the collected information (Ibid). In combination, 
they are intended to foster easier communication between the involved actors as well as an 
increased opportunity to create a real-time situational overview of the activities in the 
response and where the needs are (UN-OCHA, 2012). This has led to an expanding 
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diversification of the ICT systems within humanitarian aid, with the potential benefits 
becoming increasingly known by the involved actors. 
  
5.1.1 ICT systems in Lebanon  
In Lebanon the humanitarian actors have implemented ICT systems to detect needs more 
efficiently. The response mechanism uses ActivityInfo, RAIS (Refugee Assistance 
Information System) for data analysis and an inter-agency unit produces geographical maps to 
analyze the large data created.  Information from this unit is published at the Inter-agency 
Information Sharing Portal. Below follows a description of these ICT systems.  
 
 
ActivityInfo  
ActivityInfo is an online platform implemented and managed by the UNHCR in Lebanon. 
The platform’s purpose is to gather data on all activities provided to beneficiaries each month 
and is used by all partners receiving UN funding. The reporting tool was introduced in 
Lebanon in 2014, and is mandatory for all implementing partners. All actors working in the 
response have the opportunity to use the reporting tool if desired. The ActivityInfo reporting 
database was introduced as a more efficient alternative to multiple formats and offline 
monitoring tools. The evolution section of the Lebanon response plan 2015-2016 states that, 
in 2014, ActivityInfo allowed for more meaningful and efficient tracking of targets as well as 
being a new coordination mechanism that helped the partners to systemize the assessment 
process between the actors and also harmonized the data collection. The tool is based upon 
partners’ reports on indicators and these are divided into sectors (ref 2.2). The indicators are 
prescribed every year and state all activities performed in each sector. At the end of each 
month all activities need to be registered in ActivityInfo, and following this UNHCR 
processes the received data to produce a formal published report on activities performed in the 
humanitarian response. This report is received after three months, and the tool is non-dynamic 
in its content for the implementing partners, though, for UN agencies leading sectors, the tool 
presents a spatial overview of the activities over the previous month. 
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RAIS  
The UNHCR developed an online tool called RAIS that was introduced in 2014. The tool has 
gathered the basic information of refugees registered with UNHCR and is used to track 
service provision of aid and confirm and track identities of refugees during distributions. 
During distributions they scan the registration papers in RAIS to ensure that the person is 
eligible for the item provided. The actors can track the service assistance of aid by the pre-
entered assessments fed into the tracking database of RAIS. The tool also helps avoid 
duplication of aid. In order to gain access to the tool, the partners need to sign a 
confidentiality agreement to ensure that the sensitive information is secure. 
 
Inter-agency mapping  
In order to create a comprehensive inter-agency coordination structure the inter-agency 
mapping unit was established by the UNHCR. The unit consists of five organizations that 
provide geographical mapped information through ICT tools to the humanitarian response in 
Lebanon. The actors within this unit have been given a mandate for one of the five 
operational areas and are responsible for assisting in the overall response in their area. Each 
organization has a team that gathers information through monthly assessments in their 
operational area. The data collected are presented on the online Inter-agency Information 
Sharing Portal together with other relevant data from the response; often as reports, maps or 
analyses that show vulnerabilities within the specific area of interest. The maps presented on 
the platform are non-dynamic and are used together with ActivityInfo and RAIS to provide an 
overview of gaps and vulnerabilities.  
The connection between data collection and data analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Relationship between assessments and activities when gathering information. 
 63 
 Figure 5.1 depicts the continuous process of gathering information through the official ICT 
systems. While ActivityInfo gives an overview over activities done at community level, 
RAIS, in contrast, presents a summary at the household level together with the inter-agency 
(IA mapping) unit that produces maps, reports, and analysis on the Inter-agency Information 
Sharing Portal. It is designed to create a strategic overview of the entire response.  By 
subtracting the activities contacted and vulnerabilities identified through assessments the 
actors are intended to get a comprehensive overview of where the needs and gaps are.                          
          
5.1.2 Adoption and involvement of actors  
Adoption 
ActivityInfo, RAIS and the mapping performed by the inter-agency unit are all initiated by 
UNHCR, as they are the lead agency in the response. Prior to the adoption of these tools the 
actors had to contend with a fragmented situational picture - as most of the information shared 
among the actors was done manually through occasional phone calls, e-mails and meetings. 
Everyone reported their activities, though this was done through innumerable Excel sheets 
shared in meetings, creating complex information processing requirements. The adoption of 
ICT systems has created an efficient working environment for the organizations involved, as 
they don’t need to spend hour’s manually inputting written assessments into computers. This 
not only saves time, but also money and manpower. According to UNHCR: 
  
Information sharing and all the other tools I have told you about is for coordination. The 
mapping, dissemination tool, the platform we share information on, and ActivityInfo. It 
doesn’t need to be ActivityInfo, with the use of such systems we have proven here that 
everyone can use the same tool. There is no other place where all agencies use the same tool. 
We proved that is possible (IM, UNHCR). 
 
The informant is here explaining that all humanitarian actors use UNHCR’s tools, claiming 
that this has never before been seen in a humanitarian response. The development team from 
the UN lead-agency expressed during interviews that the tools provided contribute to the 
strategic overview needed in the response. However, this does not completely accord with 
what several NGO/INGO informants expressed during interviews. They stated that, though 
they used the tool, it does not give them the strategic overview they are in need of because the 
framework that the tools are created within does not necessarily match the organizations’ 
values and needs in terms of information processing. An IM from an UN agency exemplified 
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this: “The users which have defined tools like ActivityInfo as a tool are very few users, the 
users are only the senior management of UNHCR and UNICEF. Because the tools fit their 
needs and nobody else’s that is the main problem”. This statement can be seen as 
ActivityInfo not being defined as a very useful tool by the implementing partners, but rather 
as a reporting mechanism that the humanitarian actors are obligated to report in. For the UN-
agencies this statement shows that it is a functional tool. This may be because all the actors 
report their activities to them, leaving them with the complete overview of what is being 
done.  
 
Involvement 
During data collection it was observed that there was a lack of focus on the users from INGOs 
and NGOs when developing ICT systems. This was most noticeably revealed during 
interviews with UN actors and technological developers. Their focus was on how ICT 
systems could provide reliable and efficient data in the response, rather than how the systems 
are adjusted to the functional needs: precise and timely information on and across 
organizations working at field level. One informant expressed these thoughts of making ICT 
systems user-relevant:  
 …technology in its own sake is not going to help anybody. It is about making technology user 
relevant. So it is more what you use technology for, so to have one information management 
system to the response I think is possible, and the technology are probably already built for 
that. But then having the system to make sure that data is there, its feeding back, you know 
that the in and out flow data are relevant and useful. And that’s about again, having the 
technology people work on it with the users and the providers to make sure that it’s not, you 
know the geeks have made some great technology that nobody knows how to use. And then the 
operators think that the technology is not relevant for what they need. This is always the 
biggest challenge (Country director, INGO).  
 
The informant notes that it is useful that developers and operators are working closely with 
the actors in the field in order to ensure that the technology is appropriate for their needs and 
skills. Several INGOs and NGOs stated that this concern had resulted in them not using 
ActivityInfo. This was also observed during a national sector meeting, where the sector lead 
encouraged the organizations to start reporting again, as the sector was struggling with getting 
the actors to submit reports. Many ActivityInfo users are highly dissatisfied and the problem 
is rooted in not having access to the information gathered from ActivityInfo prior to the 3-
monthly report UNHCR produces, as non-UN organizations do not have access to 
information about other organizations activities before the report is published. Several 
informants commented that this negatively affected the possibility of getting a comprehensive 
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understanding of what others are doing in the area in which they are working. A country 
director for an INGO said that the response in Lebanon is facing challenges with information 
processing: 
I think to look at technological solutions is the wrong way to go about the problem, because 
you are talking about stuff that has to be accessible for hundreds of people with different 
background. You know the mistake that the coordination systems always do in terms of 
technology is have one size fits all. So to come up with this one system and every response 
have tried one, here its ActivityInfo, it’s been developed for a year and a half, and it’s going to 
sort all of our problems, of course it’s not, it’s never going to happen.  
 
This may mean that the ICT systems alone are not going to provide precise and timely 
information, as they need to be user relevant, which, according to this informant is impossible 
due to different organizational mandates, needs and values. ActivityInfo is indicator based, 
meaning that activities are reported through pre-decided references that describe the 
performed activity. One example is: number of hygiene kits delivered, where hygiene kits are 
the indicator. Our informants identified this indicator-based approach as a weakness due to 
the fact that these indicators do not incorporate the range of activities performed in this 
response, as the number of indicators are limited and the existing indicators are too confined. 
This may lead to activities reported on wrong indicators or not reported at all, resulting in 
inaccurate data. According to two IM informants in an INGO, the standardized indicators do 
not offer the possibility to compare data between organizations. This is because actors might 
report activities that are not consistent with the confined indicator, resulting in refugees 
receiving greater or lower levels of goods or aid than the indicator stated, or something 
entirely different as there is not an indicator describing this activity. These indicators do, 
however, change every year, so the actors have the possibility of affecting this through their 
sector, as each sector defines their own indicators. Another informants stated that the issue is 
not only related to ActivityInfo, but also the joint assessments set up by the inter-agency 
mapping unit: “To date very little joint methodology is used. And I think well we have tried to 
improve that. There is sort of a joint assessment group (inter agency unit) there is an 
information management team, but we are still in a working progress” (Legal advisor, 
INGO).  However the contextual complexity shifts frequently, resulting in maps becoming 
outdated upon publishing, as they are not dynamic - as well as the fact that they are built upon 
little joint methodology.  
 
RAIS is the only ICT system that tracks at a household level and is the only system that 
updates dynamically. Because the tool is dynamic, it requires an internet connection to 
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update. An informant from a UN agency explained that this could potentially be a challenge if 
the internet connection is severed. During the fieldwork the authors’ participated in the 
distribution of mattresses. The refugees were invited to the distribution through a text 
message stating time and date for distribution. When it is their turn their registration paper 
with UNHCR gets scanned through RAIS, in order to validate their identification and to 
verify that they are eligible. After they receive the item this gets registered through RAIS in 
order to avoid duplication and that the refugee has received this item.  If, however, the 
internet connection breaks down, RAIS will not function and the distribution would have to 
be canceled or delayed. One informant from an INGO further emphasized this by informing 
the authors’ of previous experiences. One of these distributions was delayed for four hours. 
The RAIS system is also only functional for UNHCR registered refugees and performed by 
UN lead-agency implementing partners.  This means that services to refugees not registered 
will not be tracked as well as non-Syrian refugees, as they are not included in the official 
response. 
 
The implementing partners in the official response consist of both NGOs and INGOs. Every 
informant within these organizations admitted that the official ICT tools in Lebanon are not 
very user-friendly and demand a certain level of IT expertise. A developer within INGO 
expressed concerns regarding the level of expertise that the humanitarian aid workers in 
Lebanon possess, as they, in his opinion, did not even know how to use Excel.  An IM in a 
UN agency corroborated this, saying: 
 
 We (developers) create all these amazing new tools in Beirut and then in the field there is 
someone trying to catch up with the tools we made four months ago. I don’t know what to say 
about the quality of it, it is half pass. Something works really well. I think probably the best 
thing I can say is that actual professional relationship is that we have people in the field and 
that’s probably the best way to facilitate information at the moment.  
 
This informant has an understanding that appears consistent with what previous informants 
have stated with regards to how ICT systems must be user-relevant in order to reach their 
potential. For now the informant thinks the best way to disseminate information is face-to-
face in the field, as ICT systems, in the informant’s opinion, do not facilitate this in 
accordance with what is needed. 
 
When discussing the degree of involvement of the ICT systems with MoSA, they were rather 
dissatisfied, as they felt they were, up until now, not being involved by UN agencies. MoSA 
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needs more technical support as they are mostly familiar with working with pen and paper 
and do not have access to the ICT systems discussed above.  The reasons for this are due to 
lack of technical expertise in the ministry and the lack of being involved by the UN agencies. 
However, they stress the fact that Lebanese government does not have the capacity to assist 
the huge number of refugees and are, therefore, dependent on support of the UN in order to 
manage the emergency, especially within the usage of ICT systems.   
 
When interviewing the INGOs and the UN agencies, they also highlighted that the local 
NGOs and MoSA are less included in the official response, and, consequently, are less 
involved in the ICT systems in Lebanon. This was also the opinion among NGOs and MoSA, 
and the stated reason for this was often that of a language and resources barrier. The ICT 
systems and all other information shared are in English, and some NGOs as well as MoSA 
face the problem of staff not understanding English, and do not always have resources to 
engage with the international response. The authors’ only met one NGO that participated 
actively in the response. The rest of the NGOs said that they only participated sporadically in 
meetings due to the fact that they do not trust the UN agencies, and felt they were corrupt. 
Therefore they did not feel any urgent need to involve themselves fully. Informants from 
NGOs, INGOs and two UN agencies stressed that the reports on activities performed were 
based on unreliable numbers, and did not reflect what is in the field. This was exemplified by 
a head of office in a UN agency, who commented that a report on winterization turned out to 
be inaccurate, as when the informant visited the field, the children who were supposed to have 
received winterization kits were still walking around in flip-flops. Even though the INGOs, 
NGOs and MoSA state that they are less involved, the UN lead-agency emphasizes that all 
actors who wish to have access to the ICT systems have the opportunity of using them. The 
authors also have observed that both the information on how these ICT systems function, as 
well as the possibility to sign up for future training sessions to learn to use them, are available 
on UNHCR Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal.  
 
5.1.3 Adoption and involvement through organizational structures 
In the sections above, the diffusion and implementation of the official ICT systems 
concerning digital data collection into data analysis platforms are described. The users’ 
involvement in this process has also been highlighted. The ICT systems should ultimately be 
used to create a feedback loop of information between the humanitarian actors and the 
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individuals they are serving.  However, there must also be a commitment and capacity to use 
this feedback to improve programming (IFRC, 2013). Throughout the interviews it was 
discovered that the correlation between the implementation and the users’ involvement of this 
was highly affected by the existing organizational structure. One country director from an 
INGO expressed that ultimately it was not a matter of technology but how it is used. 
Conversely, how they use it is reliant on the humanitarian actors expertise and access to the 
technology, according to an IM in an INGO, this informant also stated that the creation of 
systematic and standardized procedures for implementation was necessary in order for the 
ICT systems to function fully. The empirical findings of information processing among 
humanitarian actors are documented below.  
 
5.2 Information processing  
In Lebanon the humanitarian organizations at national level implement and plan interventions 
developed at the strategic level. The field level performs the interventions, and collects new 
information through assessments. The implementing partners at national level thereafter 
register the collected information and activities in the ICT systems. These form the basis for 
further strategies that the strategic level sets the framework for. The empirical findings have 
shown that the external information processing is highly influenced by the organizational 
structures, as shown in the following section: 
 
5.2.1. Information processing and organizational structure 
 
Triple role 
 From the outset of the Syria crisis and until the beginning of 2015, the crisis in Lebanon was 
classified as a purely refugee crisis, and the mandate for leading the response was given to 
UNHCRs in co-operation with MoSA (ref. section 2.2). UNHCR’s leadership role was 
extensively highlighted as an issue of concern in the real-time evaluation report (Crisp et al., 
2013). The agency’s triple role was considered problematic in that it could potentially lead to 
a conflict of interest, due to the fact that UNHCRs were donors, coordinators and 
implementers of their own programs. The report stressed that the stakeholders had a 
perception that UNHCR were often more preoccupied with managing its own operation than 
coordinating the overall refugee response (Crisp et al., 2013). This was, however, taken into 
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account before the response plan for 2014 was implemented. UNHCR also responded to the 
report December 2013, by publishing a report where these issues were discussed and further 
plans for addressing them were stated (UNHCR, 2013a). When talking to informants from 
UNHCR, they emphasized that they had intentionally distinguished their inter-agency 
coordination function from the operational function in Lebanon as they agreed the matter was 
problematic and could lead to a conflict of interest. The inter-agency unit was established in 
Lebanon the same year in a separate office with UNHCR’s employees.  
 
The real-time evaluation report (Crisp et al., 2013) also emphasized how UNHCRs could 
strengthen their coordination and reputation in the Syrian response. Among these 
recommendations a focus on information sharing and management within and among sectors 
was paid particular attention in the report, as the information management plays a crucial and 
central role in the relation to inter-agency coordination. Without this the response may fail to 
deliver an effective and collective reaction to the beneficiaries (Crisp et al., 2013). This was 
also addressed in UNHCR’s response to the real-time evaluation report. The agency was 
going to invest and develop ICT systems and provide training for the actors in order to 
strengthen the information sharing and information management within coordination. This, 
together with the separation of their inter-agency and the operational roles would form part of 
the strategy to strengthen the information management and sharing among humanitarian 
actors. 
 
However, a year later several of the implementing partners at national level still saw 
UNHCR’s role as an issue of concern. The NGOs spoken to were not aware that this had been 
done. The UN agencies and the INGOs were, however, fully aware that UNHCR had 
separated their roles. One informant stressed: “So you have a big conflict of interest which 
was sort of resolved at national level, by having different people affect the coordination and 
the implementation. But at the field level it was not.” (Country director, INGO). According to 
this informant the role of UNHCR was not clearly distinguished at field level, creating 
difficulties for the field workers to know the role UNHCR had in the field.  This was further 
exemplified by the head of office of an UN agency: “There are five field areas, which are 
based on UNHCR’s offices … In those areas there is a field coordinator for each sector who 
is generally part time coordinating and part time program implementer for UNHCR”.  This 
meant that the field coordinator’s role was both to control UNHCR’s own programs and 
ensure coordination for the entire sectors. According to these two informants, UNHCR had 
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therefore not managed to separate their roles as both coordinator and implementer. Even 
though several of the informants still thought of UNHCR’s role as problematic, all of them 
said that the agency, given the complex context, had managed the role the best they could. 
 
Information silo 
Instead of the Cluster approach usually implemented by UN-OCHA (ref 2.2), UNHCR have 
implemented SWG within each sector. As the SWG are built up to work closely with their 
own sector within all of the five operational areas, the cross-sectorial co-operation within each 
geographical area has experienced challenges with structured information sharing. This is 
because all sectors in each geographical area are not explicitly held accountable as they would 
do if the Cluster approach had been implemented. Several informants on national level 
stressed this: 
 
“People forget to share, or they don’t share with everyone they should. So they might be 
sharing something with this sector, or in this field area and then others do not know what is 
happening” (Sector lead, UN agency) 
 
“They call them sectors, but we still sit in the same office but are not communicating. 
Sometimes somebody is 20 feet away from you, but because we are not communicating we 
might be trying to do the exact same thing” (IM, UN agency) 
 
“…the most challenging aspect is sharing information with other organizations about the 
humanitarian operation… across humanitarian sectors” (Country coordinator, INGO) 
 
These informants highlight the common interpretation of the informants’ understanding of the 
information processing in the humanitarian response in Lebanon.  The informants convey that 
information sharing across organizations within a certain operational area is difficult and 
often shared in an unstructured manner. Many informants have said that the difficulties with 
sharing information are due to what they define as an ‘information silo’. This means that 
information is shared in a limited extent to a certain group of people, and sporadically.  
Consequently, this creates difficulties in establishing a situational overview both in an 
operational area, within one sector, as well as at national level. However, several informants 
from INGOs did not share this opinion. They thought information sharing across 
organizations was good, and that organizations gladly shared their information with others. 
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The real-time evaluation report did, however, note that not having the Cluster approach was 
problematic, and that humanitarian workers had been accustomed to working within this type 
of coordination structure (Crisp et al., 2013).   
 
One IM informant from a UN agency stated that information sharing was difficult due to the 
humanitarian foundation of working on a voluntary basis: 
 
 In terms of actual information sharing, like how we get it out there in a systematic way, well I 
think the biggest problem is that the whole sort of concept is like working together on a 
voluntary basis, where you sort of co-operation and agree to do this stuff together because 
there is no formalized structure. 
 
The informant’s statement can also be interpreted in a different way. Because the 
organizations are not only working on a voluntary basis, but also under non-unified structures 
it means that, as the humanitarian organizations have differential organizational values and 
mandates, it will create dissimilar operational focus affecting the ways of sharing information 
across organizations. The insufficient organizational structures may reduce the possibility for 
coherent information processing, as the humanitarian actors don’t have a standardized way of 
operating. A significant number of the informants stressed these factors, stating that this 
created difficulties with regard to having a standardized way of sharing information.  
 
The information shared between national and field level is often exchanged without the use of 
ICT systems. Field workers stated that they don’t have access or the necessary equipment to 
use the ICT systems for reporting. The activities performed at field level are therefore 
registered in Excel sheets sent to INGO and NGO staff at a national level. When talking to 
INGOs at national levels, all stated that they had someone assigned to register these Excel 
sheets into the ICT systems. The major INGOs stated that they had electronic devices that 
their field workers used, but these devices where not used to report activities but rather the 
assessments performed. Meetings are a potential arena for sharing information across 
organizations, as the humanitarian actors can meet face-to-face to coordinate. Informants 
stated that the intention in both the national and field level meetings was to create a situational 
overview for the involved humanitarian actors by sharing information across levels. However, 
not all the organizations take part in these meetings, with the NGOs, in particular, being 
frequently absent. The NGOs are also the actors who stated most frequently that they did not 
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use the official ICT systems. This may indicate that there is information from organizations 
not being shared through the ICT systems, and this information might also not be shared at 
meetings. The authors observed that during both a national sector and an inter-agency 
meeting, information was shared about security concerns, challenges within the sector and 
how to use the official ICT systems. During these meetings there were no discussions 
regarding the current interventions and needs. Although the informants did, nonetheless, state 
that this was often shared at field level within each sector. 
 
Turnover in staff 
One IM informant from an UN agency claimed that even if it was difficult to share 
information due to the voluntary practices and lack of formalized standards, there was good 
information flow within sectors. The biggest struggle was ensuring all humanitarian workers 
get this information. The informant said that the information was online at their Inter-agency 
Information Sharing Portal, but the field workers could still not find the information they 
wanted: 
I put it all into the portal and the Dropbox and it’s the sort of assumptions that once it is out 
there people know that and where they can go and get all the information, the problem though 
is that people in the field change every six months. So when new staff comes here they don’t 
know that this stuff is out there, so they are all saying: we need a map of this, and they hire 
someone else to do it. Meanwhile the information is there right. So one of the biggest thing is 
trying to get a sort of awareness of all the work that we have here. 
 
The informant highlighted something several other informants have stated as an issue with 
regards to information sharing. Due to high turnover in staff the information posted on the 
Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal is not commonly known; often because the staff has 
not received information about where they can find this information. Another informant 
further exemplified this: “There are always new people coming and leaving, so the turnover 
of staff is quite considerable. Therefore you have to explain the technological systems and 
make sure that everyone is aware of how everything is working” (Sector lead, UN agency).  
The informants that have claimed that high turnover in staff is a problem also said that the 
IM’s presence at the field level was of significant value, because they could personally 
provide this information to the field staff. This is in order that the field staff would know 
where to find information about where other humanitarian actors are operating, and what they 
are doing. 
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Information processing through ICT systems   
The massive development of ICT systems in Lebanon was initially observed by the authors as 
a positive development that would strengthen information sharing amongst different agencies. 
However, this view changed rapidly as several informants stated that this was a major issue 
for them as it hindered their attempts to ensure a comprehensive situational picture. When 
informants from UN agencies were asked, they specifically labeled the ICT systems 
developed within INGOs as problematic. All INGOs interviewed in Lebanon except one had 
developed their own program to keep control of their own activity plans and distinguish 
where further gaps and need could be found. When asking these INGOs if this was a problem, 
none of the informants identified it in such terms, but stated that the ICT system they had was 
used extensively to help them process information internally. The authors then asked if this 
information was shared with other INGOs, NGOs and UN agencies, to which the informants 
said ‘no’. However, several informants did say that they shared some of their reports on 
assessments they had conducted, when it was for the benefit of a joint program within their 
sector. All informants’ from INGOs and NGOs said that they did share information, but this 
was not regarding plans, but rather on what had already been performed. 
 
The planning part of the operation was a subject most informants specified as lacking within 
the official ICT systems. When asking these informants why this was important, they said it 
was because, in order to deliver aid efficiently and without duplication, they had to have an 
informative overview of where the other humanitarian actors would deliver. One informant 
from an UN agency described the consequences of not having the proper technological tools 
to provide an overview of the needs of information at all levels:   
 
There are only few people doing tool development for other users, and those (tools) are 
generally to their credit. Some of the IM teams of UNHCR in particular that are in the field, 
and because they are in the field they are everyday badgered by everyone who walks in to 
their office and saying we need this and that information, and who is working where? And in 
their desperation they start developing tools for people locally, and this is what they have 
been doing. And so you have massive flow of these tools that are out there, and have been 
done by individuals that are trying to fix the local needs at the field level. So that’s the 
situation there, what you don’t have is a concern at the strategic level that there is a bunch of 
users that are not being considered and just being left to their own devices (IM, UN agency).  
 
The informant’s statement could indicate that the needs at field level are not being considered, 
and that they are trying to devise a system for themselves through getting ICT systems 
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developed for their own internal use. The informant highlighted an interesting aspect: that 
there was no genuine interest regarding the massive innovations of ICT systems at strategic 
level. This could indicate that the strategic actors are either not aware of the intensive 
development of ICT systems, or that they do not see this as an issue for the external 
information processing. However, other informants did not mention a lack of concern at 
strategic level.  
 
Figure 5.2 The information flow between strategic, national and field level. 
 
Figure 5.2 depicts a summary of the various aspects of the information processing among the 
humanitarian actors on different levels. As the figure suggests, the strategic level does not 
interact much with the field level but rather forms strategies based on the information 
collected by the field level. The information shared from the national to the field level is 
negatively affected by the organizational structures, because, as stated, the triple role of 
UNHCR has created uncertainties in regard to UNHCR’s role in the field. In addition to this, 
the various humanitarian organizations at national level have different mandates and values, 
thus creating difficulties in sharing externally standardized information as they have different 
working methods. The field level provides the national and strategic level with information 
about the refugees’ needs, and reports upon activities performed. The field staff are also 
continuously changing, creating difficulties with training staff on where to find information, 
how to share it, and how the ICT systems are working. The field workers further stated that 
they were in need of more information about what other organizations were doing in their 
operational area. This was also highlighted as a problem by several INGOs at national level. 
This information in the official ICT systems was seen as lacking. Most informants at national 
 75 
level thought of ICT systems as a solution to what they stated as old coordination problems. 
This suggested that they were convinced that these ICT systems could potentially be the 
solution to organizational challenges such as the lack of real-time information and fragmented 
information processing often found in humanitarian response.  
 
5.3 Meeting needs through assessments 
Assessments are the foundation for taking action in the humanitarian response. Interventions 
of activities are based on strategies formed by the strategic level. Assessments conducted at 
field level provide the national level with information about the needs that exist at field level 
in order that they can base the framework for further interventions on the data collected in the 
field. These assessments are either performed at community level or at house level by field 
workers working for INGOs and NGOs.  The inter-agency unit also performs assessments 
seeking to identify vulnerabilities within each sector and operational area. The inter-agency 
unit provides the response mechanism with reports and maps shared through the Inter-agency 
Information Sharing Portal as well as in meetings. 
 
The assessments measure the refugees life situation, and, together with the activities reported 
through ActivityInfo, seek to ensure a comprehensive picture of the existing needs and 
potential areas of focus. All humanitarian actors also conduct assessments for internal use.   
 
The real-time evaluation report (Crisp et al., 2013) states that concerted contingency planning 
and preparedness efforts were needed in the regional Syrian Response. In order to strengthen 
the operational capacity joint planning with national and local governments, UN agencies, 
donors and NGOs should be further strengthened. However, in order to do so, the contingency 
planning of preparedness measures had to be based on an ongoing analysis that would require 
effective information sharing and management. In Lebanon targeting has been implemented 
as a way of identifying the refugees’ vulnerabilities. Targeting means that the humanitarian 
actors select potential refugees based on pre-identified criteria of vulnerability such as number 
of family members or living conditions. The targeting of the most vulnerable is performed in 
the field through door-to-door assessments or similar approaches where the refugees live in 
ITS or in rented rooms. Some informants at national level stated that the assessments enabled 
them to see which refugees had the most vulnerable living conditions and ensure these 
received aid first. The implementation of targeting was initiated because the high influx of 
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refugees living in out-of camp areas, so targeting was established to reach the “hidden 
population” in these areas. Two IMs at an INGO pointed at that because the refugees were 
constantly moving, the situation was always changing and making it difficult to operate. 
 
The real-time evaluation report (Crisp et al., 2013) further states that partners in the response 
were concerned about the process for this because the vulnerability criteria on which the 
targeting was to be based was not yet clear, and they were missing sufficient data in order to 
accurately target the refugees. The response mechanism in Lebanon is intended to gain a 
strategic overview of where the gaps and needs are, by measuring activities conducted against 
the vulnerability targeted through assessments. As the vulnerability criteria are not based on 
coherent standards, the informants from INGOs at national level stated that it complicated the 
opportunity to get real-time data. The informants from the INGOs explained that they 
therefore choose to address this themselves and conduct their own assessments for internal 
use in order to implement their own interventions based on real needs. These are often not 
shared between organizations working in the response. This was concluded further by 
information from a UN-agency that: “people don’t always share all of their assessments, but 
when they do we try to encourage them to share, because we benefit and we can learn from 
their views and get aware of what is going on” (UN agency, sector lead).  The informant 
expressed, however, that sharing information is positive for all organizations working in the 
response, as they can potentially learn from each other. In contrast, the quote can also be 
interpreted as information sharing being lacking. The authors have observed that 
organizations are in desperate need of information and are highly willing to share their 
information with others, although this is however regarding what they have done, but not 
about what they are planning to do. 
 
It is not only the vulnerability criteria that lack standardization but also what the assistance 
packages should include. When the authors observed a national WASH sector meeting, the 
participating humanitarian actors stressed that other sectors were distributing hygiene kits that 
were not in accordance to the WASH sector standards, as it did not give an accurate picture of 
what the hygiene kits delivered included: that they consisted of fewer items then the WASH 
sector had pre-defined that the indicator for hygiene kits should include in ActivityInfo. The 
result was that refugees would be registered with a received item they did not in fact receive. 
When incomplete hygiene kits were reported as delivered at the official ICT systems, it could 
lead to incorrect presentation of data. 
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 All our informants have expressed their concerns of the massive conduction of assessments at 
both community level and household level. As one informant working in legal assistance in 
an INGO expressed: “It’s a huge response and it’s just so difficult here because the way it is 
structured with the sectors working groups”. One informant also stated that the key difficulty 
is in terms of planning the next stage of operations:  
 
But generally I think it is okay in terms of ongoing interventions at least it is clear there is 
ActivityInfo, which I’m sure you have seen. Which is very clear about what has been done. In 
terms of plans it is more difficult to get comprehensive information, and that is where we have 
to move outside of coordination structures often, because people will talk about what they are 
doing and what they have done through formal structures, but there is no reporting on plans 
(Country director, INGO).  
 
These statements are in accordance with what many informants have expressed as a concern: 
that, as it is a huge decentralized response structured with sector working groups, the official 
ICT systems do not give them comprehensive information, and that they need to go outside 
the official coordination structure to get real time information. This means that everyone in 
the field must try to ensure a situational picture of where the needs are, where to implement 
interventions and that these interventions don’t result in gaps or duplication. The lack of 
comprehensive information about where to focus next through the official ICT systems was 
substantially explained by one informant:   
 
 
The sectors were all telling us: how do we use ActivityInfo for planning? It doesn’t, because 
it’s not a planning tool, it’s a reporting tool so it’s for UNHCR for ultimately have ability to 
say this is what we are doing, this is what we did, but it doesn’t help the partner figure out 
where should we go, how do we coordinate, so they all end up doing these little internal excel 
sheets or local places where they all put up things on map and say we are working here, you 
are working there, so they all end up with their local tools, they are all over the place, 
because every groups in certain areas tries to put some orders in what they are trying to do, 
but everybody is there for developing their own little mini information management tool kit, 
when we should be developing one for easier to develop something that everybody can take 
and use, then they can tailor it, and adapt it or whatever (IM, UN agency) 
 
A few informants stressed the fact that it should not be forgotten who the response is about 
and, as one informant explained to us:  
 
Probably all of us as humanitarian actors are over intruding and doing too many mappings 
and too many services, that’s where the coordination have been weak at times. Asking to many 
people the same question, people seeing all these white cars come and do assessments, but 
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they don’t see any result, so we have to be very careful that we manage that better and do not 
increase the expectations (Legal assistance, INGO). 
 
Moreover, an informant from an INGO stated that the formal coordination structure in 
Lebanon has been weak in ensuring that the constant need of information at national level 
does not end up negatively affecting the refugees. When there is a constant flow of 
organizations conducting assessments it increases the refugees’ expectations. On top of this, it 
might not give the humanitarian organizations what they need, which is day-to-day 
information from the field. When every organization is collecting information for their own 
internal purpose, they all end up with their own set of information, rather than one single and 
comprehensive picture. One informant also stated that the reason for not always gaining 
results from the extensive assessments conducted might be due to lack of resources to follow 
them through. 
5.3.1 The beneficiaries’ perspective of the assessments  
The refugees living at ITS in Lebanon are scattered over 1900tented areas. During visits to the 
ITSs in Lebanon, there was an opportunity to hear the beneficiaries’ perspective on the 
assessments performed by the response mechanism. In both areas the beneficiaries had a 
consistent perception that the INGOs and NGOs were constantly performing assessments that 
did not provide any results for them. Several refugee informants in the ITS also said that the 
questions asked were too general and did not give them the possibility to state their individual 
needs. The assessments were also not performed on all refugees, leaving several of the 
beneficiaries talked to feeling neglected and disrespected. All the informants in the camps 
stated that the assessments were predominately performed with the camp leaders only. When 
the two camp leaders were asked about this they expressed deep concern over being left with 
the enormous responsibility of stating the needs for all the refugees living in their area.  One 
of the camp leaders said “I don’t like that they are doing assessments only with me. The 
people that live here have different needs and different subjects they need assistance for. If 
they only talk to me I can’t provide them with the correct information”. The informant stated 
that having the responsibility to state all refugees’ needs was impossible. Conversely, it can 
also be seen as quite difficult for the humanitarian workers to map out the needs for all the 
refugees living in an ITS. This is because there could be from hundred to several thousand 
refugees in just one ITS. Therefore, performing assessments on just a few individuals in the 
ITS might make it more manageable. 
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During a tour of one of the ITSs, the authors noted that they had a well-functioning school 
area for children of all ages. The camp leader expressed great gratitude for this, and 
commented that they did not need any more school equipment. When talking to several 
refugees in this ITS, it was discovered that even though the school was well equipped, many 
children could not attend due to illnesses from the lack of medicine or treatment. One child 
explained that he wanted to attend school, but his mother said that his tumor had spread and 
he did not receive any medicine or help and he had to be taken out of school. In the same ITS 
the beneficiaries showed their tents. None of the informants had mattresses or any blankets 
for winterization in their tents except for the camp leader. In a second ITS, located at a lower 
altitude in a different part of Lebanon, the beneficiaries did have winterization kits. We also 
participated in a distribution of mattresses in the second area. In the 2014 response plan for 
Lebanon it was speculated that there should be clearer assessments of vulnerability among the 
existing refugee population (RRP, 2014). When talking to UN agencies at their headquarters, 
several informants said that the purpose of targeted assistance was to identify the most 
vulnerable beneficiaries. One IM informant at UNHCR said that it was challenging to operate 
in Lebanon, and that when performing targeted assistance:  “you can never control who 
deserved to get this assistance and how fair it is and the most in need is the one that receives 
it”. The same informant did however state that they did have a system that seeks to prevent 
these types of problems: “…We have a sort of mechanism to ensure that these targeted people 
are genuine cases, they come to registration and have an interview and then we have a home 
visits.” The informant stressed the difficulties with assisting genuine cases; even though the 
response seeks to ensure dependability, it is not always possible to ensure that the target 
refugees are the most vulnerable. When asking the informant why this was not possible, they 
said that people would always try to take advantage of the system, resulting in people being 
registered as refugees, though in reality they might not be. The frequent flow of aid workers 
taking assessments has also resulted in one of the ITS visited now refusing to welcome 
humanitarian organizations into the camp. When asked why, they responded that until results 
are seen they will refuse to disclose any further information. One of the camp leaders said: “I 
have said to them that they cannot come here anymore for assessments. Because they just do 
assessments, and we never not even once, have seen any results from this. We have so many 
needs and this camp receive nothing”.  This informant stated that they closed the ITS for 
further assessments. This indicates that the refugees in this ITS have stated their needs to the 
humanitarian organizations many times, but without the necessary aid being provided. When 
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interviewing informants at field level from MoSA one of these informants also expressed 
concerns at the amount of assessments performed: 
 
Every day in general there is a lot of INGOs coming taking assessments, but nothing ever 
happens. As we do see this as an issue, we are soon going to put a limit on this through MoSA. 
They can’t just continue to do this. We need results and we will demand results. What do we 
get? And in what sector do we receive it? The limit is reached, and they will have to talk to us 
and give us promises on this. 
 
The informant at MoSA said that they would start to demand results from the assessments 
performed, as it was seen as an issue that needs were collected but not addressed. 
Another informant from MoSA expressed that the response mechanism did in fact respond to 
gaps. However, the informant expressed that the response responded after incidents of 
concern had occurred: 
 
They respond to the gaps, but not always. The first storm we had they did not. Seven people 
died. I had expected more because this storm even took trees, how can you expect that tents 
made of plastic will still be there? I can understand them but still no emergency plan was 
made so I had to make my own emergency plan with the government here and the religious 
leaders and some schools. 
 
This informant from MoSA expressed that the humanitarian response lacked the ability to be 
preemptive. Therefore the matter had to be dealt with by themselves in co-operation with the 
local population. The informants at the two community centers visited also pointed out the 
frustration over the massive undertaking of assessments.  However, they also stated that they 
themselves perform assessments, but these are done on paper and sent to central governmental 
offices. When talking to a country director in an INGO, the authors were told that, as 
ActivityInfo did not include priorities or needs, it was not therefore possible to get a full 
picture of the effects of the interventions:  
 
If you want to know what are the priorities or needs of a community and whether these have 
been addressed, you will never know this through ActivityInfo, but then again to have a 
technology that gives you that would need to have a consistent understanding of vulnerability 
across communities and you would need to have a consistent evaluation or assessment of 
priority needs across the communities, which then the issue again is not the technology it is 
about the framework for feeding the data into it. 
 
What the informant has outlined might be the reason for performing the huge amount of 
assessments within each organization, because the ICT systems themselves are not offering a 
complete picture of where the priorities or needs are in the field, and if they have been 
addressed. 
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6.0 Discussion  
This chapter seeks to answer the research problem: How do ICT systems contribute to reliable 
information management in the humanitarian response in Lebanon?  This is performed 
through the research questions and is based on the dialog between the empirical findings and 
the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis. As described in the methodology (chapter 4) 
this study is based on Danemark’s (1997) understanding of an abductive research strategy. 
This means that the purpose of this chapter is to combine the world perceived by the 
humanitarian actors in Lebanon (chapter 5), with the theoretical framework (chapter 3).  
 
To answer the research problem the discussion of the empirical findings are structured 
through the research questions (ref 1.1.) in order to reach the conclusion. Section 6.1 
elaborates the diffusion and adoption of ICT systems in Lebanon. Section 6.2 discuss the 
information processing among humanitarian actors in Lebanon. Section 6.3 further deliberate 
the relation between the assessments, activities planned and the implementation of 
interventions in the humanitarian response in Lebanon.  
 
6.1 Diffusion and adoption of ICT systems in Lebanon 
As stated in the theoretical framework, diffusion of innovations is the process where an 
innovation is communicated over time among members of a social system and how this 
potentially leads to adoption of the innovation, either by individuals or an organizational unit 
(Rogers, 1995 p. 10) 
6.1.1 Diffusion  
The first element in the diffusion process is innovation (Rogers, 1995), and, in Lebanon, the 
innovations are the ICT systems ActivityInfo, RAIS, and the inter-agency mapping. These 
systems are ICT because their intention is to share and gather information. Rogers (2003) 
distinguishes between hardware and software artifacts. In Lebanon the ICT systems are not 
hardware, but software programs used on hardware that has already been innovated by others: 
computers, tablets and smartphones. The humanitarian ICT systems are designed to detect 
needs earlier, predict crises and ultimately engender an efficient and reliable response that 
matches the resources to the needs of the community at risk (IFRC, 2013).  
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According to Rogers (2003) the innovations are developed to reduce the uncertainty in 
achieving the desired result. Even though the technology is used to reduce the uncertainty, 
Aase (1991) highlights that these tools are nonetheless operated by humans, which means that 
the interplay between the task, team and tool will affect the integration of the innovation 
based on the organizational and individual knowledge and purpose when using these systems 
(Olsen & Lindøe, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 6.1. The interplay between the team, task and tool. Influenced by Olsen & Lindøe (2009). 
 
In order to understand the diffusion and adoption of ICT systems in Lebanon a model was 
developed which is illustrated in figure 6.1. The figure depicts how the humanitarian actors 
influence the tool through their skills and intentions when using ICT systems to increase 
productivity. In order to observe how this interplay affects the possibility of a reliable 
humanitarian response, it is important to consider the diffusion and adoption of the ICT 
systems in Lebanon as well as the involvement of the users. 
 
The adoption of innovations is therefore heavily dependent on its characteristics; how it is 
perceived by the actors. In the following section the characteristics of relative advantage and 
compatibility (Rogers, 2003) of the ICT systems in Lebanon are discussed.  
 
It was commonly agreed upon by the informants that the ICT systems in Lebanon were better 
than the previous time-consuming working methods. However, compatibility is nonetheless 
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lacking with regard to the humanitarian actors’ values and experienced needs. The empirical 
findings show that several implementing partners thought that the tools did not match the 
organizational needs in regard to information processing, even though UNHCR stressed that 
the existing programs were intended to create a strategic overview for all actors in the 
response.  
 
According to Rogers (2003), the existing needs are adapted in regard to the potential adopters. 
In Lebanon, however, there is disagreement as to who these would be. Most INGOs and 
NGOs thought the system were not designed for them, but the national actors managing the 
humanitarian response. One IM from an UN agency stated that the original adopters are the 
senior management at national level: “The users who have defined tools like ActivityInfo as a 
tool are very few users. The users are only the senior management of UNHCR and UNICEF. 
Because the tools only fit their needs and nobody else’s and this are the main problem”. 
According to this statement, the ICT systems are compatible with the UN agencies needs at 
national level. However, according to the UN agency at national level, the adopters are the 
implementing partners. This creates a barrier in terms of compatibility, as the innovations 
adopters are not clearly defined.   
 
The innovation is also affected by socio-cultural values and beliefs, and the innovations are 
interpreted by the adopters based on their cultural knowledge (Rogers, 2003). The various 
organizations operating in Lebanon represent different cultural backgrounds, values and 
beliefs. Rogers (2003) states that the adopters also have to recognize their needs. This is often 
only identified when the adopters see the consequences of the innovation (Ibid). The 
implementing partners in Lebanon stated that they had trouble seeing the advantages of the 
ICT systems and that several were still waiting to see the benefits for them as an organization. 
The informants stated that they have used the ICT systems for a period of time, and that it has 
not resulted in any improvement regarding the information processing among them and other 
humanitarian actors.  
How can the humanitarian actors recognize their needs when, according to an IM, they do not 
have the necessary knowledge of the technological possibilities? The IM stated sardonically 
that they have asked for more advanced Excel sheets instead of sophisticated ICT systems. 
The implementing partners at field level expressed that the ICT systems do not match their 
needs, though how can they state that the ICT systems do not match the needs when they are 
incapable of identifying them? But then again, are they really the intended users of these 
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systems?  As mentioned above the implementing partners and the UN agencies have different 
opinions on which user the system is designed to serve. 
 
With regards to communication channels, the most efficient way to disseminate innovation is 
through interpersonal channels (Rogers, 1995). This can be identified in Lebanon where the 
knowledge about the ICT systems is gained commonly through interpersonal communication 
in inter-agency meetings. This is despite the information about the ICT systems being 
available online on the Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, and that the actors in the 
response who want to access the ICT systems having the possibility of doing so. NGOs and 
MoSA stated that as this information was in English, many of their staff were not able to 
understand the information shared. The interpersonal communication at inter-agency meetings 
was therefore the best way to receive information. However, the same informant stated that 
these meetings were themselves held in English. This language barrier hampers the possibility 
of diffusion and adoption of ICT systems; especially to NGOs and MoSA.   
  
The time within the diffusion process plays a major role regarding adoption or rejection of the 
innovation (Rogers, 2003). As mentioned above interpersonal communication is a way of 
gaining knowledge about the innovation. The IMs in Lebanon hold an important position in 
spreading information because not everyone attends the meetings, and when they do, the 
information is in English. One IM said that he used an extensive amount of time to 
communicate information about the ICT systems existing in Lebanon, because of the high 
turnover of staff was problematical when seeking to get the actors to adopt the systems. 
According to Rogers (2003) the natural process of diffusion is where the length of adoption 
starts with one unit’s adoption and thereafter spreads to the other actors. As there is a high 
turnover in staff in Lebanon there will always be humanitarian actors arriving that do not have 
knowledge about the ICT systems. This makes it difficult for everyone to be cognizant of, and 
adopt the, ICT systems fully even though it has already been communicated through 
interpersonal channels or adopted by several users.  
 
When new ideas are invented, diffused and adopted or rejected into social systems it can 
create social change. This might affect the structure and function, as the social systems and 
their involved actors need to work together to accomplish a common goal (Rogers, 2003). 
The social system in Lebanon is that of all the humanitarian actors are working to save lives.  
However, the differentiated organizational norms that the organizations inhabit restrict the 
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possibility of reaching the goal consistently, because each organization works to their own 
mandate, and, based on their own internal values and beliefs, create different paths to reach 
the goal.  
 
The four elements in the diffusion process are innovation, communication channels, time and 
social system. The diffusion of ICT systems is also highly affected by whether the process is 
decentralized or centralized (Rogers, 1995). The diffusion of the official ICT systems 
ActivityInfo, RAIS, and the inter-agency mapping are spread through a centralized diffusion 
process. This is because the official ICT systems are developed by UNHCR who push 
adoption of these ICT systems downwards to the implementing partners. According to Rogers 
(1995), centralized diffusion can cause problems because these innovations are often not 
compatible with the adopters’ needs. When UNHCR developed these ICT systems in 
Lebanon it was not in accordance with every actor’s needs and therefore may have created a 
mismatch. Rogers (1995) claims that the decentralized diffusion stems from the operational 
level and spreads horizontally, and, in this way, is more likely to incorporate the locally 
perceived needs and problem. As the Official ICT systems are diffused centrally in Lebanon 
it’s more likely that the ICT systems match the needs for the UN agencies at national level 
rather than implementing partners working at operational level. The result is that they start to 
re-invent their own system to meet their needs as a technological pull. 
 
Figure 6.2. Decentralized and centralized diffusion. 
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 Figure 6.2 shows the difference between centralized and decentralized diffusion (Rogers, 
1995). In Lebanon there is a hybrid: centralized diffusion where UNHCR push and spread 
their ICT systems, yet as these do not match all humanitarian actors’ needs, it results in 
decentralized diffusion. Informants from INGOs have explained that they had developed and 
diffused their own ICT systems at operational level. This is, according to Rogers (1995), 
understood as a technological pull, where adopters re-invent the innovation to the particular 
context. In order to understand why the humanitarian actors re-invent and develop their own 
ICT systems it’s necessary to further explore how the centralized diffusion fails in terms of 
adoption. 
 
 6.1.2 Adoption  
 
Rogers (2003) claims that the diffusion rate can be affected by authority innovation-decision. 
As the official ICT systems are mandatory for the implementing partners in the official 
response, they do not have the freedom of choosing whether to adopt or reject these ICT 
systems.   
 
When actors adopt an innovation there follows an implementation phase consisting of three 
stages: redefining/reconstruction, clarifying and routinizing (Rogers, 1995).  
 
Figure 6.3. Five stages in the innovation process in an organization, based on Rogers (1995)  
 
This model depicts the five stages of the innovation process in an organization. In the 
implementation phase the adopted innovation gets redefined/restructured when the innovation 
is re-invented to fit the organizational context and structure (Rogers, 1995). In order to 
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routinize the innovation, Orlikowski (1992), claims that, as the technological systems are a 
product of human interaction, the organizational structure modifies itself to the innovation. 
The ICT systems in Lebanon have existed since 2014, with IM at UNHCR stating: “… with 
the use of such systems we have proven here that everyone can use the same tool. There is no 
other place where all agencies use the same tool. We proved that is possible.” The informant 
indicates that the system is routinized and should therefore be fully absorbed by the various 
humanitarian organizations. Nonetheless, several informants stated that, as they are not 
obligated to use the official ICT system, they did not utilize it. This was because it did not 
match the contextual need. All implementing partners are obligated to use these ICT systems 
and stated that they did. However, several of these did not see the benefit. When the ICT 
systems are not redefined, it not is possible to clarify and routinize, and Rogers (1995) states 
that these stages of the implementation of the innovation need to successful in order for the 
innovation to be completely implemented in the organizations.  
 
Rogers (1995) asserts that a lack of expertise and knowledge in the technological system 
could hinder the implementation phase of the innovation process. MoSA stressed during the 
interviews that they lacked comprehensive knowledge and expertise with regards to using 
these ICT systems. How can MoSA affect the re-invention process when they don't have the 
expertise to state what they need regarding the technology? In order for this to function for the 
humanitarian actors as well as for MoSA they must be able to design the innovation based on 
what is perceived as most familiar and compatible for their organization. UN actors at 
national level and technological developers stated that their focus was on how ICT systems 
could provide reliable data in the response rather than how the systems adjusted to the needs 
at operational level. One informant expressed that it was the technological developers’ 
responsibility, in cooperation with the providers of the ICT systems, to deliver tools that were 
compatible with the users’ needs:  
 
…technology in its own sake is not going to help anybody. It is about making technology user 
relevant. So it is more what you use technology for, so to we have one information 
management system to the response I think is possible, and the technology are probably 
already built for that. But then having the system to make sure that data is there, its feeding 
back, you know that the in and out flow data are relevant and useful. And that’s about again, 
having the technology people work on it with the users and the providers to make sure that it’s 
not, you know the geeks have made some great technology that nobody knows how to use. And 
then the operators think that the technology is not relevant for what they need. This is always 
the biggest challenge (Country director, INGO). 
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This informant states that the technology needs to be compatible with the existing knowledge 
of the users in order that the developers do not create a tool that nobody knows how to use. 
This means that not only do the ICT systems need to be compatible in regard to the actors’ 
needs, but also to the user’s degree of technological knowledge and expertise. This 
uncertainty of compatibility has thus created difficulties in implementing the ICT systems to 
their fullest potential as an intellectual tool. This can therefore describe why actors that have 
access to, but are not obligated to use the systems choose not to use them, as the systems are 
not compatible with their organization. In order to be compatible, Rogers (1995) states that 
the agenda-setting and matching process in the initiation phase of the innovation needs to be 
adapted to the defined problem, then match the technological innovation to the problem. The 
original problem the actors seek to solve is to help the people in need, but the organizations 
have various working methods and mandates, as well as differencing demands to the ICT 
systems. This includes what the systems should contain with regards to planning, dynamic 
updates, reporting functions, as well as inter-agency information processing.  
 
The uncertainty does not only rely on the compatibility, but also on the degree to which the 
organizations determine the ICT systems as reliable. All NGO informants said that they did 
not trust the UN system in Lebanon. However, the INGOs and the UN agencies did not 
corroborate this in any way, though it was a common apprehension that the precision of data 
published in the official reports was lacking. This was often due to overly-confined indicators 
to report activities on, the massive amount of unstructured assessments performed without 
standardization, and a lack of a common understanding of how to feed the data into the 
official ICT systems. The common perception of these reports not being accurate was stated 
by all NGOs and INGOs, as well as two UN-agencies. Gerwin (1998) observes that how 
organizations determine reliability, capacity and precision of the technological system will 
define the degree of uncertainty when implementing the innovation. Gerwin’s (1998) 
perspective can be seen in correlation with the official ICT systems in Lebanon, which collect 
and verify information, yet the humanitarian actors do not have a coherent understanding of 
the reliability and precision of the collected data. Gerwin (1998) also highlights the social 
uncertainty with the conflicts of interest when implementing innovations. In Lebanon the 
social and technological uncertainty have led most of the humanitarian organizations to 
innovate their own ICT systems. This was performed in order for them to get the strategic and 
correct overview - at least of their own activities. Informants claim that this has resulted in 
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conflict of interest among the actors, where some actors pull to obtain the position of their 
ICT system, and other actors try to establish their own innovations.  
 
Most of the informants expressed that the official ICT system failed to deliver the information 
promptly, having to wait three months to get the overall information of what other 
implementing partners were doing and had done. Information about this was, however, shared 
in sector meetings as well as inter-agency meetings, though informants expressed that this 
was not explicitly shared across sectors. This information is nonetheless in the hands of 
UNHCR as they receive the collected data from the official ICT systems. This means that the 
implementation process again leads back to the innovation stage of agenda-setting and 
matching (Rogers, 1995), as the innovations themselves seek to match the problems and 
needs that the lead agency has. To have one system that matches the needs, values, mandates 
and expectations of the various actors, as one informant expressed during an interview, not 
possible. Specifically, this was because the innovation is a social process through human 
interaction, and the actors therefore need to have the same interpreted understanding of what 
the innovation seeks to solve in order for it to fulfill its potential (Rogers, 1995).   
 
6.2 Information processing 
Rasmussen (1997) explores how the socio-technical system can be reliable through the three 
shaping mechanisms: technological change, organizational structure and human behavior.  
The system is shaped by technological change and this guides the subjective criteria. It is also 
shaped by the human behavior that operates through boundaries of acceptable behavior, and 
organizational structures that shape ideas of work constraints (Rasmussen, 1997).  In contrast 
to Rasmussen’s (1997) position, Turner (1976) states that an organization cannot be free of 
failure because the interaction between the human and the socio-technical system creates 
organizational errors. According to Olsen and Scharffscher (1991) the humanitarian 
organizations can be described as what Rasmussen (1997) calls a socio-technical system.   
Below follows a discussion of how information processing between the humanitarian actors is 
affected by the technological change and the organizational structure, as well as through 
human behavior.   
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6.2.1 Technological change  
According to Rasmussen (1997) the fast pace of technological change at an operational level 
will affect the reliability in the socio-technical system. This is because, in Rasmussen’s (1997) 
opinion, the operational level adapts faster to technological change than management level. In 
Lebanon the empirical findings suggest the opposite, where the humanitarian UN actors at 
national level push the ICT systems downwards to the operational level faster than the actors 
are able to adapt. However, the operational actors have innovated their own ICT systems, as 
the technology presented by management level does not contribute to an overview of the 
current activities and plans. Several INGOs stated that having their own internal ICT systems 
was, due to the reflexive context, beneficial for their organization in order to have control 
over the information flow internally. The actors in Lebanon work under high pressure and to 
respond strongly to the huge level of existing needs - they need real-time information. Turner 
(1976) states that difficulties of information handling can contribute to latent conditions. 
However, Rasmussen (1997) states that coherent knowledge of the situation at all levels in the 
organization ensures reliable information processing. In Lebanon the actors seem to be unsure 
as regards to who to inform, about what and when. Several informants also highlighted that 
there is no existing standardized way of sharing information, and the information that was 
shared was often rather sporadic and too late. One informant stated:  
In terms of actual information sharing, like how we get it out there in a systematic way, well I 
think the biggest problem is that the whole sort of concept is like working together on a 
voluntary basis, where you sort of co-operate and agree to do this stuff together because there 
is no formalized structure (IM, UN-agency).  
 
According to this informant the lack of standardization was seen as a result of humanitarian 
organizational structures. As it is voluntary there is no formal authority or organizational 
structure to guide the way of operating. Turner (1976) states that loosely formulated and a 
lack of unequivocal criteria for deciding when the goal is attained may result in organizational 
failure. In Lebanon the lack of standardization may hinder the possibility of reliable external 
information sharing, because there is uncertainty on how to attain the goal in standardized 
ways. Therefore, the voluntary practices and lack of unequivocal and standardized criteria 
may result in unequal access to information. 
 
Rogers (2003) states that, in order for a technology to be fully operational, it needs to be 
diffused, meaning that all actors involved need to adopt and implement the innovation. The 
subjective criteria will, according to Rasmussen (1997), guide the adoption. However, this 
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also relies on the social aspects of how you commonly understand and interpret the purpose of 
the task that the innovation is originally supposed to solve (Rogers, 2003). This might 
therefore be the reason for the humanitarian actors uncertainly about how to share 
information, as they don’t have a common understanding of what the ICT systems are 
supposed to solve. This uncertainty can be ameliorated by what Rasmussen (1997) describes 
as competence in know-how, practical skills and formal knowledge in order to process 
information: the actors’ understanding or their own work constraints and role in the socio-
technical system can reduce the uncertainty further (Rasmussen, 1997).  
 
6.2.2 Human behavior and organizational structure 
This section will elaborate the information processing among humanitarian actors in Lebanon. 
The competence in know-how, practical skills and formal knowledge are important factors 
when disseminating, integrating and interpreting information vertical and horizontally in the 
socio-technical system. This is important to ensure a reliable information processing (Kruke 
& Olsen, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Information processing between levels in the humanitarian response (Kruke & Olsen, 
2011). 
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Figure 6.3 represents information processing among the humanitarian actors in Lebanon, both 
vertically and horizontally. The horizontal interaction could, according to Kruke & Olsen 
(2011 p. 252), be seen as inter-organizational information flow within the coordination 
structure. The vertical interaction, in contrast, can be described as internal information 
dissemination, with Dixon (1994) considering that these are based on organizational 
collective meaning structures. As figure 6.3 depicts, the field level in Lebanon provides the 
national level with information gathered through assessments conducted on refugees. This 
information is then sent to the strategic level which produce reports that get sent back to 
national level. This information is, as previously mentioned, often too late, as the report is 
received three months after completion (ref 6.1.2). Many informants at both national and field 
level stated that that the difficulties in sharing information are due to what they define as 
information silos, because the SWG limits cross-sectorial information sharing across levels. 
This means that the information is shared in a limited extent to a certain group of people and 
sporadically creates difficulties in establishing a situational overview - both in an operational 
area within one sector, as well as at national level. However, several informants from the 
INGOs did not share this opinion, and thought that organizations gladly shared their 
information. 
 
The informants remarked that the information’s upward flow from the field level is often 
reported without the use of ICT systems. Turner (1976) asserts that, when the information is 
transferred through interpersonal communication, it can create misunderstandings. The 
national level therefore has to interpret the information from field level when plotting the 
information into the ICT systems. The authors have observed that information flow from field 
level to national level exists, but the information flow downwards is rather ineffectual. 
Several informants pointed this out, and one IM from an UN-agency notes that IMs in the 
field struggle: 
...because they are in the field, they are badgered every day by everyone coming in to their 
office and saying: we need this and that information, and who is working where? And in their 
desperation they start to develop tools for people locally… These tools have been developed 
by individuals that are trying to fix the local needs at field level… What you don’t have is a 
concern at the strategic level that there is bunch of users that are not being considered, but 
just being left to their own devices.  
 
The informant’s claim may be seen as the result of lack of information flow downwards from 
strategic to field level. This may create desperation for information at the field, because the 
strategic level have not developed any tools to cover what the field workers are in need of.  
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The reliable processing of information in Lebanon may become hampered through challenges 
at all levels. The empirical findings suggest that the triple role of UNHCR at national level, 
incompatible organizational mandates and focus at national level and the high turnover in 
staff at field level negatively affects reliable information processing. Additionally, as the 
design of ICT systems does not match the needs at all levels, and with no standardization way 
of sharing information, the processing gets further hampered. In the following sections these 
challenges will be further elaborated.  
 
Triple role 
As the response in Lebanon was regarded as a purely refugee crisis at the beginning of the 
Syrian war, the mandate of managing the response was given to UNHCR and not UN-OCHA. 
This was strongly highlighted as being problematic in the real-time evaluation report (Crisp et 
al., 2013). The report stated that the triple role of UNHCR as coordination body, implementer 
as well as funder was a problem as humanitarian actors stated that UNHCR were more 
focused on handling their own operation than managing the entire humanitarian response. The 
following year they separated the coordination body from the implementing role (UNHCR, 
2013a) and established ICT systems to information sharing among the humanitarian 
organizations at all levels (RRP, 2014; UNHCR, 2013a). Rasmussen (1997) highlights the 
importance of having tightly coordinated analysis across organizational levels in order to 
create a reliable system that seeks to reduce vulnerabilities. Even though the ICT systems 
were implemented to strengthen the operational capacity of joint planning among actors 
(UNHCR, 2013a), a year on several of the informants stated that the triple role was still an 
issue. One informant expressed: “So you have a big conflict of interest which was sort of 
resolved at national level, by having different people affect the coordination and the 
implementation. But at the field level it was not” (Country director, INGO). According to this 
informant the role of UNHCR were not clearly distinguished at field level, possibly proving 
an obstacle to what Kruke & Olsen (2011) calls dissemination, integration and interpretation 
of information. This, in turn, may obstruct the tightly coupled analysis that Rasmussen (1997) 
stresses is important for reliable information processing, because they do not have an 
integrated common approach when working in the field as they did not manage to separate the 
two conflicting roles. 
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Incompatible mandates and focus 
A rapidly changing environment needs actors who have a certain situational awareness 
(Kruke & Olsen, 2011). The working constraints means their roles will therefore affect the 
boundaries of acceptable performance and what should be shared in information (Rasmussen, 
1997). However, according to Turner (1976) the cultural lag can create a mismatch between 
the procedures, standards and regulations (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997). In Lebanon the organizations consist of incompatible mandates, focus and values, and, 
as they are working in a reflexive environment, the possibility to ensure what Rasmussen 
(1997) calls acceptable performance might be difficult. This is because there is a mismatch 
between the standards and procedures because of the incompatible organizational working 
methods.  
 
The ICT systems strive to create a common situational awareness. As the organizations have 
different working methods they may interpret the information differently and not have a 
coherent understanding of what should be shared. The official ICT systems in Lebanon might 
therefore fail to accomplish reliable external information processing, because, according to 
Rogers (2003), the adopters need to have a common goal and work together as a social 
system. Moreover, they do not have what Kruke & Olsen (2011) calls a common situational 
awareness. According to one of our informants, it is impossible to have one size fits all:  
 
I think to look at technological solutions is the wrong way to go about the problem, because 
you are talking about stuff that has to be accessible for hundreds of people with different 
background. You know the mistake that the coordination system always do in terms of 
technology is have one size fits all. So to come up with this one system and every response 
have tried one...and it’s going to sort all of our problems, of course it’s not, it’s never going to 
happen.  (Country Director, INGO) 
 
 As the informant explains, having various organizations with different backgrounds working 
together through one system is difficult because, as Turner (1976) states, the risk of failure in 
terms of information processing increases when the task is handled by several organizations 
and their bounded rationalities through their subculture and framework. 
 
Turnover in staff 
Rasmussen (1997) stresses that the actors at the core need to be involved in the control of the 
information processing to avoid hazards. The bounded rationalities (Turner, 1976) frame what 
Rasmussen (1997) calls work constraints. The field workers in Lebanon are the individuals 
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interacting with refugees on a daily basis. While some informants from INGOs and NGOs 
stated that the field workers did not get enough information about needs and further plans 
from the headquarters at national level, other informants from the UN agencies stated that it 
did exist, but due to high turnover in staff, the field workers did not know where to find it. 
This was highlighted by an IM in a UN agency: 
..the problem though is that people in the field  change every six months, so when new staff 
comes here they don’t know that this information is out there, so they are all saying: We need 
a map of this, and they hire someone else to do it. Meanwhile the information is there right. So 
one of the biggest thing is trying to get a sort of awareness of all the work that we have here. 
  
This statement can be understood as, because the operational organizations’ staff changes 
often, they are not aware of where to find information, and what to share and with whom. 
When there is a high turnover in staff the competence and skills with regards to the usage of 
the ICT systems is differential. Therefore, the individual staff are heavily reliant on the IMs 
present in the field in order to stay updated on external information. Rasmussen (1997) 
emphasizes that it is important to have competence in know-how and practical skills in order 
to reduce vulnerability. This can be increased through situational knowledge, and this is 
needed to base decisions upon information in the running context, and respond strongly to 
weak signals with familiar action alternatives (Rasmussen, 1997; Weick et al., 1999). Due to 
high turnover in staff and weak information processing from the national to the field level, the 
overall situational knowledge in the field may be dysfunctional.  Because information flows 
downward in the response, it is essential in order for the individuals to fully understand what 
their role in the humanitarian response is. If they do not, it can lead to what Turner (1976) 
classifies as incubation, because there might be a disconnection between the reality and the 
individual assumptions. 
 
In order to prevent this disconnection there needs to be a holistic feedback loop of 
information across all levels (Rasmussen, 1997). The reliability of the feedback loop is 
dependent on the actors’ objectives and performance criteria (Ibid). In Lebanon the process 
between assessments and implemented interventions needs to be in accordance with the actual 
needs in the field.  In order to achieve this, there has to be a standardized way of 
disseminating, integrating and interpreting information that should be shared through ICT 
systems. 
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6.3 Assessments, plans and implementation 
Rasmussen (1997) stresses that the entire system needs to be involved when aiming to control 
hazardous sources. A holistic feedback loop needs to be applied where the control structure, 
the actors’ objectives, and their capability of control needs to be evaluated, and all 
information needs to be analyzed from a feedback control point of view. For the humanitarian 
response in Lebanon to be reliable through what Rasmussen (1997) defines as a reliable 
feedback loop, the assessments performed must result in activities and implementation that 
addresses the needs identified through assessments, and results in the needs being covered.  
Figure 6.4 depicts how this process should work in order to be reliable in accordance with 
Rasmussen (1997).  
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Representation of the continuously normative process between assessments, activities and 
implementation. 
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As this figure shows, the process should be normative, where the inter-agency mapping and 
implementing partners perform the assessments to identify the needs. Based on this they 
could create plans and strategies that, through the implementation of interventions, cover 
these needs. When registering the activities in ActivityInfo at community level and in RAIS at 
household level these activities should be based on the needs identified during assessments. 
When the activities match the needs they can see where the needs are not covered. If the 
humanitarian actors operate in accordance with this they will help create a comprehensive 
situational picture and reliable information processing. As the situation in Lebanon is 
reflexive, this process should be continuous. In the following sections we will discuss whether 
the process between assessments, activities and implementation in Lebanon are in accordance 
with Rasmussen’s (1997) definition of a reliable and holistic feedback loop.   
6.3.1 Assessments  
Assessments are performed in the humanitarian response in order to gain what Kruke & Olsen 
(2011) calls situational awareness and to identify the needs. Situational awareness can be 
what Hannan & Freeman (1984) refers to as “unusual capacity to produce collective outcomes 
of a certain minimum quality repeatedly” (as cited in p. 283 Kruke & Olsen, 2005). 
 
Assessments in Lebanon are performed at both household and community level by field 
workers, for identifying vulnerabilities, needs or gaps. Informants stated that in Lebanon, 
targeting has been implemented as a way of identifying the refugees’ vulnerability efficiently. 
Because of the high influx of refugees targeting enables the humanitarian actors to have an 
overview of the most vulnerable. Targeting means that the actors select potential refugees 
based on pre-identified criteria of vulnerability. Through targeting the refugees through door-
to-door assessments the aid workers state that they were able to see which refugees were 
undergoing vulnerable living conditions and ensure that the most vulnerable received aid first. 
This indicates that the humanitarian actors have, to an extent, adapted to the reflexive 
environment by implementing targeting as a way of handling the complex operational 
context.  
 
However the real-time evaluation report (Crisp et al., 2013) stressed that the vulnerability 
criteria lacked standardization, as the criteria on which the targeting is supposed to be based is 
not clear. This may result in latent conditions resembling what Turner & Pidgeon (1997) and 
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Pidgeon & O´Leary (1997) call a mismatch between the procedures, standards and regulation 
when defining the vulnerability criteria. RAIS is a national ICT system that seeks to 
standardize targeting among the actors by enabling them to upload targeted assessments 
performed at household level. The system also offers the chance to see what has been 
distributed to the refugees by others. However, not all involved actors use this system, and 
most actors have their own internal ICT systems that they upload their assessments to. This 
problematizes defining the criteria of vulnerability, as each organization operates based upon 
their own standards and procedures; creating a further fragmented assessment process, which 
also leads to mismatching the procedures, regulations and standards that Turner & Pidgeon 
(1997) and Pidgeon & O´Leary (1997) believe lead to latent conditions. 
 
When tasks are managed across several organizations, the possibility of maintaining 
communication between levels may be difficult, because each organization has their own 
distinctive subculture and framework of bounded rationality (Turner, 1976). In Lebanon the 
subculture and framework of bounded rationality is related to the various organizations’ 
mandates, focus and values. These factors will affect how they work together, as they all are 
working with different methods and standardizations. Several informants expressed that the 
criteria regarding what the various assistance packages included was not clear. During a 
national sector meeting the actors stressed that other sectors were distributing hygiene kits 
that were not in accordance to the predefined WASH criteria. This meant that refugees 
receives incorrect levels of aid and goods or duplication through reporting-failure in 
ActivityInfo. According to Turner (1976) this is the consequence of handling great amounts 
of information in a complex situation. Weick, Sutcliff and Obstfeld (1999) state that high 
reliable performance relies on the organization's capacity to detect weak signals and respond 
strongly to them. Therefore, even if the humanitarian actors fail to have the same standards as 
to what the criteria consists of, and lack standardized vulnerability criteria for targeting, they 
will still be able to provide assistance even if it is not in a coherent manner.  
 
The inter-agency unit creates a map of vulnerabilities for the entire humanitarian response. 
Therefore, even if the individual organizations target different criteria the unit produces 
coherent maps of vulnerabilities that all actors have access to on the Inter-agency Information 
Sharing Portal. These maps are also handed out during meetings, though, as mentioned, 
NGOs and MoSA are often absent, and the high turnover in staff means there are always 
individuals that are not told where to find the maps, or even that they exist.  
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Another challenge mentioned in several interviews was the fact that these maps are non-
dynamic: that they were already outdated once published due to the dynamic environment. 
One informant further highlighted this by referring to the refugees constantly moving around 
within the borders of Lebanon - making it exceptionally difficult to gain an overview of 
where the refugees are located. Turner (1976) and Wohlstetter (1962) state that, when the task 
is prolonged and complex, the information handling is difficult, and generates yet more 
information that needs to be handled. Rasmussen (1997) states that actors need to have 
coherent competence and acumen when utilizing information. Therefore, the humanitarian 
actors in Lebanon need to have competence in how to perform assessments and where to find 
the results of these, as well as having knowledge about what the assistance packages they 
provide should include. The actors in Lebanon find this problematical, yet in order to take 
appropriate actions that leads to the implementation of activities, they need to base this on the 
information gathered through assessments, as the assessments provide the foundation for 
further strategies and aid priorities.  
 
6.3.2 Activities and implementation based on assessments 
Implementing partners’ registered activities is done at community level in ActivityInfo. 
Activities on household level are registered in RAIS. The inter-agency mapping unit produces 
maps, reports and analysis. These three ICT systems are intended to map out existing needs as 
well as disseminate information about needs and pinpoint implementing partners to cover 
these. If this process is functioning properly it can create what Rasmussen (1997) calls 
reliable feedback loop and, in Lebanon, this is the feedback loop between the humanitarian 
actors and the individuals they are helping.  There must also be a commitment and capacity to 
use this feedback to improve programming (IFRC, 2013). During emergencies there is a 
constant and unexpected flow of events that creates difficulties for individual organizations to 
cope (Kruke & Olsen, 2011), and it is therefore extremely important that the organizations co-
operate and have a common approach when working in the response (Kruke & Olsen, 2011). 
Through the two field studies in Lebanon, it was discovered that the co-operation among 
humanitarian actors is highly affected by differential organizational structures, and not the 
ICT system itself. This means that they struggle to establish a common approach when 
implementing interventions and registering activities. 
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Turner (1976) states that the possibility of maintaining communication is lowered when a task 
is to be handled by several organizations, because of the bounded rationality. In Lebanon the 
task is handled by several organizations, and their different mandates, values, and norms form 
their working method. Through the field studies it has been observed and informed that the 
boundaries that the organizations work within may hamper co-operation, because the various 
organizations report in different ways. As the verified report from UNHCR is published 
quarterly, and ActivityInfo only shows their own activities, the field levels use Excel sheets to 
cross-check and avoid duplication of aid on an everyday basis. These Excel sheets state what 
has been delivered, though when looking at these sheets most of the organizations have 
reported information differently. Some identified delivery based on gender and the amount in 
dollars, whereas others reported numbers of refugees assisted, and what type of delivery they 
had received.  How can the humanitarian actors at field level compare data, when they use 
dissimilar methods of reporting?  Turner (1976) states that, when the information available is 
not supplementing what is needed to describe and handle the situation, it will create latent 
conditions. The informants in Lebanon stated that the most commonly shared information 
regarded what actors had done and not what they planned. As the information is about the 
past, it will not supplement the real-time information humanitarian actors are in need of. One 
informant stated the issue of not having comprehensive information about plans:  
 
…in terms of ongoing interventions, at least it is clear in ActivityInfo, Which is very clear 
about what has been done. In terms of plans it is more difficult to get comprehensive 
information, and that is where we have to move outside of coordination structures often, 
because people will talk about what they are doing and what they have done through formal 
structures, but there is no reporting on plans”(Country director, INGO).  
 
This informant stated that the information about what has been done is clear, but as there is no 
structure for sharing plans, they need to go outside the formal coordination structure. An IM 
from an UN agency further highlighted this; 
 
“…how do we use ActivityInfo for planning? It doesn’t, because it’s not a planning tool, it’s a 
reporting tool so it’s for UNHCR for ultimately have ability to say this is what we are doing, 
this is what we did, but it doesn’t help the partner figure out where should we go, how do we 
coordinate”. 
 
 
What the two informants are stating is that because ActivityInfo lacks the possibility to see 
what other organizations are planning and the interventions currently being performed, they 
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have to move outside of the formal coordination structure to seek information about this. This 
is in accordance with what several informants at field level expressed: that information 
sharing was conducted through random phone calls, sharing Excel sheets, and talking in 
meetings where possible. When the actors are partly unaware of where other organizations are 
working and what they are doing, this might be detrimental to what Rasmussen (1997) 
describes as a reliable feedback loop and instead turn the situation to what Turner (1976) calls 
latent conditions. During large-scale complex situations it is not possible to agree upon one 
single description of the situation, because everyone operates with differing sets of 
information and construct their own theories about the current situation and what needs to be 
done, thus further complicating the already complex situation (Turner, 1976). This is certainly 
the case in Lebanon where the actors conduct a massive amount of assessments in attempting 
to gain a situational overview and to create assistance consistent with the actual needs. 
Therefore, the question to ask is, why doesn't the massive amount of assessment create a 
reliable feedback loop whereby the activities performed meet the needs identified in the 
assessments, and thus reduce omissions? The empirical findings suggest that, as they operate 
with their own set of information and constructs their own theories, the complexity does not 
get reduced, but rather creates a chaotic relationship between the assessments done, planned 
activities and implementation.  
 
Rogers (2003) says that innovations are designed for instrumental actions and aim to reduce 
the uncertainty in order to achieve the desired result. In Lebanon the ICT systems seek to 
reduce the uncertainty by having a reliable linked process between needs covered and 
activities performed. Turner (1976), however, states that when an organization’s 
understanding of the world starts to differ from reality, they may find themselves in an 
incubation period, accumulating latent conditions. This might therefore be a reason for the 
ICT systems failing as an innovation, because the organizational frame that the ICT systems 
are innovated within differs from reality. The organizations may therefore find themselves in 
an incubation period without even noticing. As the ICT systems fail to match the needs in 
terms of information, many organizations go out in the field and perform their own 
assessments as a way of seeking control. One informant expressed the negative aspects of 
this:  
…that’s where the coordination have been weak at times. Asking too many people the same 
question, people seeing all these white cars come and do assessments, but they don’t see any 
result, so we have to be very careful that we manage that better and do not increase the 
expectations” (Legal assistance, INGO).  
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 In relation to the informant’s statement that organizations are conducting too many 
assessments. Kruke & Olsen (2011) assert that when working in a chaotic environment it is 
difficult to create situational awareness. As there is no standardized way of performing 
assessments in Lebanon the possibility to create situational awareness is impeded. Turner 
(1976) claims that when there is no standardized or structured process between dissemination 
and collective interpretation of information it results in information being unintentionally 
distorted. When the actors control their own operations through their own ICT systems, it 
obstructs what Rasmussen (1997) considers to be a reliable and holistic feedback loop of 
information. Complexity makes relevant information a scarce resource and the cost of 
obtaining one set of information is added to the cost of another, thus limiting the possibility of 
having full control of the situation (Turner, 1976). This is clearly the case in Lebanon where 
the humanitarian actors are more preoccupied with collecting their own information than 
doing so collectively.  
6.3.3 The beneficiaries  
Turner (1976) states that when existing danger signs are not perceived, given low priority or 
as a source of disagreement, or even considered insignificant, the possibility for accumulation 
of events that lead to a disaster may happen. The implementation of activities was, as the 
empirical findings show, not always performed on the basis of actual needs in the field. The 
refugees expressed deep concerns over the massive amount of assessments performed when 
never seeing any results. They also stated that they felt disrespected and neglected, as the aid 
workers would not assess all refugees in their informal settlements - generally the camp leader 
had to speak for the entire camp. Given that the refugees had different needs, the camp leaders 
were not therefore able to state all of these. Additionally, the assessments performed are based 
on each aid organization’s standardized set of questions, and this did not enable the refugees 
to state their own needs freely. The humanitarian actors failed to realize that collecting 
extensive amount of information for their own purpose only decrease the possibility of having 
common strategies. 
 
One of the ITSs visibly demonstrated that the response mechanism had failed to identify the 
actual needs of the refugees. Instead of being providing school equipment, the refugees 
should have received more urgent packages such as winterization kits, medicine and 
treatments for illnesses. This indicates that the understanding of what is needed by the 
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humanitarian organizations differs from the reality, or, at least, that the way of operating the 
assessments, activities and implementation of interventions did not function as intended.  All 
informants except the NGOs and MoSA emphasize this, stating that the ICT systems they had 
internally or externally were supposed to enable them to target the most vulnerable. The 
winterization kits were intended to be given to the most vulnerable living in high altitude. In 
practice however, when visiting one ITS in a low altitudes, and one in high altitude, the 
opposite was true. While the mattresses in the low altitude areas were given out due to winter 
coming to an end, the ITS in the high altitude had received nothing even if they still had snow 
surrounding them. According to Rogers (1995) this can result in not being able to match the 
ICT systems to the defined problem, and, in such a manner, create what Turner (1976) calls 
latent conditions leading to an incubation period. 
 
 
One of the IM informants at UNHCR said that it was challenging to operate in Lebanon and 
that when doing targeted assistance: “you can never control who deserved to get this 
assistance and how fair it is and the most in need is the one that receives it”. The same 
informant did however stress that they did have a system intended to prevent these types of 
problems: “...We have a sort of mechanism to ensure that these targeted people are genuine 
cases, they come to registration and have an interview and then we have a home visits”.  The 
informant stresses the difficulties with assisting genuine cases, and, even though the response 
seeks to ensure a reliable mechanism to secure that the target refugees are the most 
vulnerable, it is not always possible. The massive amount of assessments performed by 
various organizations have resulted in one ITS now refusing humanitarian actors to enter and 
conduct assessments. The camp leaders said the following: “I have said to them that they 
cannot come here anymore for assessments. Because they just do assessments, and we never 
not even once, have seen any results from this. We have so many needs and this camp receive 
nothing”.  This informant stated that their needs have still not been covered, even though 
innumerable assessments had been performed. MoSA also stated that they would start to 
demand results in specific sectors for every organizations intending to go into the field to 
perform assessments. One of the informants from MoSA also said that the response usually 
reacted after an incident occurred, but that this was too late as lives were already lost due to 
the lack of emergency preparedness. Responding after a crisis has occurred suggests that the 
actors are not able to anticipate and predict dangers before the damage is done (Wildavsky, 
1991). This may be due to the fact that the actors lack competence in working in a fast-paced 
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environment (Rasmussen, 1997) because of their limited ability to recognize and analyze 
changes in the surroundings (Reason, 1997). In Lebanon, the possibility to improve 
information management in the response and reduce hazards in the refugees living 
environment is thus not a matter of the technology, but how the actors from all levels use it. 
This will affect the relationship between the assessments, the planned activities and the 
implementation of interventions, and how this could potentially be a continuously holistic 
feedback loop of information. In contrast, how they use it relies on the users’ expertise and 
access to the technology, as well as the creation of systematic and standardized procedures for 
implementation.  
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7.0 Conclusion 
This thesis’ purpose is to answer the following research problem: How do ICT systems 
contribute to reliable information management in the humanitarian response in Lebanon?  To 
answer the research problem two field studies have been conducted using explorative and 
abductive approaches in the social actors’ natural settings, in order to present the social 
actors’ understanding of the humanitarian response. The empirical findings are seen in 
connection to the theoretical stance adopted in this thesis. The chapter presents the most 
pertinent aspects found in the discussion of each research question, and, cumulatively, 
answers the research problem in order to produce a conclusion. The end of this chapter will 
present the suggestions for further research. 
 
How is the diffusion and adoption of ICT systems in Lebanon?  
 
This research has shown that even if the ICT systems are designed with the purpose of 
ensuring a reliable information management in the response, they have failed to do so in 
Lebanon. The official ICT systems are not compatible with the needs identified by the users 
on an operational level, which hampers the adoption and implementation of the centralized 
diffusion. The centralized diffusion is seen as a central part in the obstruction of the diffusion 
as the ICT systems were pushed downward in the system by the UN at national level, thus not 
enabling the adopters at operational level to modify its content to match their needs. This had 
resulted in massive development of innovations horizontally in the response on an operational 
level in order to have ICT systems compatible to their perceived needs and problems. As the 
official ICT systems were not diffused through decentralization, the re-invention of their own 
system has created a technological pull that negatively affected the success of the official ICT 
systems implementation and adoption in the organizations. 
  
How is the information processing among humanitarian actors in Lebanon?  
 
The purpose of the official ICT systems is to enhance the reliability in the information 
processing among all actors working in the response, however the systems are not compatible 
with the needs at the operational level. This is compounded by the lack of constant and 
structured information flow across levels and organizations. Moreover, there is a lack of 
standardized procedures for sharing information, with the ICT systems failing, to a certain 
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extent to fulfill their original purpose. The humanitarian organizations do not have a 
standardized and coherent way of sharing information, creating difficulties for the staff to 
know their role and with whom to share, what, and when. This is due to differential 
organizational bounded rationalities that form and obstruct the ability to ensure reliable 
external information processing. As the systems are produced by the social actors and their 
interpretations of the problems, in that each individual organization bases their interpretation 
on their own set of information collected for their organization, collective information 
processing fails. Therefore, the humanitarian actors in Lebanon fail to accomplish a holistic 
feedback loop between organizations horizontally and vertically through ICT systems in the 
humanitarian response. 
 
What is the relation between the assessments, the planned activities, and the 
implementation of interventions in the humanitarian response in Lebanon? 
 
Poor and fragmented external information processing among organizations, and official ICT 
systems that are not compatible with the users’ needs with regard to information have 
contributed to the conduction of numerous assessments. MoSA and the refugees are now 
denying organizations the opportunity to perform further assessments if they do not see any 
tangible results. As the implemented interventions are not always in accordance with the 
needs of the refugees, there is a disconnection between the assessment done and the planned 
activities. Because the feedback loop of information is not tightly coupled across levels and 
organizations, the humanitarian actors are not able to get a comprehensive situational 
overview of where the needs and gaps are, as there is exists no uniformed and standardized 
method of sharing information in terms of assessments and planned activities. This is further 
problematized when the organizations do not have a coherent understanding of what the 
assistance packages and reporting indicators should include, which may lead to duplication 
and gaps of aid and unreliable data in the official ICT systems. In addition, when all actors are 
trying to create an internal situational overview through their own ICT systems, the 
possibility of creating holistic feedback loop of reliable information vertically and 
horizontally among actors fails.  
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Main conclusion  
The overall conclusion to the research problem is that the ICT systems only partially 
contribute to reliable information management in the humanitarian response. First of all the 
systems are not implemented in ways that involve all actors and their stated needs. This 
hampers the possibility for reliable information processing, as there is no standardization for 
how to share information, and to whom and when. Secondly, the complex context has created 
an extensive need for more information, as well as the need for a clear, timely situational 
picture. As all actors operate with their own set of information, and construct their own 
theories, the complexity does not get reduced, but rather creates a chaotic relationship 
between the assessments done, planned activities and the implementation of interventions.  
Regardless, this is due to disparate organizational practices that influence the information 
management over ICT systems negatively. Ultimately ICT systems cannot solve the 
fragmented organizational structures that exists in the humanitarian system, as they are not 
able to jointly anticipate the unexpected flow of all events, and therefore the capacity to cope 
with these events after they have become manifested may be challenging in the reflexive 
environment. This further hampers the possibility for the official ICT systems to ensure 
reliable information management in the humanitarian response in Lebanon.  
  
 Further research  
 
The findings of this thesis suggest that using ICT systems to create reliability in a 
humanitarian response has numerous challenges. This is not limited to the adoption 
(compatible to the needs of the users) and implementation of the ICT systems (training, 
access to equipment), but also the organizational structure and the lack of standardized ways 
of operating the ICT systems. 
 
The user-developer relationship should be further examined. If the ICT systems are developed 
in accordance with what the users need, it is more likely that the majority of the organizations 
will adopt and implement the ICT systems fully. This will enhance the possibility of having 
one system across all organizations. The initiation phase should be explored in order to 
prevent technological solutions being developed that aren’t in accordance to the actual 
technological needs. 
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Additionally, further research on how the organizations could potentially strive for a common 
and standardized way of operating should be prioritized. The findings in this thesis suggest 
that ICT systems will not provide the humanitarian actors with what is needed until they can 
agree upon a common and standardized way of operation. If humanitarian actors at the 
strategic level can develop a set of common operational standards, the ICT systems have an 
increased possibility of fulfilling its purpose.  
 
The beneficiaries of the humanitarian response should be able to identify their own needs. 
Therefore, further research about how ICT systems could be adapted in ways that enable the 
beneficiaries to do this should be conducted. During the data collection period, several 
informants stressed the effects ICT systems had on human interaction. It is therefore 
significant to examine how the aid delivered through technology is replacing human contact: 
how this influences the beneficiaries with respect to the need for empathy and human 
sympathy when living in unsecure living conditions.  
 
As the humanitarian response in Lebanon is working through SWG, further research should 
be conducted in a context where the Cluster approach is implemented and practiced, in order 
to see if the information management through ICT systems have an increased possibility of 
providing reliability through the Cluster structure. Especially in a humanitarian emergency 
where ActivityInfo and RAIS is implemented as official ICT systems. 
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Appendix A – Interview guide 
Interview guide national level - UN, INGO, NGO. 
 
Organization:     Date: 
Background:     Age: 
Position:     Gender: 
 
 
COORDINATION AND INFORMATION SHARING  
 
1) How is your sector structured, and what is your part within this sector?  
 
2) Who do you co-operate with within you sector? 
 
3) What information is shared on your coordination meetings? 
 
4) What is your view of the information sharing within you sector? 
 
5) If people don’t share information, what do you think the reason is for not sharing? 
 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS  
 
6) Do you use ActivityInfo? 
    If yes- what is the value of the information shared here for your organization? 
    If yes- does ActivityInfo influence the coordination between agencies? 
    If no- why not? 
 
7) Have you heard about UNDPs program Atlas? 
     If yes- are you going to use it?  
      If no- why not?  
 
8) What type of technology solutions can contribute to better coordination between agencies? 
 
9) Do you think it is possible to have one national technological program for coordination?      
    And what is needed for this to be possible? 
 
10) What challenges exist when using technology within coordination? 
 
11) Do you use other types of technology for inter-agency coordination? 
       If yes- does it contribute to better information sharing? 
 
12) What are the benefits and challenges with using technology to share information and        
        manage coordination?   
 
13) What is your view of not having cluster approach here in Lebanon, and what do you think     
       is the main difference between clusters and sectors? 
 
14) What are your main concerns regarding the humanitarian response in Lebanon? 
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Interview guide for national level – MoSA   
Organization:     Date: 
Background:     Age: 
Position:     Gender: 
 
 
1) Can you short tell us about the Ministry of Social Affairs?  
 
2) What are your concerns about the situation in Lebanon now?  
 
3) What is the UN agencies position in the current situation in Lebanon?  
 
 
INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION 
 
 
4) How do you co-operate with the UN in practice?  
 
5) Do you co-operate with the NGOs and INGOs?  
 
6) Are you familiar with UNHCR’s ActivityInfo?  
 
7) What is your role in the UNDP’s new program of MRP and financial tracking?  
 
8) Do you apply to technological systems for information sharing and coordination in this 
response?  
 
9) Who do you identify as the main actors in this response?  
 
10) What challenges are you facing within coordination in the humanitarian response? 
 
11) What kind of information do you receive from other key actors in the response?  
 
12) Do you feel included by the UN in the response mechanism?  
 
13) What sectors do you co-lead?  
 
14) What are your thoughts of coordination meetings here?  
 
15) How would you classify the information sharing between you and the UN, INGOs, NGOs 
and municipalities?   
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Interview guide for field level – field officers, MoSA 
 
 
Organization:     Date: 
Background:     Age: 
Position:     Gender:   
1) What is your position and role in MoSA? 
 
2) What is your position in the response?  
 
 
INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION 
 
 
3) How is the coordination structure at field level?  
 
4) What challenges do you meet in the field?  
 
5) What are your thoughts of the new response plan 2015-16?  
 
6) How do you co-operate with the UN, INGOs and NGOs?  
 
7) What are your thoughts on the assessments done by humanitarian organizations?  
 
8) What are your concerns here in the field?  
 
9) Do you work with the IM and focal points from the humanitarian organizations?  
 
10) Do you attend any official meetings in the response?  
 
11) What are your thoughts on the information sharing in the field?  
 
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
 
12) What technological systems do you use?  
 
13) Have you heard of UNHCR’s ActivityInfo, and are you using it? 
 
14) Have you heard about UNDP’s new program Atlas?  
 
15) Do you report to the UN?  
 
16) What kind of technology are you in the field need of?  
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Appendix B - List of informants 
 
No. Organization Description 
1 UNHCR Information manager 
2 UNHCR Information manager 
3 UNHCR Distribution worker 
4 UNHCR Sector lead 
5 UNHCR Sector lead 
6 UNHCR Sector lead 
7 UN agency Sector lead 
8 UN agency Information manager  
9 UN agency Information manager 
10 UN agency Head of office 
11 UN agency Head of office 
12 UN agency Humanitarian affairs officer 
13 INGO Legal advisor 
14 INGO Information manager 
15 INGO Information manager 
16 INGO Information manager 
17 INGO Information manager 
18 INGO Information manager 
19 INGO Information manager 
20 INGO Information manager 
21 INGO Country director 
22 INGO Country director 
23 INGO Country director 
24 INGO Country coordinator 
25 INGO Field worker 
26 INGO Field worker 
27 INGO Field worker 
28 INGO Field worker 
29 INGO Field worker 
30 INGO Project quality coordinator 
31 INGO technological tools  Country director  
32 NGO Country director 
33 NGO Country director 
34 NGO Country coordinator 
35 NGO Refugee field worker 
36 NGO Refugee field worker 
37 NGO Field worker 
38 NGO Field worker 
39 NGO Field worker 
40 NGO Field worker 
41 NGO Information manager field 
42 NGO Program implementer 
43 NGO Program implementer 
44 NGO Unit coordinator 
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45 NGO Doctor 
46 NGO Program coordinator field 
47 NGO Program coordinator field 
48 MoSA Director general in charge 
49 MoSA Focal point field 
50 MoSA Field coordinator 
51 MoSA Field coordinator 
52 MoSA Field worker 
53 MoSA Field worker 
54 MoSA Field worker 
56 Municipality Mayor 
57 Municipality Mayor 
58 Norwegian company Lawyer 
59 Provider of ICT tools Developer 
60 Refugee Camp leader 
61 Refugee Camp leader 
62 Refugee Male 
63 Refugee Male 
64 Refugee Female 
65 Refugee Female 
66 Refugee Female 
67 Refugee Female 
68 Refugee Female 
69 Refugee Female 
70 Refugee Female 
71 Refugee Female 
72 Local population Military general 
73 Local population University professor 
74 Local population Store manager 
75 Local population Taxi driver for INGOs 
76 Local population Hezbollah soldier 
77 Local population Hezbollah soldier  
78 UNIFIL  Previous UNIFIL soldier 
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